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WILEY RUTLEDGE, EXECUTIVE DETENTION, 
AND JUDICIAL CONSCIENCE AT WAR 
CRAIG GREEN*
Judicial biography has never been more popular than it is today, nor 
more politically relevant. Felix Frankfurter as a law professor announced 
the need for full-length stories of Supreme Court Justices “to rescue the 
Court from the limbo of impersonality.”1 “Until we have penetrating 
studies of the influence of these men,” he wrote, “we shall not have an 
adequate history of the Supreme Court, and, therefore, of the United 
States.”2 Frankfurter’s call has been answered for many jurists,3 yet even 
fifty years after Wiley Rutledge died, there was no adequate account of 
Frankfurter’s colleague, leaving modern readers with little to no 
impression of Justice Rutledge or his work.4
 * Assistant Professor, Temple University’s Beasley Law School; J.D., Yale Law School. Many 
thanks to John Ferren, David Hoffman, Duncan Hollis, Louis H. Pollak, and Neil Siegel for invaluable 
help with previous drafts, and to Kathryn Davidson, Joshua D’Ancona, and Carolyn Small for 
exceptional research assistance. This Article is dedicated, with deepest gratitude and respect, to Louis 
H. Pollak.  
 1. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WHITE 6 
(1937) [hereinafter FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE]. Frankfurter claimed that “[a] full-length 
analysis of only two or three of the seventy-eight Supreme Court Justices has been attempted.” Id. 
That appraisal was exaggerated when written. See, e.g., ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN 
MARSHALL (1916); WILLIAM GARRETT BROWN, THE LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH (1905); FRANK 
MONAGHAN, JOHN JAY: DEFENDER OF LIBERTY (1935); JAMES PIKE, CHIEF JUSTICE CHASE (1873); 
BERNARD STEINER, LIFE OF ROGER BROOK TANEY: CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT (1922); CARL BRENT SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW (1930). 
Frankfurter himself also contributed to the field. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES 
(1937); cf. MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS (Felix Frankfurter ed., 1932). 
 2. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, supra note 1, at 6. 
 3. If any “impersonality” continues to cloak modern Courts, it does not owe to a dearth of 
biographies. For recent examples, see DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER 
WHITE: A PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE (1998); JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JUSTICE LEWIS F. 
POWELL, JR. (1994); BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM O. 
DOUGLAS (2003); ANDREW PEYTON THOMAS, CLARENCE THOMAS: A BIOGRAPHY (2001); JUAN 
WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY (1998); TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, 
MR. JUSTICE BLACK AND HIS CRITICS (1988); TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, DAVID HACKETT SOUTER: 
TRADITIONAL REPUBLICAN ON THE REHNQUIST COURT (2005). See also LIVA BAKER, FELIX 
FRANKFURTER (1969); J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., MR. JUSTICE MURPHY: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 
(1968); ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: 
PILLAR OF THE LAW (1956); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE (1946); 
ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY (1994); TINSLEY E. YARBOUGH, JOHN MARSHALL 
HARLAN: GREAT DISSENTER OF THE WARREN COURT (1992). 
 4. The only book-length treatment of Rutledge before John Ferren’s was FOWLER V. HARPER, 
JUSTICE RUTLEDGE AND THE BRIGHT CONSTELLATION (1965), which does not aspire to true biography 
and is of varied quality. Until recently, the best sources on Rutledge were two essays, John Paul 
Stevens, Mr. Justice Rutledge, in MR. JUSTICE 319 (Allison Dunham & Phillip B. Kurland eds., 1956), 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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John Ferren’s Salt of the Earth, Conscience of the Court is the first full 
biography of Rutledge, and the book not only lifts Rutledge from 
obscurity’s shadow; it also dispels any “limbo” surrounding the Court he 
served.5 Part I of this Article offers a brief biographical sketch showing 
that Rutledge deserves that much. His pre-judicial life as dean, legal 
reformer, and advocate of progressive politics provides context for his 
work on the bench. Also, Rutledge’s tale illuminates broader issues, 
including FDR’s transformative judicial appointments, early twentieth-
century legal education, and the New Deal’s influence on both. Students of 
history, and especially students of the Court, will appreciate Ferren’s 
introduction to this unknown, important Justice. 
Part II shifts from the historical to the modern, analyzing the impact of 
Rutledge’s judicial work on today’s cases concerning executive detention. 
In recent Supreme Court litigation, President Bush has claimed the power 
to detain individuals without judicial oversight, without criminal charges, 
and with at most hand-tailored military commissions to punish violations 
of the law of nations.6 Such issues might seem novel today, but they 
would not to Rutledge. The most important cases of his era concerned the 
executive’s authority to detain. And Rutledge’s career, more than that of 
any other judge, exemplifies the challenges and mistakes affecting the rule 
of law in wartime. 
Three pairs of “old” and “new” cases illustrate Rutledge’s modern 
relevance. First, a 1948 Rutledge opinion about habeas jurisdiction 
demonstrates the force of a certain style of legal reasoning.7 The calm, 
and Louis H. Pollak, Wiley Blount Rutledge: Profile of a Judge, in SIX JUSTICES ON CIVIL RIGHTS 177 
(Ronald D. Rotunda ed., 1983) [hereinafter Pollak, Profile of a Judge]. Also, the Indiana Law Journal 
and Iowa Law Review jointly published several memorial essays, Symposium, Mr. Justice Rutledge, 
25 IND. L.J. 421 (1950); and Symposium, Mr. Justice Rutledge, 35 IOWA L. REV. 541 (1950); see also 
David M. Levitan, Mr. Justice Rutledge, 34 VA. L. REV. 393, 526 (1948); Louis H. Pollak, Wiley B. 
Rutledge, 1943–1949, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789–1993, 41 
(Clare Cushman ed., 1993); Landon G. Rockwell, Justice Rutledge on Civil Liberties, 59 YALE L.J. 27 
(1949). 
 5. JOHN M. FERREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT: THE STORY OF JUSTICE 
WILEY RUTLEDGE (2004). In describing how his book came about, Ferren explains that he long desired 
to write a full biography of “someone in our national political life.” Id. at 543. Ferren’s search for a 
subject led him to the Library of Congress’s Assistant Chief of Manuscripts, who “immediately” 
named Wiley Rutledge as someone who had escaped due attention, and “whose papers, he assured me, 
contained a book worth writing.” Id. Ferren also identified Professor Andrew L. Kaufman of Harvard 
Law School as supporting the choice of Rutledge. Id. 
 6. See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (addressing military 
commissions); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (addressing indefinite detention without 
charges); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (addressing federal jurisdiction over executive detainees 
in Guantanamo Bay). 
 7. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 194 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss1/3
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technical, value-laden analysis of Rutledge’s opinion did not persuade his 
colleagues at the time, but the Court decades later adopted Rutledge’s 
approach in the wartime detention context that concerned him most.8 
Second, Rutledge was the decisive fifth conference vote to support the 
government in Korematsu v. United States.9 Korematsu, and its precursor 
Hirabayashi v. United States,10 show the immense dangers of “small” 
judicial errors regarding executive power. My thesis is that analysis of 
Rutledge’s role not only transforms those cases’ meaning; it also offers a 
crucial benchmark for modern efforts in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld to avoid 
“another Korematsu.”11 Third, Rutledge’s most famous opinion concerned 
limits on presidential authority to try defendants in military commissions, 
and the Court revisited that same issue in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.12 
Rutledge’s analysis yields singular perspective in discerning what 
Hamdan did, and what we might expect in future executive detention 
cases. Given the ongoing coincidence of legal issues between Rutledge’s 
time and ours, lessons from his success and failure may be more valuable 
than ever. 
Part III connects Rutledge’s life and Ferren’s book to the deepest issues 
underlying any judicial biography—namely, what judges should do and 
who they should be. Consider why judicial biographies are read in the first 
place. Compared to politicians, movie stars, generals, and other 
“biographees,” judges fill their lives with plodding, sedentary events that 
do not produce a gripping read. The unacknowledged appeal of judicial 
biographies, however, is the light that their subjects’ stories cast on 
general issues of judging and judicial role. In our legal culture, biography 
is a repository for stories about “great” and “villainous” judges. These 
stories shape the context of modern judicial performance and, in turn, how 
such performance is itself judged. 
Using the genre of judicial biography to build and store legal icons has 
undeniable benefits, but it also carries risks. To maximize public currency, 
biographies typically describe only judges who served the Court for 
decades and who radically reformed some field of (preferably 
constitutional) law. Against that tradition, Ferren’s book introduces a 
judge who meets neither criterion. Insofar as Rutledge is a distinctive 
 8. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466. 
 9. 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944). 
 10. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 11. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507. 
 12. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 1606 (2006) 
(No. 05-184). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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“type” of judge and a role model for judicial behavior, Ferren’s book 
invites us to reevaluate how judicial heroes are chosen for study and 
celebration. Such questions are especially important today, as Justices join 
the Court and define new approaches to the nation’s great legal work. 
In the final analysis, I suggest that judicial biography—done well, at 
the right time—can focus much-needed attention on questions of judicial 
role. And although the character and talents of judges are always 
important, they are distinctively so under the pressures of our War on 
Terror. It may be plain good luck that Ferren has written such a fine book 
about such a fine judge at this moment, when judicial excellence is at an 
undeniable premium. As a legal community, let us make the most of it. 
I. AN ALL-AMERICAN JURIST 
Before considering Rutledge’s work as a judge, some readers may 
appreciate certain pre-judicial details that affected his life in the law.13 In 
1894, the boy who became Justice Rutledge was born to a Southern 
Baptist preacher and a mother who died of tuberculosis nine years later. 
After living with his father and other relatives in Kentucky, North 
Carolina, and Tennessee, Rutledge studied at the small Maryville College, 
where he joined the Law Club and undertook public debates and oratory. 
Rutledge was an outgoing student who earned social respect and academic 
success, especially in the humanities. Before his senior year, however, 
Rutledge transferred to the University of Wisconsin to focus on chemistry, 
which he hoped would produce a better career than, for example, law. 
Fortunately, Rutledge was no great chemist. After graduation, he 
studied shorthand and moved to Bloomington, Indiana, to take law classes 
in the morning and teach high school in the afternoon. After three 
semesters, the double-shifts proved unmanageable. Because Rutledge 
could not afford to be a full-time student, he moved again and taught high 
school in eastern Indiana. 
In 1916, a twenty-two-year-old Rutledge was diagnosed with 
tuberculosis and sought treatment in North Carolina. The next eight 
 13. Discussion in this Part draws heavily upon Ferren, supra note 5, at 13–31 (describing 
Rutledge as a youth and collegian); id. at 31–38 (treatment and teaching in New Mexico); id. at 38–51 
(law school and private practice); id. at 51–52 (teaching at the University of Colorado); id. at 55–80 
(teaching at Washington University); id. at 81–83, 100–30 (teaching at the University of Iowa); id. at 
137–50 (consideration for Justice Cardozo’s vacancy); id. at 151–70 (consideration for Justice 
Brandeis’s vacancy); id. at 173–207 (work on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia); id. at 
208–21 (nomination to the Supreme Court); id. at 222–415 (work on the Supreme Court); and id. at 
416–22 (death and memorials). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss1/3
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months could have been isolating; instead, Rutledge’s impulse toward 
interpersonal contact introduced him to people from all walks of life, with 
more serious ailments than his own. After his inpatient treatment ended, 
Rutledge’s weak health barred him from military service and almost kept 
him out of the public schools. Nonetheless, Rutledge married his lifelong 
love (a former Maryville teacher) and moved to New Mexico to teach high 
school in a climate congenial to his recovery. Rutledge’s wife also taught, 
and the young couple saved to complete Rutledge’s education, which he 
compared to “a house, built to the roof, the rafters laid . . . but there’s no 
top.”14
In 1920, Rutledge began law school at the University of Colorado in 
Boulder while also teaching high school. This time, he flourished in both 
capacities. Professor Herbert Hadley, Missouri’s former Governor and 
Attorney General, was so impressed that he let Rutledge as a third-year 
student teach much of a first-year criminal law class. After graduation, 
Rutledge joined a local firm and became a father. Two years later, 
Professor Hadley left Colorado to be chancellor at Washington University 
in St. Louis; another professor followed, and Rutledge filled the latter’s 
vacancy. Rutledge soon earned reports of “very considerable success” as a 
teacher, and although Rutledge’s expertise was in corporations and 
business law, he spent several years “teaching around the curriculum,” as 
was common practice in those days.15
In 1926, Chancellor Hadley invited Rutledge to teach law at 
Washington University. Rutledge accepted not only for “usual 
considerations of advancement,” but also so his family (now with a second 
child) could be closer to relatives.16 In St. Louis, Rutledge joined an 
institution in flux. The law school’s faculty was of mixed quality, its move 
to “case method” instruction was overdue, its students were 
undercredentialed, its finances were limited, and the Association of 
American Law Schools (“AALS”) had imposed a two-year probation for 
poor performance. Rutledge nonetheless excelled as one of the school’s 
best, hardest, and fairest teachers. For example, Rutledge would slam his 
book shut and leave class if students were unprepared, but many viewed 
him as the most outstanding professor they ever met and a man of great 
character. Four years after arriving in St. Louis, Rutledge—at age thirty-
 14. Id. at 34. 
 15. Id. at 51–52. 
 16. Id. at 52. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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seven—became dean, and eighty percent of the graduating class petitioned 
the board of directors to support that appointment.17
Rutledge’s deanship from 1930 to 1935 was impressive. He 
restructured law review admissions to improve student writing and access. 
He organized lectureships integrating law and social science.18 He raised 
admission standards, consolidated the curriculum, expanded ethics 
instruction, began a legal aid clinic, started a master of laws degree, 
bolstered the school’s thesis requirement, and strengthened synergies 
between the law school, lawyers, and social workers. Progress was by no 
means universal; for example, Rutledge did not publicly challenge his 
university’s racial segregation, nor did he commit to increasing women’s 
enrollment.19 Still, Dean Rutledge led the law school many steps forward, 
and in doing so he attracted attention in academic circles and beyond. 
In addition to his parental responsibilities (now with three children), 
Rutledge was active in St. Louis public life and advocated legal reforms 
such as criminal code revision, the use of women jurors, access to criminal 
defense, and apolitical bar standards. Rutledge worked with St. Louis’s 
Social Justice Commission, which sought to reduce racial and religious 
tensions, and was a director of the St. Louis Civil Liberties Committee. On 
the national stage, Rutledge was a member of the AALS, the American 
Law Institute, and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws.20
The issue that most drew Rutledge’s attention was child labor, which 
had increased rates of illiteracy, accidents, and tuberculosis as the Great 
Depression worsened. The Supreme Court twice invalidated statutes 
restricting child labor,21 and many lawyers (including the American Bar 
Association’s President) opposed populist efforts to annul such rulings by 
 17. Id. at 66. 
 18. In Rutledge’s day, interdisciplinary work was a politically progressive “alternative” to the 
formalism that made Langdell famous. See generally FERREN, supra note 5, at 87–89 (comparing 
Rutledge’s legal philosophy to Roscoe Pound’s). 
 19. From 1896 through the late 1940s, Washington University, including the law school, was 
completely segregated by race. Indeed, in 1947, the law school rejected a donor’s grant to the 
scholarship fund because the donor demanded a color-blind admissions policy. Id. at 72. 
 20. One significant social activity for Rutledge was the “Public Question Club,” a group of 
professionals that discussed issues from economics to football, philosophy, science, politics, and 
drama. Such talks led Rutledge to refine not only his public speaking, but his private thinking as well. 
In particular, Ferren suggests that these meetings fed Rutledge’s skepticism of religious dogma and 
racial barriers. Id. at 72–73 (identifying Rutledge’s wife as another important influence on Rutledge’s 
racial views). 
 21. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss1/3
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constitutional amendment.22 Rutledge’s attacks on child labor were broad 
and vehement: 
Social progress . . . is faced constantly with the three hurdles of 
so-called “natural rights,” “state rights,” and “republican 
institutions.” . . . [These] are the sheep’s wool in which the 
institution of human slavery was legally clothed; the guise under 
which . . . trusts sought . . . to establish monopoly; . . . the basis 
upon which workmen’s compensation acts, minimum wage laws, 
laws regulating hours of labor, and all other forms of legislation in 
the public interest have been resisted. Nowhere have these hoary 
philosophies been more effectively employed than in tying the 
hands of the federal government in the protection of children.23
Missouri never did ratify the Child Labor Amendment, but Rutledge’s 
speeches showcased his commitment to broad federal power and his 
opposition to contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
In 1935, Rutledge left St. Louis to become dean at the University of 
Iowa. Though the move owed mainly to disputes among other Washington 
University administrators, the result raised Rutledge’s profile and gave 
him an academic home with more resources and talent, albeit less open to 
internal change.24 Rutledge continued to succeed as a teacher, and he 
pursued extracurricular activities as before, including many speeches to 
social organizations, and continued service to the National Conference on 
Uniform State Laws. Rutledge also drafted an AALS report criticizing 
inadequate legal services for unemployed persons and the bar’s “almost 
appalling apathy and indifference” to providing effective legal aid; the 
report concluded that “[n]o legal system can survive . . . [when] so large a 
proportion of the general population” is ignored.25 At the state level, 
Rutledge proposed changing bar standards and “unauthorized practice” 
rules to increase indigent persons’ access to laymen and nonlegal experts. 
Perhaps Rutledge’s most controversial activity was his support for 
FDR’s “court-packing plan,” which would have added fifty judges to the 
 22. FERREN, supra note 5, at 74–76. 
 23. Id. at 75. 
 24. For example, when Rutledge sought to increase interdisciplinary and clinical education, the 
faculty assented to adding only one “judicial process” class, which was taught by Rutledge himself. Id. 
at 104–05. 
 25. Id. at 120. Some law school deans did not welcome the unapologetic tenor of Rutledge’s 
draft. See id. at 121 (quoting the University of Illinois’s dean, who called the report “too contentious,” 
and Yale’s dean, who predicted it would “probably offend not merely the lawyers, but also the law 
teachers. . . . [Y]ou would be well advised to change the tone of the report quite considerably.”). But 
see id. (quoting other deans’ support for the draft as “splendid” in its “provocative character”). 
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federal bench, including six Supreme Court Justices, wherever existing 
judges were seventy years old with ten years of service.26 Rutledge shared 
other intellectuals’ concerns about overwhelming the Judiciary, but he 
viewed the Court as unbearably resistant to legislation addressing 
underconsumption, employment displacement, land planning, 
conservation, social security, and other urgent issues. Illustrating his 
flexible view of constitutional structure, Rutledge characterized the 
Court’s cases as threatening “basic principles of national democracy,” 
possibly risking “another Dred Scott situation.”27 Rutledge concluded that 
if States like Missouri would not correct the Court’s errors through 
constitutional provisions like the Child Labor Amendment,28 a change in 
judicial personnel was the only feasible option.29
Although Rutledge agreed to support court-packing plan by testifying 
before Congress,30 the Court displaced any need for such testimony—and 
for the proposal itself—by suddenly changing direction. Even as 
legislative hearings began in March 1937, the Court effectively reversed a 
one-year-old precedent to uphold a state minimum wage law; in April, the 
Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act; and in May, it upheld the 
Social Security Act.31 Given such profound jurisprudential shifts, 
Congress was ultimately content to offer septuagenarian Justices with ten 
years’ service the option of full-salary retirement.32
Roosevelt thus failed to reorganize the Court’s institutional structure, 
but he did influence that organ by appointing eight Justices.33 Rutledge 
was considered several times among FDR’s nominees, first as a successor 
 26. Judiciary Reorganization Bill of 1937, S. 1392, 62d Cong. (1937). See generally, e.g., 
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN 
THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 133–34 (1995) (describing the court-packing plan in more detail). 
 27. FERREN, supra note 5, at 124. 
 28. See id. at 76–77 (describing the amendment movement’s failure). 
 29. Even in such seemingly dire circumstances, Rutledge did not support other proposals to rein 
in the Supreme Court, such as requiring a supermajority of Justices to invalidate legislation, or 
granting Congress general constitutional authority to reenact statutes that the Court struck down. Id. at 
127. 
 30. This willingness to support the court-packing proposal set Rutledge in opposition to the dean 
of the University of Michigan Law School, a fact which was reported in the Des Moines Register, 
again emphasizing Rutledge’s pro-Roosevelt views. Id. at 127–28. 
 31. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (distinguishing Morehead v. New York 
ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936), and upholding a state minimum wage law); NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act); Steward Mach. 
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding the Social Security Act); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 
619 (1937) (upholding the Social Security Act). 
 32. Supreme Court Retirement Act, 28 U.S.C. § 375 (1937). 
 33. One of those, Justice James F. Byrnes, served for only sixteen months before resigning to 
direct Roosevelt’s Office of Economic Stabilization. FERREN, supra note 5, at 206–08. 
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to Justice Cardozo in 1938.34 Irving Brant, a Democratic writer from St. 
Louis,35 brought Rutledge to Roosevelt’s attention partly due to 
Rutledge’s views on child labor and legal reform. Brant saw in Rutledge a 
young, liberal thinker who could combine interpersonal skills, legal 
talents, and perseverance to “win over” the Court’s moderate and 
conservative members. 
The frontrunner for Cardozo’s seat, however, was the brilliant 
Professor Felix Frankfurter, whom even Brant preferred. Frankfurter’s 
candidacy was blocked only by pressures to nominate a “westerner,” and 
to avoid (or appease) anti-semitic sentiment about appointing a second 
Jewish Justice.36 Brant therefore endorsed Rutledge as a second-best 
option, or perhaps for future vacancies. Describing Iowa’s dean as a man 
of “extreme modesty and simplicity,” Brant added that “[h]e has met what 
I regard as the one and only absolute test of liberalism—he has been a 
liberal in conservative communities and against all counterpressures, when 
all logical prospect of gain to himself, and all social factors, ran in the 
other direction.”37 Rutledge unknowingly confirmed praise of his humility 
by writing Brant that Frankfurter would be “an ideal selection,” and that 
geography should be irrelevant because there was not “anyone west of the 
Mississippi that I know who would be even within close distance to 
Frankfurter on the basis of qualifications, with the possible exception of 
[Fifth Circuit Judge] Hutcheson of Texas.”38
Brant and other Rutledge supporters, including faculty and luminaries 
from the St. Louis and Iowa bar, buoyed Rutledge as an alternative to 
Frankfurter throughout a long nomination process. When Frankfurter was 
finally chosen, Rutledge advocates looked forward to other vacancies, and 
they did not wait long, as Justice Brandeis retired just weeks after 
Frankfurter was confirmed. Although Rutledge was seriously considered 
for Brandeis’s vacancy, he was again passed over. This time, Roosevelt 
chose William O. Douglas for the Supreme Court and placed Rutledge on 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 
 34. Before the Cardozo vacancy, Roosevelt appointed Hugo Black to succeed Willis Van 
Devanter, and Stanley Reed to succeed George Sutherland. Id. at 131–37. 
 35. Notable among Brant’s writings is a six-volume biography of James Madison. 1 IRVING 
BRANT, JAMES MADISON (1941). The later volumes were published in 1948, 1950, 1953, 1956, and 
1961. 
 36. President Hoover had overcome the latter objection when he appointed Cardozo to a Court 
where Louis Brandeis also served. FERREN, supra note 5, at 139. 
 37. Id. at 143. 
 38. Id. 
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In 1939, Rutledge began a decade of judicial service with “perhaps the 
most strenuous year” of his life.39 The many causes of Rutledge’s stress 
included his penchant for long writing, his academic curiosity, his drive to 
maintain personal ties and correspondence, his close attention to cases’ 
factual records, his insistence on teaching summer school, and the inherent 
demands of the court he served. Serving double- and triple-duty was 
nothing new to Rutledge, and he seldom let his judicial work curtail 
outside commitments. For example, he continued to speak nationwide 
about legal services for indigent populations. Rutledge also helped a 
young Herbert Wechsler restructure the federal personnel system, and he 
served on the National Railway Labor Panel, which provided advice when 
mediation could not resolve disputes affecting war efforts. Continuing his 
efforts toward populist reform, Rutledge floated a proposal to amend the 
District of Columbia’s government and grant residents congressional 
representation. 
When Rutledge joined the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia, that court had a unique docket, including appeals 
from federal district court, review petitions from administrative agencies, 
and appeals from municipal courts concerning contracts, torts, criminal 
law, family law, and the like.40 The court had six members, five of whom 
were Roosevelt appointees; four of the six were former academics, and 
two were staunch conservatives. Although Rutledge never said so, his 
experience on this small appellate court, with its diverse docket and 
divided membership, was a fine training ground for what would come 
next.41
While Rutledge served on the court of appeals, Roosevelt made four 
Supreme Court appointments, but Rutledge was not a serious candidate 
until James Byrnes’s resignation in 1943. Unlike previous occasions, 
Rutledge discouraged the President from appointing him to the Court, 
partly due to the job’s staggering workload.42 Three factors pushed the 
 39. Id. at 181. 
 40. See JEFFERY BRANDON MORRIS, CALMLY TO POISE THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF 
THE COURTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 85–109 (2001). 
 41. See Pollak, Profile of a Judge, supra note 4, at 183 (describing this period as a “substantial 
apprenticeship for . . . the Supreme Court”). 
 42. See, e.g., FERREN, supra note 5, at 209 (writing to a friend that a Supreme Court post would 
be undesirable because, “[w]hile I enjoy judging, I have had enough of it to know one has to make 
great sacrifices . . . . This includes giving up time with friends and family, foregoing many of the most 
pleasant associations in life, and grinding away at all hours of the day and night on hard, tough, legal 
knots.”); id. at 210 (writing to another friend, “For God’s sake, don’t do anything about stirring up the 
matter! I am uncomfortable enough as it is.”); id. (writing to Attorney General Francis Biddle, “I hope 
you will believe me when I say that I do not have Supreme Courtitis. . . . [T]he President should 
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other way. First, Attorney General Francis Biddle sought advice from 
Chief Justice Stone, Justice Black, and Justice Douglas, and each 
confirmed Rutledge as the best available option, with Black and Douglas 
expressing particular “enthusias[m].”43
Second, Biddle asked his assistant, Herbert Wechsler, to evaluate 
several candidates’ judicial work. Wechsler’s memorandum noted his 
earlier experience with Rutledge, but more importantly, the report offered 
a rare appraisal of judicial product without flattery or exaggeration.44 
Wechsler described Rutledge as having a “soundness of judgment, a 
searching mind, a properly progressive approach to legal issues, some 
mastery of phrase and style . . . and a dominating effort to answer all the 
problems in terms that will satisfy the litigant and his lawyer that their 
points have not been ignored.”45 Wechsler continued that “Rutledge’s 
most striking trait [is] his warm sense for real people as the ultimate 
concern of law and his awareness of what real people are like throughout 
this broad land.”46 And he stressed “constant evidence of the quality—so 
treasured in Holmes—of pointing [out] the implications of small things, if 
only by defining an underlying reason for a rule or a concealed principle 
of its growth.”47 Wechsler lastly noted that, in Rutledge’s cases, “[c]ivil 
liberty problems and review of administrative agencies . . . have been the 
major issues. His work leaves no . . . doubt that these values are safe in his 
hands. More than this, however, I think it shows independence of mind 
. . . . There is none of the easy factionalism to which so many liberals 
succumb.”48
The third factor supporting Rutledge’s nomination was Brant, who 
again coordinated a tireless campaign of endorsements from lawyers and 
politicians, and even made a visit to FDR himself. As before, Roosevelt 
was pressured to appoint a Justice from west of the Mississippi, and it is 
telling that, when FDR finally greeted Rutledge as his Supreme Court 
nominee, he said—to the boy from Kentucky, North Carolina, and 
appoint a Republican to this vacancy . . . . If [rumors about my Supreme Court nomination] should 
prove to be true I merely want to request that before any action is taken I be given an opportunity to 
talk with you.”) 
 43. Another candidate endorsed by sitting Justices was Learned Hand, who was thought too old 
for the post, especially given FDR’s insistence on young, vigorous Justices during his court-packing 
efforts. Id. at 213, 217. 
 44. Many characteristics identified in Wechsler’s private report are corroborated by Rutledge’s 
memorial eulogies. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4. 
 45. FERREN, supra note 5, at 215. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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Tennessee, the teacher from New Mexico and Colorado, the dean from 
Missouri and Iowa, and the judge from the District of Columbia—“Wiley, 
you have a lot of geography.”49
When Rutledge reached the Supreme Court in February 1943, his 
colleagues suffered serious interpersonal frictions, and matters soon 
worsened. Although seven of nine Justices were FDR appointees, Jackson 
and Frankfurter were conservatives who combined with Roberts and Reed 
to oppose the Court’s liberal wing (Murphy, Douglas, Black, Rutledge, 
and occasionally Stone).50 All ideological divisions, however, paled beside 
the conflicts over propriety and ethics during the Court’s next few years.51 
 49. Id. at 219. 
 50. Although Stone was nominated to the Court by Republican Calvin Coolidge in 1925, it was 
FDR who promoted him to Chief Justice. Stone voted with the more liberal Justices in rejecting 
Lochner-era substantive due process and in upholding congressional commerce power. However, “[i]n 
some of the most contested cases of his last years on the Bench involving civil liberties problems . . . 
Stone was on the side of restriction. . . . Stone’s lone dissent in the first Flag Salute case, . . . plus 
Stone’s very important intellectual contribution in the Carolene Products case, [have] tended to 
overemphasize the orientation of Stone’s views in matters of personal liberty.” John P. Frank, Harlan 
Fiske Stone: An Estimate, 9 STAN. L. REV. 621, 624 (1957). 
 51. A few examples may serve. See FERREN, supra note 5, at 272–83. In January 1944, someone 
leaked to the press that Rutledge could not decide how to vote in a pending administrative law case. 
Furious with the breach of confidence, Roberts demanded a meeting, and Frankfurter suggested that 
Murphy or Douglas was responsible. Both denied the charge, which in turn only exacerbated their 
existing dislike of Frankfurter. Roberts tried but failed to make Black disclose the leaker’s name, and 
Roberts thereafter refused to speak to any Justice except Frankfurter and Jackson, decrying the rest as 
“men without honor.” Id. at 272–77. 
 Frankfurter annoyed Black, Murphy, Douglas, and others with pedantry, condescension, and 
intracourt scheming. Douglas’s political ambitions were chronic irritants, as was his practice of taking 
summer recess before others’ opinions circulated. Many at the Court were unhappy that Jackson 
agreed to prosecute at the Nuremberg Trials without advising even Chief Justice Stone, especially 
because that departure shifted heavy burdens to others on the Court. Black and Jackson had a terrible 
dispute over whether Black should recuse himself from a case argued by his former law partner. That 
fight culminated in loud argument with pounded tables. Also, Black and Stone divided bitterly over the 
language of a proposed retirement letter to Roberts, resulting in no letter’s being sent. Id. at 279–83. 
 Ferren summarized the Court’s interpersonal relations when Chief Justice Stone died in 1946: 
“Jackson and Black were feuding. Douglas and Frankfurter were ignoring each other. Frankfurter and 
Murphy exhibited mutual disdain and, with Black, were still smarting after the [above press leak]. 
Jackson and Murphy continued to feel a mutual antipathy . . . . And tempers were smoldering since the 
fiasco surrounding Roberts’s resignation letter.” Id. at 325. As the President sought Stone’s successor, 
the press wrote that Black and Douglas would resign if Jackson were promoted to Chief, and that 
Jackson would resign if Black were chosen. When Truman nominated Fred Vinson, Jackson wrote a 
truly disgraceful letter from Nuremberg to the chairmen of the Senate and House Judiciary 
Committees, reporting that his fight with Black went beyond a “mere personal vendetta,” and struck at 
“the reputation of the court for nonpartisan and unbiased decision.” Id. at 328; see Dennis J. 
Hutchinson, The Jackson-Black Feud, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 203 (1989). 
 For other sources describing the Court’s conflicts during this period, see, for example, PETER 
IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE-INTERNMENT CASES 229 (1983) (“Frankfurter 
did not hide his contempt for [Black, Douglas, and Murphy], whom he collectively derided as ‘the 
Axis.’ . . . . Frankfurter reviled Douglas as ‘the most systematic exploiter of flattery I have ever 
encountered in my life.’”), and Frank, supra note 50, at 628 (noting that Stone “got on very happily 
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Such controversies are remarkable in their own right, but most important 
for this Article is the absence of bad behavior, and bad blood, on 
Rutledge’s part. Whether it was his temperament, his experience as dean 
(presiding over institutions where factiousness can be common), or 
something else, Rutledge kept his interjudicial relations, like his public 
opinions, free of vitriol and snipe, despite working closely with men 
sometimes afflicted by both.52
In terms of legal opinions, a full account of Rutledge’s contributions in 
such fields as religion, federalism, criminal procedure, and free speech is 
beyond this Article’s scope. Nonetheless, Ferren demonstrates that, despite 
Rutledge’s lack of seniority (and therefore limited assignments on the 
Court), he produced a highly distinguished record as a Justice. The 
“Roosevelt Court” had many distinguished judges—among the finest 
groups in history—yet Rutledge’s overall product compares well with any 
of his colleagues’ during that time. 
The temporal caveat, “during that time,” is important because Rutledge 
served the Court for only six years—shorter than any of his colleagues. In 
1947, Rutledge learned he had high blood pressure, which was not helped 
by his poor eating habits, heavy smoking, lack of exercise, and exhausting 
extrajudicial commitments. Clerks and family urged him to slow down, 
but in 1949, during the Court’s summer recess, a stroke caused Rutledge 
to collapse while driving, and he died a few weeks later at the age of fifty-
five. 
*  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * 
The foregoing sketch aims to reinforce the value of full-length 
biographies like Ferren’s. Any Rutledge opinion is the work of a 
professor, a New Dealer, a dean, a midwesterner, and someone who 
earned and granted near-universal personal respect. Rutledge’s career caps 
President Roosevelt’s efforts at “court-picking,” and it highlights legal 
issues that occupied the Court between Lochner’s death and Brown’s birth. 
Thus, although Ferren’s historical contribution is set in personal terms, his 
book is a valuable resource for all students of the Supreme Court’s 
significance. 
with Frankfurter before the professor became a justice, but thereafter . . . found his colleague very hard 
to take”; Stone effectively issued “a press release condemning Black; he described Jackson’s 
Nuremberg adventure . . . as a ‘high-grade lynching party’ and . . . expressed his complete 
disapprobation of that Justice’s conduct; he thought Murphy an incompetent . . . ; he thought Rutledge 
a lightweight, and . . . expressed low regard for . . . Roberts, culminating [in] . . . a beauty of a 
conference room quarrel.” (citations omitted)). 
 52. See FERREN, supra note 5, at 329. 
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Two items need brief mention. First is Ferren’s focus on Rutledge’s 
character and warmth, which appears from the book’s first page to its last. 
Some readers will recoil from such sentimentality, but the book musters 
ample evidence for its point of view. Interviews with students and 
colleagues from Washington University and Iowa, stories from family 
members, interviews with the clerks of Rutledge and other Justices, 
memoranda from presidential advisers, and abundant personal 
correspondence confirm a link between Rutledge’s personality and his 
success. As Rutledge wrote after his nomination to the Court: 
I kn[ow] enough of myself to realize . . . that some mysterious 
leaven works up a very small amount of real merit into a big return. 
The leaven isn’t brains, or knowledge, or grandeur of character, or 
any such unusual thing. So far as I can guess what it is—it’s that I 
like people, have some sort way of letting them know it, and in turn 
they like me regardless of all the other deficiencies.53
A second personal dimension of the Rutledge story concerns his law 
clerks. In the late nineteenth century, Supreme Court Justices began hiring 
recent law graduates to manage certiorari requests, research, and 
sometimes draft opinions.54 Although American legal education once 
relied entirely on apprenticeship, clerkships (at the Supreme Court and 
elsewhere) are our last great example of institutionalized mentoring. 
Obviously, clerkships vary with the personalities involved, but that 
experience, while propelling lawyers toward a newfound profession, often 
leaves indelible impressions of what counts as good law and good 
judgment. 
For most of Rutledge’s tenure, Justices hired one law clerk per year; in 
1948 and 1949, they hired two. Thus, Rutledge had nine clerks at the 
Court. One is a Harvard law professor, one was a two-time law school 
dean and is a district court judge, another served the Seventh Circuit, and 
another is Justice John Paul Stevens. Even among the lofty ranks of 
Supreme Court clerks, such distinctions stand out,55 and several Rutledge 
 53. FERREN, supra note 5, at 219. Ferren also suggests that Rutledge’s humility and compassion 
spurred his concern for minority religious and racial groups and his attention to procedural fairness. 
See, e.g., FERREN, supra note 5; cf. sources cited supra note 4.  
 54. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNTIED STATES: THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 1910–21, at 82–84 (1984) 
(summarizing the early history of Supreme Court law clerks); Chester A. Newland, Personal 
Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law Clerks, 40 OR. L. REV. 299 (1961). 
 55. Cf. Pollak, Profile of a Judge, supra note 4, at 190 n.4 (cataloguing the similarly 
extraordinary accomplishments of Frankfurter’s clerks). 
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clerks name their former boss as a permanent influence upon their view of 
life and law.56 This aspect of Rutledge’s legacy is a lasting testament to 
his force as a teacher and role model, which, as the next Part indicates, has 
more than purely historical relevance. 
II. EXECUTIVE POWER, JUDICIAL LIMITS 
Although Ferren’s book and Rutledge’s story satisfy Frankfurter’s 
historical aims for judicial biographies, for many readers, history isn’t 
enough. After all, biography always contextualizes its subject, yet few 
seek books on just any Justice. Especially in today’s biography-rich 
landscape, it is Rutledge’s tie to modern circumstances that calls attention, 
and the greatest such link concerns executive detention.57 After decades of 
jurisprudential quiet, the President’s authority to detain individuals 
without criminal process is again important, and Rutledge’s career shows 
how such executive detention tests the limits of judicial competence and 
legal principle. 
This Part divides judicial review of executive detention into three 
stages: (i) jurisdiction to review detention’s legality; (ii) standards for 
detaining individuals without charges; and (iii) standards for trying 
detainees in military tribunals. With respect to each of these stages, 
Rutledge played a critical role in landmark World War II decisions. And 
those decisions, in turn, intimately affect cases in today’s Court. By 
comparing three pairs of “old” and “new” cases, I suggest that the World 
War II precedents illustrate how well and badly courts behave in 
addressing executive detention issues; they thus offer vital standards for 
judging modern courts’ performance in this sensitive area of law. 
 56. Cliff Sloan, The Mourning After: John Roberts Grieves for His Mentor, SLATE, Sept. 7, 2005, 
available at http://www.slate.com/id/2125848 (“The influence on these former-clerk justices of the 
justices for whom they once worked is profound. Stevens speaks and writes reverentially of the little-
known Wiley Rutledge more than five decades after his clerkship.”); see Joseph P. Thai, The Law 
Clerk Who Wrote Rasul v. Bush: John Paul Stevens’s Influence from World War II to the War on 
Terror, 92 VA. L. REV. 501, 502–03 (2006) (linking Stevens’s current jurisprudence to his experience 
as a Rutledge clerk); see also Diane Marie Amann, John Paul Stevens, Human Rights Judge, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1569, 1589–92, 1595–1600 (2006) (exploring similarly important connections 
between Stevens and Rutledge). 
 57. For other doctrinal parallels, compare, for example, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 
1 (1947) (addressing the constitutionality of public payments to religious schools); Louisiana ex rel. 
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (analyzing due process constraints on state capital 
punishment); and WILEY B. RUTLEDGE, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH (1947) (discussing the 
structure of congressional commerce power), with, for example, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) 
(upholding Commerce Clause regulation of medical marijuana); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2005) (invalidating the execution of juvenile defendants); and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 
639 (2002) (upholding the expenditure of government vouchers on religious education). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p99 Green book pages2.doc8/23/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
114 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first pair of cases concerns Rutledge’s dissent in Ahrens v. Clark, 
which addressed the territorial limits of habeas jurisdiction, and Rasul v. 
Bush, involving detentions at Guantanamo Bay.58 Justice Stevens was the 
Rutledge law clerk who helped draft the Ahrens dissent, and it was 
Stevens a half-century later who wrote the Court’s opinion in Rasul. From 
a historical perspective, Rutledge’s Ahrens dissent evinces a commitment 
to judicial craft and constitutional value. And in the modern context, the 
opinion is a peerless lens for examining weaknesses in Rasul’s dissents, as 
well as ambiguities in the Rasul majority itself. 
The second pair of cases, concerning uncharged executive detention, 
connects Korematsu v. United States, which involved Japanese-
Americans’ relocation during World War II, with Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
concerning the detention of “enemy combatants” who are United States 
citizens.59 Rutledge was the decisive fifth vote at conference in 
Korematsu, and the fractured majority in Hamdi self-consciously tried to 
craft legal safeguards to reduce the risk of “another Korematsu.” 
As a matter of Supreme Court history, Rutledge’s role in the 
“internment cases” shows that modern conventional wisdom about 
Korematsu is flawed. Judicial support for civil liberties was even weaker, 
and less principled, than Korematsu’s six to three vote indicates. To 
understand the nature and scope of Rutledge’s mistake offers unique 
insights about whether today’s courts are doomed to repeat it. 
Third, Rutledge’s best-known opinion is his dissent in In re Yamashita, 
concerning the military commission trial of a Japanese general.60 Just 
weeks ago, the Court unexpectedly overruled Yamashita in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, which involved the military commission trial of Osama bin 
Laden’s driver.61 Here again, Rutledge’s example sets a crucial standard 
for analyzing presidential authority in national crisis. The Yamashita 
dissent was indispensable to Hamdan’s result, yet the normative depth of 
Rutledge’s methodology stands in stark contrast with the modern Court’s 
preference for narrow reasoning. Future cases may test whether the 
modern approach is enough to protect fundamental values, and whether 
the Court might go farther. Thus, at every stage of executive detention 
 58. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 194 (1948) (Rutledge, J., 
dissenting); see infra Part II.A. 
 59. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 
(1944); see infra Part II.B. 
 60. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 42, 46–47 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
 61. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006); see infra Part II.C. 
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jurisprudence, Rutledge’s story is not just history for historians; it is 
history for now. 
A. Habeas Jurisdiction: Comparing Ahrens and Rasul 
In Ahrens v. Clark,62 the Attorney General deported over a hundred 
German nationals pursuant to the Alien Enemy Act of 1798, which grants 
broad power to remove citizens of nations at war with the United States.63 
While the Ahrens deportees were held at Ellis Island, they filed habeas 
petitions in the District of Columbia, claiming that their deportation orders 
were unlawful because the German war had ended. In the Supreme Court, 
the decisive jurisdictional issue was whether the District of Columbia’s 
district court could grant habeas relief to detainees held in New York. 
Seeking a quick merits resolution, the United States did not dispute 
jurisdiction and waived all defenses against hearing the case in the District 
of Columbia.64
Voting six to three, the Supreme Court denied jurisdiction. The federal 
habeas statutes allow judges, “within their respective jurisdictions, . . . to 
grant writs of habeas corpus for . . . inquiry into the cause of restraint of 
liberty.”65 In Ahrens, the respondent Attorney General was undeniably 
“within” the district court’s jurisdiction, but Douglas wrote for the Court 
that jurisdiction was lacking because the detainees were not “within” the 
District of Columbia.66 The Court discussed possible travel and security 
problems if prisoners nationwide could seek habeas, and ultimately 
appear, in courts where only their custodians were located.67 Accordingly, 
the Court held that Congress had allowed jurisdiction only for detainees 
who were themselves within the deciding court’s territorial boundaries.68
Rutledge’s Ahrens dissent has been described as “sufficiently 
representative to provide . . . an introduction to its author’s judicial 
career.”69 Meeting the majority’s five-page opinion with eighteen in 
response, Rutledge surveyed statutory language, legislative history, and 
 62. 335 U.S. 188 (1948). 
 63. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 20–21 (2000); Proclamation No. 2655, 10 Fed. Reg. 8947 (1945). 
 64. Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 193. 
 65. Id. at 189–90 (emphasis added). Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2000) with Act of Sept. 24, 
1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 82 (1789) (authorizing habeas relief for prisoners “in custody, under or by 
colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same”). 
 66. Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 190–92. 
 67. Id. at 190–93. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Stevens, supra note 4, at 178. 
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prior precedents, showing that none compelled the majority’s result.70 He 
also explained that travel and convenience issues should be addressed by 
venue, not jurisdictional rules, because the latter cannot be waived or 
relaxed even under extraordinary circumstances. Rutledge knew it would 
be “only the exceptional case” that would require a district court to hear 
from detainees located outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction, but “[i]t 
is one thing to lay down a rule of discretion adequate to prevent flooding 
the courts . . . . It is entirely another to tie their hands . . . with a strict 
jurisdictional limitation which can only defeat the writ’s efficacy in many 
cases where it may be most needed.”71  Rutledge rebutted every step of the 
majority’s reasoning, and the Court did not try to respond. 
Rutledge also indicated that, for him, Ahrens had deeper significance.72 
Although the majority focused on litigative convenience, Rutledge treated 
Ahrens as a case about the nature of habeas corpus itself, with potential to 
affect future detainees many miles from Ellis Island. Describing habeas 
review as basic to the “personal security of every citizen,” Rutledge could 
not accept that a detainee’s physical location was prerequisite to judicial 
oversight.73 He found the majority’s “place-of-the-body” jurisdictional 
rule especially inapt when: (i) a prisoner’s location is unknown, (ii) the 
detainee is held somewhere that her custodian cannot be served, or (iii) 
detention occurs outside any district court’s territorial jurisdiction.74
From Rutledge’s perspective, the Ahrens majority might allow illegal 
detention and no chance of relief for detainees held “in places unknown to 
those who would apply for habeas corpus in their behalf. Without 
knowing the district of confinement, a petitioner would be unable to . . . 
[establish] jurisdiction in any court in the land.”75 Such events could arise 
from “military detention,” from “mass evacuation of groups . . . in time of 
emergency,” or “possibly . . . even from wilful misconduct by arbitrary 
 70. Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 201–07 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
 71. Id. at 209–10. Rutledge noted that the majority “reserved decision upon cases where the 
place of confinement is not within the territorial jurisdiction of any court,” but stated that such a 
reservation “goes far to destroy the validity of the present decision’s grounding.” Id. at 208. Rutledge 
also discussed Ahrens’s impact on the District of Columbia, which (as Rutledge knew from his service 
on the court of appeals) confined some of its prisoners in Virginia. Id. at 207 n.24. 
 72. Id. at 193 (explaining that “[t]he jurisdictional turn this case has taken gives it importance far 
beyond the serious questions tendered on the merits of petitioners’ application”). 
 73. Id. at 194. 
 74. Id. at 195. Once-Professor Rutledge’s statement of these points reads like a classroom 
transcript, asking hypothetical questions not directly at issue yet possible as extensions of the decisive 
principle. 
 75. Id. at 210. 
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executive officials overreaching their constitutional or statutory 
authority.”76
Although those specific scenarios did not materialize after World War 
II, Rutledge’s concerns about wartime confinement marked the Ahrens 
dissent as a work of its time; it also explains the opinion’s emergence in 
our new war and detentions. Rutledge’s dissent is just the kind of opinion 
that great judges strive to write: technically dominant without quibbling, 
normatively grounded without preaching, and urgent without fretting. 
Two cases between Ahrens and Rasul merit note. In Johnson v. 
Eisentrager (decided the year after Rutledge died), the Court disclaimed 
habeas jurisdiction over foreigners held in Germany by the United States 
Army.77 The detainees had been convicted by a military commission for 
continuing hostilities after Germany’s surrender. The Court cited historical 
examples where judicial access was denied to nonresident enemy aliens, 
and concluded that “[n]othing in the text of the Constitution . . . [or] our 
statutes” grants habeas jurisdiction to such detainees outside any district 
court’s territorial jurisdiction.78 Eisentrager thus reversed the court of 
appeals, which had invoked constitutional norms and “fundamentals” to 
avoid Ahrens’s statutory place-of-the-body rule,79 and affirmed the district 
court, which had embraced Ahrens’s view of territorial jurisdiction. 
In contrast, Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court80 signaled 
dissatisfaction with Ahrens. Braden was an Alabama prisoner who claimed 
that his conviction on a stale Kentucky indictment violated his speedy trial 
rights.81 Because Braden sought habeas relief from Kentucky’s district 
court, despite his being held in Alabama, the first question was whether 
his case lay “within” the Kentucky district court’s “respective 
jurisdiction[].”82 The Court held that jurisdiction was proper, because (as 
Rutledge argued in Ahrens) “[t]he writ of habeas corpus does not act upon 
the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what 
is alleged to be unlawful custody.”83 Braden viewed statutory and 
doctrinal developments as having “a profound effect on [Ahrens’s] 
 76. Id. 
 77. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). Justice Black dissented, joined by Justices Douglas and Burton. 
 78. Id. at 768. 
 79. Id. at 768, 790. 
 80. 410 U.S. 484 (1973). 
 81. Id. at 486. 
 82. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2000). The case also addressed various timing and exhaustion 
requirements for speedy trial claims. Braden, 410 U.S. at 488–93. 
 83. Braden, 410 U.S. at 494–95 (emphasis added); see Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 196–97 (Rutledge, J., 
dissenting). Incidentally, Justice Brennan wrote Braden’s majority opinion, and he was the lineal 
successor to Rutledge’s seat on the Court. 
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continuing vitality,” and held that Ahrens no longer stood as “an inflexible 
jurisdictional rule,” but only as a decision applying “traditional principles 
of venue.”84
Then, decades later, came Guantanamo Bay. After the September 11 
attacks, Congress issued an “Authorization for Use of Military Force,” 
which allowed the President to use “all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks . . . or harbored such 
organizations or persons.”85 As the President ordered military attacks on 
Afghanistan, the United States began to capture hundreds of non-
American citizens for detention at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, on 
Cuba’s southeastern coast. A 1903 lease stated that “the United States 
recognizes . . . the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over 
[Guantanamo Bay],” but that “the Republic of Cuba consents that . . . the 
United States shall exercise complete jurisdiction and control over and 
within said areas.”86 The United States and Cuba later made the lease 
indefinite, lasting as long as the United States does not abandon the base.87
In 2002, foreign detainees at Guantanamo filed habeas petitions in the 
District of Columbia against Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. In that case, 
later captioned Rasul v. Bush, the petitioners claimed that they did not 
commit terrorist acts, never fought the United States, and were unlawfully 
held without charges, counsel, or access to any legal tribunal.88 In 
response, the government cited Eisentrager, arguing that federal courts 
lacked authority to review Guantanamo detentions because those detainees 
were not “within [any district court’s] respective jurisdiction[].”89
The district court and court of appeals denied habeas jurisdiction in 
Rasul, but the Supreme Court reversed. Justice Stevens’s majority opinion 
relied on the Ahrens dissent that law clerk Stevens had helped compose 
more than fifty years earlier.90 Like his mentor, Stevens declared the 
 84. Id. at 493, 497, 500. Notwithstanding Braden’s attempt at revisionism, it is absolutely clear 
that Ahrens’s holding cannot be explained through venue. The government waived any defenses to 
hearing Ahrens in the District of Columbia, thereby rendering irrelevant all waivable defenses—such 
as venue, but not jurisdiction. See Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 193. 
 85. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, §§ 1–2, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 86. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 471 (2004). 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 471–72 & n.4. 
 89. See id. at 473, 475–76. 
 90. Id. at 477 & n.7 (citing and quoting the Rutledge dissent); id. at 479 & n.9 (interpreting 
Braden as having overruled Ahrens); see also John Paul Stevens, What I Did This Summer, 18 CHI. 
BAR ASS’N REC. 34, 35 (Oct. 2004) (“[H]istory played an important role in [Rasul] . . . . [Eisentrager] 
was decided before Ahrens was overruled and had treated Ahrens as controlling precedent. . . . 
However, because the Court had not had the opportunity to revisit Eisentrager, . . . many observers 
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historic importance of habeas “as a means of reviewing the legality of 
Executive detention” and stressed its broad availability “in wartime as 
well as in times of peace.”91 Rebutting the government’s reliance on 
Eisentrager, Stevens held that Braden had unsettled Ahrens as precedent, 
thereby making Eisentrager’s constitutional and quasi-constitutional 
analysis unnecessary.92 Indeed, the Eisentrager detainees had urged a 
constitutional or quasi-constitutional basis for habeas jurisdiction only 
because they accepted the Ahrens “place-of-the-body” rule as 
authoritative. Because Braden repudiated that analysis, Stevens wrote, 
Ahrens’s holding was relevant “only to the question of the appropriate 
forum, not to whether the claim can be heard at all.”93
Some observers have had great difficulty understanding Rasul’s 
reasoning.94 Part of that confusion stems from the limited attention paid to 
wrongly assumed that the case would control the outcome of our Guantanamo decision. Thus the 
Rutledge dissent written in 1948 significantly influenced an important case decided less than three 
months ago.”). 
 Professor Thai’s detailed account of Stevens’s role in Ahrens largely parallels that offered here; a 
small difference between the two is emphasis. Thai stresses law-clerk Stevens’s role in the Ahrens 
drafting process, though Thai acknowledges an inability to know whether Stevens’s written product 
sought to implement Rutledge’s view of the law or vice versa. See Thai, supra note 56, at 508 n.39. 
What one needs is “inside information,” which neither Thai nor I possess. Id. at 501 n.*. In my own 
view, all historical “ties” go to the Justice, giving Rutledge presumptive credit for Ahrens, and Stevens 
credit for Rasul (rather than any of his law clerks). Indeed, if further speculation were warranted, one 
might imagine Rutledge and his former clerk each striving to give the other recognition for their 
“joint” product’s importance. Cf. FERREN, supra note 5, at 227–29 (describing Rutledge’s mutually 
admiring relationship with his first law clerk, Victor Brudney). 
 91. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 474. Although this Article seeks to highlight Rutledge’s influence, it must 
be said that Stevens has written other important opinions allowing habeas relief for non-criminal 
detainees. See INS v. St. Cyr, 553 U.S. 289 (2001). 
 92. Id. at 478 (“Because subsequent decisions of this Court [i.e., Braden] have filled the statutory 
gap that had occasioned Eisentrager’s resort to ‘fundamentals’, persons detained outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of any federal district court no longer need rely on the Constitution as the source of their 
right to federal habeas review.”). Justice Stevens also noted that Rasul’s facts differed from 
Eisentrager’s because the Rasul petitioners were not citizens of “enemy nations,” were not tried in a 
military tribunal, were imprisoned for over two years, and denied committing any aggression against 
the United States. Id. at 475–76. 
 93. Id. at 479. 
 94. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Observing the Separation of Powers: The President’s War 
Power Necessarily Remains “The Power to Wage War Successfully,” 53 DRAKE L. REV. 851, 876 
(2005) (expressing bewilderment at Rasul’s “startling result,” and characterizing its approach as “less 
than convincing, highly ambiguous,” and a “tortured statutory tale”); id. at 877–81 (criticizing Rasul’s 
tension with Eisentrager, without acknowledging the importance of Ahrens, and without rebutting the 
analysis of Rutledge’s dissent); Tung Yin, The Role of Article III Courts in the War on Terrorism, 13 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1035, 1039, 1047–51, 1089 (2005) (characterizing Rasul’s majority as 
“dubious,” “superficial,” “strained,” and “unpersuasive,” without mentioning the Rutledge dissent). 
But cf. Yin, supra, at 1089 (concluding that “despite the analytic flaws of the opinion, and despite the 
potentially limited nature of the relief afforded . . . , Rasul actually achieves a workable balance 
between judicial abdication and judicial intrusiveness in the war on terrorism”). 
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Rutledge and his dissent.95 Kennedy’s concurrence in Rasul and Scalia’s 
dissent exemplify this problem; both Justices protested that the majority 
opinions in Braden and Ahrens did not address detainees outside the 
United States.96 Thus, Kennedy and Scalia thought Eisentrager should 
control based on its factual similarity to Rasul, if nothing else.97 That 
argument overlooks that Rasul’s majority did more than restate Braden’s 
attack on Ahrens; it also embraced the Rutledge dissent. And although 
Kennedy and Scalia are right that the Ahrens majority did not address 
international detention, Rutledge’s analysis was conceived with precisely 
that circumstance in mind. 
Kennedy and Scalia did not cite Rutledge’s dissent, much less did they 
address its extensive arguments about habeas jurisdiction. And it is 
Rutledge’s conceptual analysis—which remains unanswered by anyone on 
the Stone Court, the Rehnquist Courts or otherwise—that forms the core 
of the Rasul majority opinion.98 The risk that legal technicalities might 
block review of wartime detention is what led Rutledge to support habeas 
jurisdiction over Ellis Island detainees whose jurisdictional arguments 
were otherwise unsympathetic.99 Although Eisentrager extended Ahrens 
and denied habeas jurisdiction for detainees overseas,100 it was Rutledge’s 
 95. Another part of that confusion owes to the Court’s choice not technically to overrule 
Eisentrager, nor to hold that Braden had done so. See supra note 92 and sources cited. Rumsfeld v. 
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), decided the same day as Rasul, further complicates matters. In Padilla, a 
majority of the Court required a detainee to file his habeas petition against his immediate custodian, 
located in South Carolina, rather than against Secretary Rumsfeld in the Southern District of New 
York. 
 96. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Id. at 488 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); cf. Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 192 n.4 (“We need not determine the question of what process, if 
any, a person confined in an area not subject to the jurisdiction of any federal court may employ to 
assert federal rights.”). 
 97. Cf. Kmiec, supra note 94, at 877–81 (criticizing Rasul’s tension with Eisentrager, but 
neglecting Ahrens, and declining even to mention Rutledge’s dissent). 
 98. As should be clear, my view is not that dissents, even good ones, are themselves 
authoritative. Rather, my claim is that Ahrens’s dissent laid the intellectual groundwork for Rasul’s 
result. Thus, anyone who would better understand (or criticize) the latter should start with the former. 
 99. To see why the Ahrens petitioners were unsympathetic, imagine Douglas and the Ahrens 
Court asking the following question: “Why shouldn't detainees on Ellis Island be required to seek 
habeas in New York, rather than D.C.? It just makes practical sense.” The problem with such a 
question is its failure to distinguish venue from jurisdictional rules, and that technical distinction is 
precisely the foundation of Rutledge’s view. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Questions of 
venue, convenience, and similar issues are exclusively in the parties’ hands and may be waived, as the 
government did in Ahrens. Thus, the Court considered only arguments concerning subject-matter 
jurisdiction, which cannot be waived. 
 100. Rutledge might also have been disappointed by Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), decided 
just before he joined the Court, which allowed trials by military commission of anti-American 
saboteurs. But see In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 46–47 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (distinguishing 
Quirin without seeking to overrule it). 
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principled discussion that ultimately allowed the Court, in its recent 
detention jurisprudence, to reach a result that was hard to anticipate and is 
difficult otherwise to explain. The fact that Justice Stevens wrote the 
opinion producing that result is astonishing, but also appropriate. 
On the other hand, strong substantive echoes between Stevens’s Rasul 
opinion and Rutledge’s Ahrens dissent cannot obscure the two opinions’ 
very different styles. Rutledge systematically disassembled the Ahrens 
majority, confronting each point with counterpoints and filling footnotes 
with legal research. By contrast, the Rasul opinion has just three elements: 
(i) a general celebration of the writ,101 (ii) a rebuttal of Eisentrager,102 and 
(iii) a rebuttal of the presumption against extraterritoriality.103 The latter 
held that Guantanamo Bay should not be considered “extraterritorial” at 
all, because the indefinite lease brings that area within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States for habeas purposes.104
As Rasul’s responsive structure suggests, its affirmative argument for 
habeas jurisdiction is spare; indeed, even its link to Rutledge is 
underemphasized.105 Furthermore, the Court’s two rebuttals stand in 
seeming tension. As Scalia puzzled: 
[Part III of the Court’s opinion holds] that the place of detention of 
an alien has no bearing on the statutory availability of habeas relief, 
but “is strictly relevant only to the question of the appropriate 
forum.” . . . Once that has been said, the status of Guantanamo Bay 
is entirely irrelevant . . . . The habeas statute is (according to the 
Court) being applied domestically, to “petitioners’ custodians,” and 
the doctrine that statutes are presumed to have no extraterritorial 
 101. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473–76. 
 102. Id. at 474–79. 
 103. Id. at 480–85. 
 104. Id. at 480–81 (internal quotation marks omitted). As a technical matter, the Court’s holding 
lies embodied in a general statement of law: “Whatever traction the presumption against 
extraterritoriality might have in other contexts, it certainly has no application to the operation of the 
habeas statute with respect to persons detained within ‘the territorial jurisdiction’ of the United States.” 
Id. at 480. In the same paragraph, however, the Court applied that principle to the particular details of 
Guantanamo Bay, and concluded that “[a]liens held at the base, no less than American citizens, are 
entitled to invoke the federal courts’ authority under [28 U.S.C. § 2241].” Id. at 481. 
 Kennedy’s opinion concurring in the judgment expresses a similar view: “Guantanamo Bay is in 
every practical respect a United States territory, and it is one far removed from any hostilities. . . . 
From a practical perspective, the indefinite lease of Guantanamo Bay has produced a place that 
belongs to the United States, extending the ‘implied protection’ of the United States to it.” Id. at 487 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 105. Perhaps the opinion’s clearest statement of its holding is the oddly textualist declaration: “No 
party questions the District Court’s jurisdiction over petitioners’ custodians. Section 2241, by its 
terms, requires nothing more.” Id. at 438–84 (citations omitted). 
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effect simply has no application. Nevertheless, the Court spends 
most of Part IV rejecting respondents’ invocation of 
[extraterritoriality] doctrine on the peculiar ground that it has no 
application to Guantanamo Bay.106
To rephrase Scalia’s point, if Rasul fully adopted the Ahrens dissent, why 
did the Court’s extraterritoriality analysis discuss the particular status of 
Guantanamo Bay?107 By contrast, if the decision rested on incidental facts 
about Guantanamo Bay’s lease, why did the Court more broadly hold that 
custodial presence is sufficient for habeas jurisdiction? 
One obvious reason for vagueness was Justice Stevens’s need to write 
for a tentative majority. Academics often admire dissents and concurring 
opinions because they can state principles broadly without risking votes or 
unintended lawmaking; indeed, it may be a professorial hazard to favor 
quotable phrases and broad-based ideals above other judicial virtues. 
Nevertheless, in a case like Rasul, Stevens perhaps chose not to overrule 
Eisentrager, and to add language about Guantanamo Bay, in the hope of 
attracting Kennedy’s vote or in fear of losing O’Connor’s.108
Rutledge, an academic who was often dissatisfied with terse judicial 
explanations, may have felt driven in Ahrens to offer a consistent view of 
habeas jurisdiction that could apply to a range of unforeseen 
circumstances. That very characteristic, which marks the Ahrens dissent’s 
long shelf-life, could have blocked the Rasul majority from fully accepting 
it. Some modern Justices, after finding jurisdiction for Guantanamo 
detainees, might have been unwilling to endorse broad judicial oversight 
of detention elsewhere in the world, at least until contours of our present 
 106. Id. at 500 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Thai, supra note 56, at 530–31 (endorsing Scalia’s 
assessment). 
 107. Stevens also discussed, in this part of the Court’s opinion, the application of traditional 
habeas jurisdiction to England’s “exempt jurisdictions” and “dominions.” Id. at 480–82. 
 108. Of course, vote-counting is not strictly necessary to explain Rasul’s dualist structure. Perhaps 
Part III was strictly limited to analyzing the habeas statutes’ jurisdictional content. Then Part IV 
separately analyzed whether such content applied to Guantanamo Bay. Each step would be logically 
necessary because, on the one hand, the habeas statutes could geographically apply to Guantanamo 
Bay, yet grant no jurisdiction to Rasul in the District of Columbia’s district court because of Ahrens’s 
place-of-the-body rule. On the other hand, even if Ahrens were generally wrong as a statutory matter, 
petitioners would nonetheless lose if the habeas statutes themselves did not apply to Guantanamo.  
 To give meaning to both of Rasul’s parts has underanalyzed consequences, as I suggest infra, note 
331. At this point, however, Rasul’s critics might simply note that, despite Scalia’s charge of 
inconsistency, Stevens’s opinion lacks any explanation like the one in this footnote. Cf. Thai, supra 
note 56, at 526, 528 (calling Stevens’s approach “clever” and “unlikely,” while arguing that “the most 
remarkable aspect of Rasul may be less doctrinal and more personal”). And that would return us to 
noting the unresolved split among Rasul’s majority over whether habeas jurisdiction indeed “extends 
. . . to the four corners of the earth.” Id. at 531 (citing Rasul, 542 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
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“War On Terror” more clearly emerge. The general merits of “broad” 
versus “narrow” legal decisions in wartime are canvassed elsewhere.109 
But my own reasons for distinguishing the Rutledge and Stevens opinions 
are to illustrate Rutledge’s judicial tendency toward full legal explanation 
(as opposed to “minimalism”), and to flag Rasul’s extraterritoriality 
analysis, which may create interesting doctrinal opportunities in future 
detention cases.110
B. Uncharged Detainees: Comparing Hirabayashi, Korematsu and Hamdi 
If Rasul vindicated Rutledge’s dissent in Ahrens, Hamdi condemned 
his vote in Korematsu.111 Many details of the Japanese-American cases are 
well known, but some are not.112 For example, attention to Rutledge’s 
unrecognized role in those decisions subverts much conventional wisdom 
about the source and nature of the Court’s error. Such lessons are vitally 
important today, as the modern Court builds doctrinal safeguards against 
possible repetition of wartime abuses.  
 109. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 Sup. Ct. Rev. 47 (2004); Neil S. Siegel, 
A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
1951 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, Testing Minimalism: A Reply, 104 MICH. L. REV. 123 (2005). 
 110. See infra note 331 and accompanying text. 
 111. Some might think it more apt to compare Hamdi with Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), 
which was decided just before Rutledge joined the Supreme Court. Quirin held, in relevant part, that 
an American citizen may be tried and sentenced to death by a military commission. Id. at 15–16. Thus, 
Quirin was cited in Hamdi to oppose Justice Scalia’s view that American citizens may not be punished 
outside the ordinary procedures of criminal law unless habeas is suspended. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
542 U.S. 507, 521–23 (2004) (plurality); cf. id. at 563–73 (Scalia, J., dissenting); infra text 
accompanying notes 189–204. Aside from rebutting Justice Scalia’s position, however, Quirin is not 
so relevant to this Article. For example, Quirin did not address what procedures are required in a 
military commission. Nor did Quirin address Hamdi’s core question, namely, when and how a 
President may detain United States citizens without criminal charges or any form of process. See infra 
Part II.B.2. 
 112. The four “internment cases” are discussed extensively in IRONS, supra note 51, at viii–ix: 
Th[e] documentary record reveals a legal scandal without precedent in the history of 
American law. Never before has evidence emerged that shows a deliberate campaign to 
present tainted records to the Supreme Court. The Justice Department files in these cases . . . 
include documents in which the government’s own lawyers charged their superiors with the 
“suppression of evidence” and with presenting to the Supreme Court a key military report that 
contained “lies” and “intentional falsehoods.” My research also uncovered military files that 
disclose the alteration and destruction by War Department officials of crucial evidence in 
those cases. 
This Article owes much to Irons and Ferren with respect to the facts surrounding these cases. My main 
contribution to this well-traveled field of legal history lies in my revisionist approach to the link 
between Hirabayashi and Korematsu, and the consequences thereof. 
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1. World War II Detentions 
In February 1942, President Roosevelt cited his Commander-in-Chief 
power and ordered the establishment of “military areas . . . from which any 
or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any 
person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions 
the Secretary [or commanders] . . . may impose in [their] discretion.”113 
Implementing that order, Lieutenant General DeWitt divided the Pacific 
Coast into “military areas” that were deemed particularly vulnerable to 
attack, sabotage, and espionage.114 In March 1942, Congress criminalized 
any violation of military-area regulations, authorizing penalties up to a 
$5000 fine and one year in prison.115
A few weeks later, DeWitt issued an order governing all alien Germans 
and Italians and all “persons of Japanese ancestry” in parts of Arizona, 
California, Washington, and Oregon. Euphemistically called a “curfew,” 
the order required such persons to be home from 8:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., 
and at all other times to be in their residence, in their workplace, traveling 
between the two, or within five miles of their residence.116 DeWitt also 
ordered that “to insure the orderly evacuation and resettlement of Japanese 
voluntarily migrating” from the Pacific Coast, no person of Japanese 
ancestry could leave the area unless so instructed.117 DeWitt’s “anti-
migration order” was particularly odd because, contrary to security-
minded intuitions, it blocked innocent persons (who might wish to avoid 
even appearing dangerous) from leaving areas that were militarily 
vulnerable.118
 113. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). Well before this, FDR had 
proclaimed under the Enemy Aliens Act that any Japanese alien “deemed dangerous to the public 
peace or safety of the United States’ by the Attorney General or the Secretary of War” would be 
subject to “summary apprehension.” See IRONS, supra note 51, at 18. See generally Ahrens v. Clark, 
335 U.S. 188 (1948) (applying the Enemy Alien Act to German nationals); supra Part II.A.  
 114. Proclamation No. 1, 7 Fed. Reg. 2320 (Mar. 2, 1942). 
 115. Act of March 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173 (1942). 
 116. Proclamation No. 3, 7 Fed. Reg. 2543 (Apr. 2, 1942). Regulated persons were also permitted 
to do business at a Post Office, Employment Service Office, or Wartime Civil Control Administration 
Office. Id. 
 117. Proclamation No. 4, 7 Fed. Reg. 2601, (Apr. 4, 1942) (emphasis added). 
 118. An earlier order had allowed persons of Japanese descent to migrate away from sensitive 
areas. Most Japanese-Americans did not take “advantage” of this legal migration period, however, due 
to a combination of patriotic optimism, frozen bank accounts, limited family or friends outside the 
West Coast, growing hostility from interior states, and the geographic expansion of military 
regulations. IRONS, supra note 51, at 66 (“In the end, fewer than ten thousand of the Japanese 
Americans affected by DeWitt’s initial proclamation moved from Military Area No. 1, and most 
members of this group resettled within Military Area No. 2 and were later caught in the internment 
trap that snapped shut in both areas.”).  
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Beginning in May 1942, DeWitt ordered all persons of Japanese 
ancestry to “evacuate” from designated military zones.119 One member of 
every Japanese family had to report to “Civil Control Stations,” and the 
only exemption was for individuals already held in governmental 
“Assembly Centers.”120 These mandates were called “exclusion orders,” 
but that name misleads insofar as affected persons had nowhere much to 
go. Still bound by DeWitt’s anti-migration order, they could not travel 
elsewhere in the United States, and to arrive at an “Assembly Center” 
almost inevitably led to temporary detention, followed by indefinite 
confinement at a “Relocation Center.”121 In due course, federal judges 
would call the government’s various confinement facilities “internment 
camps,” “detention camps,” “prisons,” and “concentration camps.”122 But 
whatever their name, such sites were used by the War Relocation 
Authority—a civilian agency overseeing evacuation—to house over 
100,000 Japanese-American persons for almost two years after their 
removal from homes, jobs, and communities.123 Relocation and detention 
were deemed necessary to investigate the detainees’ loyalty in ways that 
were presumptively impossible if Japanese-Americans remained 
 The reason for the government’s shift from a policy of migration to anti-migration owed mainly to 
the racism of western politicians and citizenries. See, e.g., id. at 71 (“The governors, attorneys general, 
and other officials of all the western states but California attended [a meeting in Salt Lake City on 
April 7, 1942]. . . . What the governors wanted . . . was a concentration camp regime for the Japanese 
Americans.”); id. at 71 (listing calls from Utah’s governor that evacuees “be put into camps” as forced 
agricultural laborers, complaints that the federal government was “much too concerned about the 
constitutional rights of Japanese-American citizens,” and suggestions that “the constitution could be 
changed” to allow internment); id. at 71–72 (recording the Wyoming Governor’s statement that his 
constituents “have a dislike of any Orientals, and simply will not stand for being California’s dumping 
ground” such that, if Japanese Americans were to buy land and resettle, “[t]here would be Japs 
hanging from every pine tree”). 
 119. DeWitt ultimately issued 108 such orders. IRONS, supra note 51, at 70. 
 120. E.g., Exclusion Order No. 34, 7 Fed. Reg. 3967 (May 28, 1942). 
 121. Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 243 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
series of military orders . . . . were so drawn that the only way Korematsu could avoid violation was to 
give himself up to the military authority. This meant submission to custody, examination, and 
transportation out of the territory, to be followed by indeterminate confinement in detention camps.”); 
id. at 230 (“[Korematsu] was forbidden, by Military Order, to leave the zone in which he lived; he was 
forbidden, by Military Order . . . to be found within that zone unless he were in an Assembly Center 
. . . . General DeWitt's report . . . makes it entirely clear . . . that an Assembly Center was a euphemism 
for a prison. No person within such a center was permitted to leave except by Military Order.”). 
 122. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223; id. at 230 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“prison” and “concentration 
camp”); id. at 243 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“detention camps”); Korematsu v. United States, 140 F.2d 
289, 300 (9th Cir. 1943) (Denman, J., dissenting) (“internment camps”). 
 123. See IRONS, supra note 51, at vii; ERIC K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND 
REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 194 (2001); see also ERIC L. 
MULLER, FREE TO DIE FOR THEIR COUNTRY: THE STORY OF JAPANESE AMERICAN DRAFT RESISTERS 
OF WORLD WAR II (2001). 
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unsupervised at home.124 Thus, within six months of Pearl Harbor, the 
United States had implemented an unprecedented race-based “curfew,” 
which approached house arrest, and a program of mass detention and 
relocation. 
The “curfew” and “exclusion” programs were both eventually tested 
before the Supreme Court. First, in 1943, Hirabayashi v. United States 
unanimously upheld application of the race-based curfew to an American 
citizen.125 Kiyoshi “Gordon” Hirabayashi was convicted on two counts: 
violating the curfew order by not being at home after 8:00 p.m., and 
violating the exclusion order by not reporting to a Civil Control Station. 
For each count, he was sentenced to three months, which ran 
concurrently.126 Hirabayashi challenged both the curfew order and the 
exclusion order as unconstitutionally delegating power to the military and 
unconstitutionally discriminating against Japanese-Americans.127 
However, because lawful conviction on either count could support 
Hirabayashi’s three-month sentence, the Supreme Court chose to rule only 
on his curfew conviction and did not address the exclusion offense. 
Stone’s majority opinion took three critical steps. First, with high 
deference to military officials, the Court accepted that at least some 
persons of Japanese ancestry, in “numbers and strength [that] could not be 
 124. Brief for the United States at 11–13, 21–23, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) 
(No. 45-22). Nanette Dembitz, who had worked for the federal government during this period, IRONS, 
supra, note 51, at 196, later criticized this rationale. Nanette Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the 
Military Judgment: The Supreme Court’s Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 175 
(1945). She thought it “startling” that detecting disloyalty among citizens of Japanese ancestry “was 
viewed as necessitating their mass racial exclusion [in the West] but was not viewed as sufficiently 
grave to require . . . special precautionary measures with respect to the activities of any of the evacuees 
in any other part of the country.” Id. at 201. She concluded, “from . . . statements of the military 
authorities, from the attempts to secure migration prior to the initiation of detention, and from the fact 
that no program for the segregation of the loyal from the disloyal was commenced until established by 
the War Relocation Authority approximately four months after the detentions in Assembly Centers 
began,” that segregation to investigate loyalty “was not the purpose of the Assembly Center detention 
in the Korematsu case.” Id. at 201–02 (footnotes omitted). 
 125. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 126. Id. at 85. Two random events were critically important to Hirabayashi’s case. First, when 
Hirabayashi presented himself for arrest, he sought solely to challenge DeWitt’s evacuation order, but 
he brought with him a briefcase, and in it a diary described various curfew violations. Based on that 
diary and Hirabayashi’s corroborative confession, the government charged him with violating the 
curfew order. IRONS, supra note 51, at 92. 
 Second, after Hirabayashi’s conviction on both counts, the district judge initially imposed a 
sentence of thirty days on count one, followed by thirty days on count two, but Hirabayashi requested 
at least a ninety-day sentence, because that was the minimum term that would allow him to work at a 
roadcamp. In response, the district judge sentenced Hirabayashi to ninety days on each count to run 
concurrently. Id. at 159. These two circumstances are what combined to defeat Hirabayashi’s 
challenge to DeWitt’s exclusion order, thereby allowing the Court to decide only the curfew’s legality. 
 127. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 89. 
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precisely and quickly ascertained,” were a “menace to the national defense 
and safety, which demanded that prompt and adequate measures be 
taken.”128 Second, the Court accepted that innocent Japanese-American 
and Japanese persons “could not readily be isolated” from dangerous 
ones.129 Third, the Court denied that a curfew must be imposed on “all 
 128. Id. at 99; see also id. at 101 (“We cannot close our eyes to the fact . . . that in time of war 
residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading force may be a greater source of danger than those 
of a different ancestry.”). The Court also noted “support” for the view that Japanese-Americans had 
failed “in large measure” to assimilate into white populations, partly due to the racism of white 
residents themselves: 
[I]n the Pacific Coast area, there has been relatively little intercourse between [Japanese 
aliens and citizens] and the white population. The restrictions, both practical and legal, 
affecting the privileges and opportunities afforded to persons of Japanese extraction residing 
in the United States, have been sources of irritation and may well have tended to increase 
their isolation, and in many instances their attachment to Japan and its institutions. 
Id. at 98; accord id. at 96. 
 129. Id. at 99. This argument’s strongest iteration appeared in Judge William Denman’s dissent in 
Hirabayashi v. United States, printed in Korematsu v. United States, 140 F.2d 289, 302–03 (9th Cir. 
1943) (Denman, J., concurring in the result): 
Because of [segregated housing and limited] social intercourse, [white] people do not become 
familiar with the Mongolian physiognomy. The uniform yellow skin, and on first impression, 
a uniformity of facial structure, make “all Chinks and Japs look alike to me,” a common 
colloquialism. Hence arises a difficulty . . . in picking out from the other Japanese crowded 
together in the segregated districts, . . . the suspected saboteurs or spies or fugitives from a 
commando landing or hiding parachutists. Also the difficulty of identification of Japanese of 
known or suspected enemy aid, by descriptions telegraphed or written to white enforcement 
officers. 
 Other federal officials expressed comparably offensive views. An early memorandum for 
Attorney General Biddle concerning evacuation stated that “[s]ince the Occidental eye cannot readily 
distinguish one Japanese resident from another, effective surveillance of the movements of particular 
Japanese residents suspected of disloyalty is extremely difficult if not practically impossible.” IRONS, 
supra note 51, at 55 (quoting memorandum). That argument alleged that it was unnecessary “‘to bar 
the millions of persons of German or Italian stock from either seacoast area,’ since ‘the normal 
Caucasian countenances of such persons enable the average American to recognize particular 
individuals by distinguishing minor facial characteristics.’” Id. 
 Secretary of War Henry J. Stimson’s diary also explained the need for evacuation based on racial 
untrustworthiness. Id. at 56 (“‘The second generation of Japanese can only be evacuated as part of a 
total evacuation [of all citizens], . . . or by frankly [admitting] . . . that their racial characteristics are 
such that we cannot understand or trust [them]. This latter is the fact but I am afraid it will make a 
tremendous hole in our constitutional system.’”). 
 The government’s lower-court briefs relied on similar racism. See id. at 138 (quoting the 
government’s tactical memorandum in Yasui v. United States, 310 U.S. 115 (1943): “[I]t is impossible 
. . . to make a particular investigation of the loyalty of each person in the Japanese community. . . . 
Such an investigation would be hampered in any case by the difficulties which the Caucasian 
experiences with Oriental psychology.”); cf. id. at 139–40 (quoting a district court brief in Yasui: “‘Jap 
citizens are inevitably bound, by intangible ties, to the people of the Empire of Japan. . . . They are 
alike, physically and psychologically. . . . Even now, though we have been separated from the English 
people for over 100 years, we still take pride in the exploits of the R.A.F. over Berlin, and the 
courageous fighting of the Aussies in Northern Africa. Why? Because they are people like us. They 
are Anglo-Saxons. . . . Who can doubt that the Japs in this country, citizens as well as aliens, feel a 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p99 Green book pages2.doc8/23/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
128 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
citizens, . . . or on none,” because that would force the military either to 
“inflict[] obviously needless hardship on the many, or sit[] passive and 
unresisting in the presence of the threat.”130
Although the Court in Hirabayashi stated that “[d]istinctions between 
citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to 
a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of 
equality,”131 it ultimately held that: 
The adoption by the Government, in the crisis of war and . . . 
threatened invasion, of measures for the public safety, based upon 
the recognition of facts and circumstances which indicate that a 
group of one national extraction may menace that safety more than 
others, is not wholly beyond the limits of the Constitution and it is 
not to be condemned merely because in other and in most 
circumstances racial distinctions are irrelevant.132
Three Justices filed concurring opinions: Douglas, Rutledge, and Murphy 
(who changed his initial dissenting vote under pressure from 
Frankfurter).133 Yet every Justice joined Stone’s opinion, and none 
disputed his analysis. 
sense of pride in the feats of the Jap Army—this feeling of pride is strong in some, weak in others, but 
the germ of it must be present in the mind of every one of them.’”). 
 But perhaps most extraordinary is Justice Black’s statement in 1971 defending the World War II 
internments: “‘I would do precisely the same thing today . . . . I would probably issue the same order 
were I president. We had a situation where we were at war. . . . People were rightly fearful of the 
Japanese,’ he explained, because ‘they all look alike to a person not a Jap.’” Id. at 356. 
 Given such corrosive beliefs’ prevalence, it is unclear as a matter of logic why neither the federal 
government nor other political interests proposed to exclude and confine persons of Chinese, Korean, 
and other “occidentally indistinguishable” peoples—just to be “safe.” As a matter of politics, however, 
the likely reason is that other East Asian nations were United States allies against Japan, and might not 
have tolerated such flagrant discrimination against their citizens and emigrants. 
 130. Korematsu, 320 U.S. at 95 (“We think that constitutional government, in time of war, is not 
so powerless and does not compel so hard a choice if those charged with the responsibility of our 
national defense have reasonable ground for believing that the threat is real.”). 
 131. Id. at 100. 
 132. Id. at 101. 
 133. See FERREN, supra note 5, at 244 (describing Murphy’s change); IRONS, supra note 51, at 
243 (similar). See generally id. at 239 (“Frankfurter’s law clerk in 1943, . . . [said that Frankfurter] 
‘saw himself as a member of the President’s war team . . . . He went to war on December 8, 1941, 
literally.’”). 
 These concurring opinions deserve brief discussion. Douglas’s opinion endorsed broad military 
discretion to detain Japanese-American citizens because he found that such decisions’ “wisdom or 
expediency” was beyond judicial review. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 106–07 
(1943) (Douglas, J., concurring). However, Douglas reserved judgment as to whether a detainee might 
need post-detention administrative review to determine her actual threat and loyalty. Id. at 108–09; cf. 
IRONS, supra note 51, at 238 (“Douglas’s law clerk [explained:] ‘Douglas encountered DeWitt on the 
West Coast . . . [who] filled him with horrible stories about Japanese submarines lurking off the coast. 
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In 1944, one year after Hirabayashi, and only months from the war’s 
end, the Court decided Korematsu v. United States, which addressed 
DeWitt’s exclusion orders. Toyosaburo “Fred” Korematsu was an 
American citizen convicted of being present in California after DeWitt’s 
exclusion order took effect;134 he challenged this conviction as 
unconstitutional discrimination. 
The Supreme Court rejected Korematsu’s argument six to three, but it 
is less well-known that the conference vote was much closer.135 Stone, 
Black, Frankfurter, and Reed voted to affirm Korematsu’s conviction; 
Roberts, Murphy, Jackson, and Douglas voted to reverse. Because Justices 
at conference speak in order of seniority—and eight members of the Court 
were evenly divided—the final decision fell to Wiley Rutledge. Stone 
gently prodded: “If you can do it for curfew you can do it for 
exclusion.”136 Then, in what must have been a “moment of high drama on 
the nation’s highest court,” Rutledge told his colleagues: “I had to swallow 
Hirabayashi. I didn’t like it. At the time I knew if I went along with that 
[curfew] order I had to go along with detention for [a] reasonably 
necessary time. Nothing but necessity would justify it.”137 Rutledge 
therefore voted to affirm, and Douglas later switched to join the majority, 
leaving as the only dissenters the very liberal Murphy and two moderate 
conservatives, Roberts and Jackson. 
He really thought we had a hell of an emergency . . . . I argued with him about paying so much 
attention to the military but I didn’t get anywhere.’”). 
 Murphy’s opinion harshly described the government’s race-based program. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. 
at 110–11 (Murphy, J., concurring) (“Distinctions based on color and ancestry are utterly inconsistent 
with our traditions and ideals. . . . The result is the creation in this country of two classes of citizens for 
purposes of a critical and perilous hour . . . . In my opinion, this goes to the very brink of constitutional 
power.”). But even Murphy ultimately concluded that the racist curfew represented an “allowable 
judgment” by the military in confronting the “peril of imminent enemy attack.” Id. at 113. 
 Rutledge’s concurrence stated only that, despite Hirabayashi’s pro-government result, federal 
courts reserved formal power to review detention decisions. Id. at 114 (Rutledge, J., concurring) (“[A 
military officer] of course must have wide discretion and room for its operation. But it does not follow 
there may not be bounds beyond which he cannot go and, if he oversteps them, that the courts may not 
have power to protect the civilian citizen.”). An earlier Rutledge draft had stated: “I have strong 
sympathy with Mr. Justice Murphy’s views . . . . Judged by peacetime standards, the statute involves a 
delegation of concentrated, unconfined power over civilian citizens and the order a racial 
discrimination only war’s highest emergency could sustain.” IRONS, supra note 51, at 247. The early 
draft also described DeWitt’s curfew order as “something which approaches the ultimate stain on 
democratic institutions constitutionally established.” Id. It is unclear why such language vanished from 
Rutledge’s published opinion. 
 134. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 135. See FERREN, supra note 5, at 249. 
 136. IRONS, supra note 51, at 322. 
 137. See FERREN, supra note 5, at 249. 
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Modern lawyers can imagine few cases more wrongly decided than 
Korematsu, but of course that view is informed by hindsight.138 When 
Roosevelt and DeWitt issued their orders in 1942, the United States had 
suffered an unthinkable surprise attack, from an enemy whose military 
capabilities were less familiar than the other Axis powers’. Major sabotage 
and espionage seemed realistic, and although invasion was less likely, 
some readers will recall that a Japanese warplane shelled the Pacific Coast, 
and submarines surfaced just offshore.139 There was certainly reason to 
doubt the military’s threat assessments even in 1942140—and the 
government concealed information from the Supreme Court that would 
have raised more doubts.141 But few commentators (and fewer judges) 
 138. For general debate over how hindsight does, and should, figure into analysis of wartime 
security measures, compare Neil S. Siegel, A Prescription for Perilous Times, 93 GEO. L.J. 1645, 
1654–56 (2005), with RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 299 (2003). 
 139. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 
188–92 (1998) (collecting contemporaneous evidence of the domestic threats and their popular 
perception); see also IRONS, supra note 51, at 26–27 (“[I]n the weeks that followed Pearl Harbor the 
prospect of a Japanese attack on the mainland simply could not be dismissed out of hand. . . . [F]rom 
December 17 to December 23, four Japanese submarines made eight or nine attacks on American 
shipping vessels, sank two tankers, and damaged one freighter[, all of which] caused great 
apprehension in DeWitt’s headquarters.”). 
 140. For example, the LA Times cautioned in a December 10, 1941 editorial entitled “Let’s Not 
Get Rattled,” that it would take several aircraft carriers “‘together with a good-sized fleet of covering 
war vessels and fuel supply ships, to carry on a sustained campaign’” against the Pacific Coast. IRONS, 
supra note 51, at 6–7 (quoting editorial). “‘Could such an aggregation of surface craft sneak up on this 
Coast undetected by our now aroused sky scouting forces?’” Id; see Yin, supra note 94, at 1098 n.420 
(documenting the decreased risk of attack by mid-1942). 
 On December 8, 1941, an Army spokesman caused a huge blackout by reporting that thirty 
Japanese planes had “‘reconnoitered the San Francisco Bay area and other sections of California.’” Id. 
at 26. This warning proved to be false. Furthermore, “[reports] the following week of a Japanese fleet 
steaming toward the West Coast and of further air attacks convinced [Major General Joseph W. 
Stilwell] that DeWitt’s intelligence units were ‘amateur’ and that the public warnings of an impending 
Japanese attack . . . had been irresponsible.” Id.; cf. id. at 179 (“When Judge Denman asked . . . 
whether there had been ‘a single case from Pearl Harbor to the evacuation’ where any Japanese 
American had been ‘found by competent authority to be a menace’ to military security, [the 
government’s attorney] admitted without hesitation that he knew of none.”). 
 141. Here are some examples of information that the Court did not know when it decided 
Korematsu in December 1944. In July 1944, General DeWitt’s successor, upon reviewing anti-
sabotage measures wrote to his superior: “‘My study . . . leads me to a belief . . . that the great 
improvement in the military situation . . . indicates that there is no longer a military necessity for the 
mass exclusion of the Japanese from the West Coast as a whole.’” Id. at 273. 
 In February 1944, J. Edgar Hoover issued a “Personal and Confidential” memorandum, 
summarizing the FBI’s investigation of claims that “‘there was a possible connection between the 
sinking of United States ships by Japanese submarines and alleged Japanese espionage activity on the 
West Coast.’” Id. at 280–81. Hoover wrote that “‘there is no information in the possession of this 
Bureau . . . which would indicate that the attacks made on ships or shores in the area immediately after 
Pearl Harbor have been associated with any espionage activity ashore or that there has been any illicit 
shore-to-ship signaling, either by radio or lights.’” Id. at 280–81. 
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would have staked national survival on such doubts until quite late in the 
war.142 Indeed, today’s most damning evidence that Japanese-Americans 
were targeted due to prejudice and racial stereotypes is our modern 
knowledge of how grievously federal officials exaggerated domestic 
perils.143 The Court in 1943 and 1944 had only partial knowledge of these 
exaggerations.144
 In May 1944, Solicitor General Fahy received documentation that FCC staff had personally 
informed DeWitt, both before his evacuation recommendation and afterward, that not one report of 
illicit radio transmissions had been verified. Id. at 282. The FCC Chairman reported: “‘The fact is that 
military personnel was entirely incapable of determining whether or not the many reports of illicit 
signaling were well-founded. . . . The basic trouble observed was the lack of training and experience of 
military personnel carrying on the monitoring and direction-finding work.’” Id. at 282; see id. at 283 
(“[The head of the FCC’s Radio Intelligence Division] confessed[:] . . . ‘Frankly, I have never seen an 
organization that was so hopeless to cope with radio intelligence requirements.’”). An Assistant to the 
Solicitor General described the impact of these revelations: “‘We are now therefore in possession of 
substantially incontrovertible evidence that [General DeWitt’s] most important statements of fact . . . 
to justify the evacuation and detention were incorrect, and furthermore that General DeWitt . . . in all 
probability did know that they were incorrect [when] he embodied them in his final report . . . .’” Id. at 
285. 
 142. For an example of one judge’s threat assessment in April 1942, consider Judge Lloyd L. 
Black’s decision denying a habeas petition. He “raised the specter of ‘fifth columnists . . . pretending 
loyalty to the land where they were born,’ but who might ‘become enemy soldiers over night.’” Id. at 
113. “‘How many believe that if our enemies should manage to send a suicide squadron of parachutists 
to Puget Sound that the Enemy High Command would not hope for assistance from many such 
American-born Japanese?’” Id. Judge Black later wrote, in an opinion upholding Hirabayashi’s 
indictment, that, “‘since Pearl Harbor last December, we have been engaged in a total war with 
enemies unbelievably treacherous and wholly ruthless, who intend to totally destroy nation, its 
Constitution, our way of life, and trample all liberty and freedom everywhere from this earth.’” Id. at 
155. “‘Of vital importance . . . is the fact that the parachutists and saboteurs, as well as the soldiers, of 
Japan make diabolically clever use of infiltration tactics. They are shrewd masters of tricky 
concealment among any who resemble them.’” Id. “‘With the aid of an artifice or treachery they seek 
such human camouflage and with uncanny skill discover and take advantage of any disloyalty among 
their kind.’” Id. 
 Justice Douglas, many years after the war, recalled the government’s argument “‘that if the 
Japanese landed troops on our West Coast nothing could stop them west of the Rockies.’” Id. at 362. 
The Court had been particularly impressed, Douglas added, by Solicitor General Fahy’s assertion that 
“‘the enclaves of Americans of Japanese ancestry should be moved inland, lest the invaders by 
donning civilian clothes would wreak even more serious havoc on our Western ports.’” Id. Douglas 
later characterized that scenario as “‘not much of an argument, but it swayed a majority of the Court, 
including myself.’” Id.; cf. id. at 129 (describing an ACLU resolution that “supported the 
government’s right during wartime ‘to establish military zones and to remove persons, either citizens 
or aliens, from such zones when their presence may endanger national security, even in the absence of 
a declaration of martial law[, if the evacuation was] based upon a classification having a reasonable 
relationship to the danger intended to be met’”). 
 143. See, e.g., id. at ix–x; YAMAMOTO supra note 124, at 9. 
 144. But cf. IRONS, supra note 51, at 306 (“Between them, the ACLU and JACL briefs [in 
Korematsu] questioned virtually every assertion in [General DeWitt’s] Final Report. [The former 
brief’s] attack on the factual veracity of DeWitt’s espionage claims was matched by [the latter brief’s] 
argument that racist motivations had led to evacuation.”). 
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Putting hindsight aside, however, it is uniquely valuable to reconstruct 
Rutledge’s perspective to understand Korematsu’s mistake. Rutledge was 
relatively sensitive to racial discrimination.145 And he had a strong 
reputation as a champion of individual rights—alongside Douglas, who 
joined the majority’s opinion, and Black, who authored it. How could he 
vote against Fred Korematsu? The question is important, but the two-fold 
answer is not easy or satisfying. First, Rutledge trusted FDR in ways that 
modern readers may struggle to grasp. Roosevelt had led the country 
through a Great Depression, using “fireside chats” to legitimate policies 
and build his personal image.146 When Korematsu was decided in 1944, 
Roosevelt was en route to winning his country’s largest foreign war and 
had just earned an unprecedented fourth presidential term; he had also 
picked seven of the nine sitting Justices. If Roosevelt said something was 
militarily necessary—as his Solicitor General did in Hirabayashi and 
Korematsu—that must have seemed to Rutledge, his colleagues, and much 
of the country a strong reason to believe it. 
 145. FERREN, supra note 5, at 387 (quoting Louis Pollak’s prediction that Rutledge “‘would have 
moved’ against racial discrimination in public schools ‘if he’d had the chance’”). See also Rutledge’s 
conduct in Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946), where Thurgood Marshall and William H. Hastie 
from the NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund argued that a Virginia statute requiring racially discriminatory 
service travel impermissibly burdened interstate commerce. Pollak, Profile of a Justice, supra note 4, 
at 208–10. At oral argument, Rutledge asked Hastie whether the main objection to the Jim Crow law 
should lie with the equal protection clause, not dormant commerce jurisprudence. Hastie responded 
that he and Marshall were not making any equal protection argument, but that they “would return to 
the Court with a case making that argument in due course.” Id. at 210. A majority in Morgan accepted 
the NAACP’s commerce argument. But Rutledge, unwilling to paper over such momentous issues of 
equality, wrote a one-line opinion: “Mr. Justice Rutledge concurs in the result.” Id. at 209. “It is not 
unreasonable to speculate that Rutledge’s laconic concurrence was a constitutional utterance of, 
ultimately, the first magnitude,” id., namely, it indicated Rutledge’s view, as early as 1946, that the 
“separate but equal” doctrine was unacceptable. 
 146. See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, The One-Way Mirror: Law Privacy, and the Media, 
82 WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 326 (2004) (describing the effect of Roosevelt’s image control on his political 
success). 
 Surprising deference to FDR persisted even among persons who opposed the government’s 
evacuation program. See IRONS, supra note 51, at 80–81 (“[Saburo Kido, a founding member of the 
JACL] denounced evacuation . . . . [but] nonetheless expressed ‘implicit confidence in President 
Roosevelt and the gratitude of the JACL ‘for the fairness with which our case has been handled. We 
are glad that we can become the wards of our government for the duration of the war.’”); id. at 134 
(explaining the “‘shift in opinion within the [ACLU] Board’ . . . [as based on] the nature of World War 
II as a global crusade against Nazi and fascist aggression and terror. Like most other Americans, 
members of the ACLU board were willing to countenance every effort to win the war. . . . The man 
who authorized the evacuation was not only the President but Commander in Chief of the troops who 
fought to preserve democracy.”); cf. id. at 180–81 (“As the only national organization of ‘progressive’ 
lawyers, the [National Lawyers Guild] . . . . actually backed the wartime internment program. . . . This 
sentiment illustrates as well the influence of the government lawyers who made up a substantial bloc 
of the Guild’s membership.”). 
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In a sense, the government used its institutional credibility as a 
litigating tactic, arguing that courts could not accurately judge national 
security risks, particularly because World War II presented “new” security 
risks “wholly unprecedented in the history of this country,” including 
unconventional warmaking through “fifth column” espionage and 
sabotage.147 Rutledge’s conversations with his first law clerk, Victor 
Brudney, confirm the effect in Hirabayashi of such arguments for 
deference. When Brudney suggested that the Court should request access 
to an FBI report casting doubt on the need for mass curfews and 
evacuations, Rutledge replied with defensive astonishment: 
What do you think you are doing? Don’t you understand that there 
are only nine of us sitting here, and that the generals have said this 
[curfew] is necessary for the preservation and security of the 
country? Pearl Harbor was attacked and more may happen! Who are 
we to question this? What makes you think any of us will question 
this? Too much is at stake, and we are too far removed from the 
realities.148
Part of Rutledge’s deferential posture surely reflected his trust, not in 
military officials generally, but in Roosevelt himself. 
Second, Rutledge’s Ahrens dissent illustrates his commitment to legal 
principle, and he saw Korematsu as conceptually inseparable from 
Hirabayashi—despite academics’ consistently opposite view.149 Modern 
jurists study Korematsu as indefensibly embracing Japanese-American 
internment, and Hirabayashi (if at all) as a curfew case of marginal 
 147. Brief for the United States at 16, 34, 60, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) 
(No. 43-870); see generally IRONS, supra note 51, at 21 n.* (“The term ‘fifth column’ [was] coined 
during the Spanish Civil War by an observer who remarked that General Franco had four military 
columns marching on Madrid and a ‘fifth column’ of civilian sympathizers already within the 
Capital.”). In modern parlance, fifth columnists would be called “terrorist sleeper cells”; further 
parallels to modern governmental rhetoric need no elaboration. 
 148. FERREN, supra note 5, at 246. 
 149. For early examples of the academic consensus that Hirabayashi and Korematsu are different, 
see Dembitz, supra note 124, at 189–97, and Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese-American Cases—A 
Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945). Interestingly, with the exception of Justice Roberts, whose 
reasoning is discussed herein, few judges have agreed with these academics’ view. In 1986, for 
example, Judge Donald Vorhees opined in Hirabayashi’s coram nobis proceeding that Hirabayashi’s 
conviction on the evacuation should be vacated, but that his curfew conviction should remain because 
the curfew had constituted a “relatively mild” burden “contrasted with the harshness of the exclusion 
order.” Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445, 1457 (W.D. Wash. 1986). The Ninth Circuit 
promptly reversed on that issue. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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significance.150 Justice Roberts’s Korematsu dissent states current 
orthodoxy: 
[Korematsu] is not a case of keeping people off the streets at night 
as was [Hirabayashi], . . . nor a case of temporary exclusion of a 
citizen from an area for his own safety or that of the community 
. . . . On the contrary, it is the case of convicting a citizen as a 
punishment for not submitting to imprisonment in a concentration 
camp based on his ancestry, and solely because of his ancestry, 
without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty and good 
disposition towards the United States.151
The briefs in Korematsu and Hirabayashi yield a very different picture. 
To start with obvious similarities, both cases concerned the validity of 
military orders from the same officer, authorized by the same statute and 
presidential order, based on the same asserted emergency, incorporating 
the same racial presuppositions, supported by the same dubious social 
science, asserting the same need for military deference, and invoking the 
same claim of judicial incompetence.152
 150. A recent essay suggests that legal education about the World War II cases fails adequately to 
recognize Ex Parte Endo. Patrick O. Guthridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933 (2003). 
Endo granted habeas relief to a Japanese-American who the military authorities had determined to be 
loyal. By contrast, Irons makes a strong argument that Endo is not so important: 
All that [the Endo Court] . . . intended, was to strike down the WRA’s requirement that 
[detainees who were deemed harmless] complete the leave forms as a condition for 
release. . . . ‘Neither the Act nor the orders use the language of detention,’ [Douglas] wrote 
. . . . Given this literal approach, of course, the Court’s opinions in the Hirabayashi and 
Korematsu cases would equally fail the test imposed by Douglas. . . . ‘We do not mean to 
imply,’ he explained on the Court’s behalf, ‘that detention in connection with no phase of the 
evacuation program would be lawful. The fact that the Act and the orders are silent on 
detention does not of course mean that any power to detain is lacking.’ The silence of the 
President and Congress meant only that ‘any such authority which exists must be implied.’ 
IRONS, supra note 51, at 342. Whatever one thinks of Endo, however, the greatest oversight is most 
lawyers’ widespread unfamiliarity with Hirabayashi, which set forth a complete doctrinal groundwork 
for the now-infamous Korematsu decision. 
 151. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225–26 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 152. Compare Brief for the United States at 3-32, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 
(1943) (No. 43-870) (discussing various racist and quasi-sociological theories arguing that people of 
Japanese descent were especially likely to be spies, saboteurs, and terrorists), with Brief for the United 
States at 3-15, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 213 (1944) (No. 45-22) (reciting and explicitly 
incorporating the Hirabayashi brief’s discussion of racial tensions and military necessity). See also 
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217 (“Exclusion Order No. 34, which the petitioner . . . admittedly violated, 
was one of a number of military orders and proclamations . . . . One of the series of orders and 
proclamations, a curfew order, which like the exclusion order here was promulgated pursuant to 
Executive Order 9066, subjected all persons of Japanese ancestry . . . to remain in their residences 
from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. As is the case with the exclusion order here, that prior curfew order was designed 
as a ‘protection against espionage and against sabotage.’”). 
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Of course it is true that a curfew, even one approaching house arrest, is 
substantially less disruptive than relocation and detention, which often 
wrecked jobs and property. Yet that line between Korematsu and 
Hirabayashi also blurs upon second glance. Hirabayashi was convicted 
not only of breaking curfew. He was also convicted of violating DeWitt’s 
exclusion order by failing to report to a Civil Control Station. The latter 
“exclusion count” was litigated and was squarely before the Court (though 
no Justice addressed the subject). By comparison, Korematsu’s case did 
not challenge indefinite detention—as many today believe—nor did it seek 
relief from relocation. Korematsu himself had not been indefinitely 
detained or relocated. Instead, he filed a direct appeal from his criminal 
conviction, and that conviction—just like Hirabayashi’s—concerned the 
failure to report to a Civil Control Station in violation of DeWitt’s 
exclusion order.153
Analysis of disputed legal issues reveals more similarities. The military 
defended, and the Court upheld, the convictions in Korematsu and 
Hirabayashi for the same reasons: (i) they involved persons of 
presumptively “menac[ing]” Japanese descent (ii) who “could not readily 
be isolated and separately dealt with,” and (iii) the military was allowed to 
use racial filters that might seem “odious” during peacetime, to avoid 
inflicting “obviously needless hardship” on the general (principally white) 
populace.154 The military deemed both the curfew and relocation programs 
necessary to counteract possible invasion, sabotage, and espionage. And 
although that conclusion was wrong, based on deeply flawed evidence, 
even modern readers must labor to draw constitutionally solid distinctions 
between the curfew and the relocation.  
In fact, only one of Korematsu’s dissenters—Justice Roberts—even 
tried to distinguish the unanimous Hirabayashi decision.155 The others 
quietly renounced their year-old votes.156 Roberts tried to distinguish 
 153. Korematsu, 323 at 215–16. 
 154. See supra text accompanying notes 128–30. 
 155. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 225–26, 231–32 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 156. Murphy’s dissent neither explains nor cites his concurrence in Hirabayashi. See id. at 233–42 
(Murphy, J., dissenting). But cf. id. at 233 (quoting without citation his earlier phrase, “the very brink 
of constitutional power”). His changed view may have resulted from information released in a post-
Hirabayashi government report concerning DeWitt’s justification and motives. Id. at 236 n.1 (noting 
explicitly that DeWitt’s latest report was not made public until after Hirabayashi was decided). 
 Jackson’s dissent also does not deny that Korematsu’s result follows logically from Hirabayashi. 
Id. at 246–47 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Instead, he lists Hirabayashi’s principled expansion as 
exemplifying inherent risks of wartime jurisprudence. In Jackson’s words, “we should learn something 
from [the Hirabayashi] experience,” and, his Korematsu vote indicates, we should not repeat it. Id. at 
246. 
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Korematsu from Hirabayashi because the government’s exclusion order 
was “part of an over-all plan for forceable detention,”157 but that argument 
is unpersuasive. The link between exclusion and detention was manifest in 
Hirabayashi. Indeed, Hirabayashi explicitly held that the relevant statute, 
executive orders, and military proclamations about Japanese-Americans 
were “not to be read in isolation” but were “parts of a single program 
[that] must be judged as such.”158 Was any part of that program, in 
Roberts’s words, for “forceable detention”? Or was every part of the 
program for security against threats?159 Roberts failed to recognize that, 
although Hirabayashi’s curfew and travel limits were milder than 
evacuation and relocation, each measure was obviously part of the same 
racially targeted security plan. It was clear to the Court, and was 
dispositive for Rutledge, that the practical effects of Korematsu and 
Hirabayashi differed, but their legal foundations were similar indeed. As 
the Korematsu majority wrote: “In the light of the principles we 
announced in the Hirabayashi case, we are unable to conclude that it was 
beyond the war power of Congress and the Executive to exclude those of 
Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area at the time they did.”160
None of this remotely suggests that Rutledge voted correctly in 
Korematsu, but it does shift the error’s root to Hirabayashi, a case where 
(in Rutledge’s first year at the Court) Frankfurter and Reed pressured even 
the stalwart liberal Murphy to support the government.161 Perhaps the 
strongest critique of Korematsu is that the exclusion order was not 
necessary for national survival—as should have been evident from the 
government’s weak arguments at the time. But the same is true of 
Hirabayashi’s curfew. There was no adequate reason to impose a mass 
curfew and travel restrictions on any population along the Pacific Coast. 
And even if there were, such regulations should have governed all persons 
in sensitive areas. If one must imagine packs of midnight saboteurs, 
 157. Id. at 232 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Roberts also seems to imply that the “emergency” basis 
for the exclusion order is less solid than that for the curfew order. Id. at 231–32. That argument is hard 
to credit, insofar as both measures seem to be military responses to the same asserted (albeit false) 
threats of sabotage, espionage, and invasion. In support of this viewpoint, Roberts cites “the facts 
above recited, and those set forth in [Endo],” id. at 232, but without more specificity, his intended 
referents are not clear. 
 158. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 103 (1943). 
 159. For a detailed analysis of complexities in identifying what discriminatory programs are “for,” 
see Roger Craig Green, Interest Definition in Equal Protection: A Study of Judicial Technique, 108 
YALE L.J. 439 (1998). 
 160. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217–18. 
 161. FERREN, supra note 5, at 244. For praise of Murphy’s Korematsu dissent, see generally Yin, 
supra note 94, at 1097 & n.411 (collecting sources). 
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seeking to bomb factories or shipping docks, it is hard to see why skin 
color or ancestry should matter much.162 Moreover, there was no evidence 
of post-Pearl Harbor sabotage or espionage by persons of Japanese 
descent, though such activities had been undertaken by non-Japanese 
persons during the war in Europe.163
The irrationality of the curfew and exclusion orders also reveals an 
obvious source of revulsion at Korematsu, namely, its racism; but once 
more, Korematsu and Hirabayashi are predominantly similar rather than 
different. Under an anti-discrimination model of equal protection, 
Hirabayashi and Korematsu were equally wrongheaded because both 
drew racial distinctions without a compelling, narrowly-tailored 
interest.164 Similarly, under an anti-subordination model, to exclude a 
racial group from home and community might be more offensive than 
house arrest because the former yields a class of “domestic exiles.”165 Yet 
race-based curfews and travel restrictions also produce “outsiders” within 
society’s gates and would undoubtedly violate anti-subordination norms. 
For purposes of this Article, what is most important is the anachronism 
of judging the Japanese-American cases under any modern theory of equal 
 162. Ironically, a variant of this argument appeared in Walter Lippman’s newspaper column, “The 
Fifth Column On the Coast,” which deplored “the unwillingness of Washington to adopt a policy of 
mass evacuation and mass internment of all those who are technically enemy aliens.” IRONS, supra 
note 51, at 60. “Nobody’s constitutional rights include the right to reside and do business on the 
battlefield,” he wrote. “And nobody ought to be on a battlefield who has no good reason to for being 
there. There is plenty of room elsewhere for him to exercise his rights.” Id. (emphasis added). If access 
restrictions, or detentions, were necessary, the most security-oriented policy would be to apply such 
restrictions to all civilians. (The anomaly, of course, is that Lippman’s article used the word “nobody” 
in this context to denote “no Japanese people.”) 
 The government’s counterarguments against universally applicable security measures were that (i) 
loyalty and ancestry correlate, (ii) Japanese people cannot be distinguished by “Occidental eyes,” and 
(iii) applying the curfew to white and other Californians would impose “obviously needless hardship.” 
Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 95 (emphasis added). For discussion of such arguments, see supra note 129. 
 163. Compare, e.g., YAMAMOTO, supra note 123, at 364, and IRONS, supra note 51, at 22–23 
(discussing the arrest of Itaru Tachibana, a Japanese naval officer masquerading as an English-
language student, in June 1941, and noting that the FBI, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and Army 
Intelligence all agreed “that the Japanese espionage ring had been broken before Roosevelt signed 
Executive Order 9066 [in February 1942]”), and id. at 52 (mentioning a report by J. Edgar Hoover on 
February 1942 “discounting the Army’s claims of sabotage and espionage on the part of Japanese 
Americans”), with Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (addressing case of German and United States 
citizen saboteurs, deposited on the East Coast by a German submarine to commit assorted acts of 
sabotage). 
 164. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995). 
 165. See Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, in EQUALITY AND PREFERENTIAL 
TREATMENT 84 (Marshall Cohen et al. eds., 1977); see also Owen M. Fiss, The Immigrant as Pariah, 
in A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF NEW AMERICANS (Joshua 
Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999). 
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protection, none of which had emerged in World War II.166 When 
Korematsu was decided, Brown was still a decade away, and the District 
of Columbia—like large swaths of the country—was unflinchingly 
segregated, with explicit discrimination from public education to the 
Capitol cafeteria.167 Nor were the Justices ignorant of links between 
United States racism and the Japanese-American cases. Indeed, the United 
States’ brief in Hirabayashi (which the government incorporated by 
reference in Korematsu) cited Plessy v. Ferguson as ordinary precedent, 
not as the constitutional pariah it would later become.168
Such historical context helps explain why the strong anti-racist 
language in Murphy’s dissent and the Court’s opinion did not ring with the 
clarity of principle that it holds today.169 The Justices lived and worked in 
a Jim Crow District of Columbia, and the Court oversaw a Jim Crow 
nation, with countless discriminatory acts against non-whites each day. 
Indeed, the United States military itself remained segregated.170 A more 
pointed question is how the Court could earnestly write that “[d]istinctions 
between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature 
odious to a free people,” and could, without mentioning legalized racism, 
describe the United States as having “institutions founded upon the 
doctrine of equality.”171 The Korematsu opinion upholding military racial 
 166. The earliest hallmark of modern equal protection theory was not yet published. Joseph 
Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949). Also, 
equal protection had not been incorporated against the federal government. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 
U.S. 497 (1954). But cf. Dembitz, supra note 124, at 188 (proposing, in an echo of equal protection 
jurisprudence decades later, that “[w]hen the method chosen to meet the danger is one of racial 
discrimination, it should not be deemed reasonable unless the Government sustains the burden of 
demonstrating that available less stringent and more limited alternatives could not reasonably have 
been considered adequate”). 
 167. See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 129 (1977) (“[As Herbert] Wechsler hurried 
out from the Court, then housed in the old Senate Office Building, he bumped into [the Dean of 
Howard Law School, Charles] Houston, who had come by to file a petition for rehearing. ‘I proposed 
that we have lunch in the Capitol,’ Wechsler would remember more than forty years afterward, ‘and he 
said no, we couldn’t do that, but we might go over to Union Station for a bite.”); GUNNAR MYRDAL, 
AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944), cited in Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954). 
 168. Brief for the United States at 60, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (No. 43-
870); Appellant’s Reply Brief at 10, Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. 81. 
 169. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 215, 242 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) 
(“Racial discrimination in any form and in any degree has no justifiable part whatever in our 
democratic way of life.”). 
 170. See KLUGER, supra note 167, at 226, 255; IRONS, supra note 51, at 364 (“During the 
evacuation debate in 1942, [Secretary of War Henry J. Stimson] defended the Army’s segregation of 
black soldiers . . . . [He] denounced the ‘foolish leaders of the colored race’ who failed to understand 
‘the basic impossibility of social equality’ in a society that forced the races apart by law.”). 
 171. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100. Incidentally, an early draft of Justice Black’s 
Korematsu opinion admitted that “the course of American life and thought has been increasingly 
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classification and evacuation was a predictably difficult occasion for the 
Court to proclaim (for the first time) that “all legal restrictions which 
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.”172 
At best, such phrases voiced dreams that the civil rights movement would 
struggle to realize. At worst, the Court’s holding that racial restrictions 
need “the most rigid scrutiny” bordered insincerity.173 Thus, although 
legal principle did not support Rutledge’s vote to join his colleagues in 
Hirabayashi,174 Rutledge did not see, and the dissents did not offer, a 
satisfying basis for changing course in Korematsu.175
It may be too late to reinvent conventional wisdom about Hirabayashi 
and Korematsu, which has long understated the former’s legal significance 
and overstated the latter’s. Two modern lessons nonetheless appear. First, 
to understand the true relationship between Hirabayashi and Korematsu is 
to illuminate the dangers of arguably “small” errors in executive detention 
cases. As Chief Justice Stone encouragingly suggested: “If you can do it 
for curfew you can do it for exclusion.”176 And as Justice Souter has 
written: “Not every epochal case has come in epochal trappings.”177 From 
Rutledge’s perspective as the decisive fifth vote, the Court’s mistake in 
Korematsu was to slip down the treacherous slope that Hirabayashi had 
constructed. For modern readers to overlook that aspect of the internment 
cases misses something important. 
Second, insofar as even Korematsu’s dissenters hesitated to invoke 
now-conventional arguments about the military curfew’s “small impact” 
to explain their year-old change in votes, one might seek explanations 
elsewhere. For some Justices, what most separated Hirabayashi from 
Korematsu was a year’s passed time, and the government’s reaction 
polluted by the warped psychology of race hatred,” but characterized that circumstance less as a 
domestic problem than as “a reflection of the witch’s brew that has lately been served up abroad.” 
IRONS, supra note 51, at 337. 
 172. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. See generally IRONS, supra note 51, at 340 (speculating that 
“[t]he odd placement of [this phrase] in the opinion—stuck in the middle of the chronology of the 
case—suggests that Black inserted it at the last minute, more as window dressing than as a plank in the 
opinion’s foundation”). 
 173. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
 174. Rutledge wrote to Chief Justice Stone, “I have had more anguish over [Hirabayashi] than any 
I have decided, save possibly one death case in the [Court] of Appeals.” FERREN, supra note 5, at 245. 
It is an irreducible shortcoming that Rutledge did not follow through on such concerns, which could 
have changed his vote. 
 175. Also interesting is the fact that none of Korematsu’s dissenters proposed to overrule 
Hirabayashi as a virulent mistake. 
 176. IRONS, supra note 51, at 322. 
 177. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 615 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).  
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thereto.178 When Korematsu reached the Court in 1944, the United States 
was far more secure than when Hirabayashi was decided. Despite that 
increased security, the government’s arguments and policies concerning 
race-based confinement were unchanged. Even years after Pearl Harbor, 
Japanese-American detainees remained in prison, even those whom the 
government found to be innocent and loyal.179 For skeptics of Japanese-
American internment, it must have seemed absolutely clear in 1945 that 
the government’s detention program encompassed—to say the least—
disturbing excesses and oversimplifications. 
From this unconventional perspective, Korematsu’s dissents look quite 
different. These opinions perhaps voiced frustration and dissatisfaction 
with the government’s exhausted, decreasingly credible arguments in its 
“second round” of detention litigation. None of this changes the 
misfortune that Rutledge, and with him a majority of the Court, used 
Korematsu to confirm, not reject, Hirabayashi’s missteps. But recreating 
Rutledge’s perspective crystallizes how a better path might have been 
clearer if any of Korematsu’s dissenters had been methodical, or perhaps 
candid, in analyzing the two cases together. 
2. “Enemy Combatants” 
Hindsight and doctrinal shifts have discredited Korematsu and 
Hirabayashi, yet the Court had no occasion to reconsider the wartime 
executive detention of uncharged citizens until Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.180 In 
late 2001, the United States took custody of Yaser Esam Hamdi, who was 
captured by the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. The United States 
transferred Hamdi to Guantanamo Bay, but upon learning that he was born 
an American citizen, the government transferred him to Virginia and then 
to South Carolina.181
In June 2002, Hamdi’s father filed for habeas corpus, claiming that the 
government should stop questioning Hamdi and give him counsel, and that 
Hamdi’s detention without charges or a hearing was illegal. The petition 
claimed that Hamdi was doing short-term relief work in Afghanistan, and 
had neither trained nor fought against the United States.182 The 
government replied that Hamdi’s detention was proper under the 
 178. Cf. supra note 156 (discussing Murphy’s reliance on new information). 
 179. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 300 (1944). 
 180. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 181. Id. at 510. 
 182. Id. at 511. 
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Authorization for Use of Military Force183 because he had helped the 
Taliban as an “enemy combatant,” i.e., “part of or supporting forces 
hostile to the United States” who “engaged in an armed conflict against 
the United States.”184 As proof, the government offered a declaration from 
an official with second- and third-hand knowledge of the case, but the 
district court ordered in camera review of numerous documents 
concerning Hamdi’s capture and detention. The Fourth Circuit reversed, 
allowing the government to detain any person in a combat zone based on 
an executive finding of enemy combatant status, without judicial review of 
the supporting evidence.185
In 2004, Hamdi reached the Court under Korematsu’s shadow. Fred 
Korematsu himself filed a brief seeking certiorari, and several merits 
briefs cited the World War II cases.186 There were, however, obvious 
differences between the two. For example, Hamdi did not concern racial 
discrimination or mass removal of citizens. Hamdi did, however, involve 
the detention of potentially innocent citizens based on executive 
judgments of fact and military necessity. And the latter principle struck 
some observers as unsound in a “war” whose uncertain duration might 
support exceedingly long confinement.187
The Supreme Court ruled eight to one that the Fourth Circuit was 
wrong, but it could not reach consensus as to why. The majority divided 
among three opinions, each of which may be judged by its capacity to 
prevent “another Korematsu.”188 O’Connor wrote for four Justices that 
Congress’s Authorization of Military Force allowed the President to detain 
any “enemy combatant” on the battlefield who supported hostile forces 
 183. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 184. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510, 516. 
 185. Id. at 514. 
 186. Brief of Amicus Curiae Fred Korematsu in Support of Petitioners, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696); see, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of the ACLU et al. in Support of 
Petitioners at 25, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696); Brief of Washington Legal 
Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 20–21, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507 (2004) (No. 03-6696); see also, e.g., Brief for United States Senators John Cornyn et al. as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Donald H. Rumsfeld at 17 n.9, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) 
(No. 03-6696). 
 187. Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 
WISC. L. REV. 273, 279 (“The already long duration of the “war on terrorism” suggests that we ought 
not think of it as a war in the sense that World War II was a war. . . . To say that law is silent during a 
more-or-less permanent condition is quite different from saying that law is silent during wartime.”). 
 188. As should be clear, I use this label for convenience, and perhaps for effect, to indicate the 
danger of excessive executive detention. I do not mean to suggest that wholesale racist internment is 
upon us, or is at all likely. Much less should the term counterindicate my personal preference for the 
(never-used) term “another Hirabayashi.” 
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and took up arms against the United States.189 For citizen detainees who 
denied committing hostile acts against the United States, however, 
O’Connor stated that procedures for deciding enemy combatant status 
must—as a matter of due process—balance detainees’ interests in liberty 
and accuracy against military interests in security and convenience.190 In 
striking that balance, the plurality required that detainees be able to dispute 
the government’s enemy combatant finding before a neutral 
decisionmaker, but the plurality also suggested that the government might 
sometimes use hearsay evidence, withhold military documents, and use 
independent military tribunals as decisionmakers.191 Finally, in providing 
instructions on remand, O’Connor endorsed broad district court discretion: 
We anticipate that a District Court would proceed with the caution 
that we have indicated is necessary in this setting, engaging in a 
factfinding process that is both prudent and incremental. We have 
no reason to doubt that courts faced with these sensitive matters will 
pay proper heed both to the matters of national security that might 
arise in an individual case and to constitutional limitations 
safeguarding essential liberties that remain vibrant even in times of 
security concerns.192
Interspersed with these fairly mild substantive rulings, O’Connor used 
sharp language to reject Korematsu’s legacy.193 Indeed, O’Connor cited 
 189. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (stating that persons determined to be Taliban fighters may be 
detained at least during active United States combat in Afghanistan). O’Connor’s opinion was joined 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer. 
 190. Id. at 528–35 (applying this balance); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 
(1976) (outlining the general methodology). 
 191. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534 (“Any factfinding imposition created by requiring a knowledgeable 
affiant to summarize [documents regarding battlefield detainees] to an independent tribunal is a 
minimal one.”). 
 192. Id. at 538–39. 
 193. Id. at 530–31 (acknowledging the lessons of “history and common sense . . . that an 
unchecked system of detention carries the potential . . . for oppression and abuse of others who do not 
present [a] threat,” and “reaffirming . . . the fundamental nature of a citizen’s right to be free from 
involuntary confinement by his own government without due process of law”); id. at 532–33 (“It is 
during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation’s commitment to due process is 
most severely tested; and it is in these times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the 
principles for which we fight abroad. . . . These essential constitutional promises may not be eroded.”). 
In Hamdi’s most quoted phrase, O’Connor wrote: 
We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when 
it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens. Whatever power the United States Constitution 
envisions for the Executive . . . in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all 
three branches when individual liberties are at stake. 
Id. at 536; id. at 536–37 (“[I]t would turn our system of checks and balances on its head to suggest that 
a citizen could not make his way to court with a challenge to the factual basis for his detention by his 
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Murphy’s Korematsu dissent as evidence that, while courts afford the 
greatest respect to the judgments of military authorities “in matters 
relating to the actual prosecution of a war, . . . it does not infringe on the 
core role of the military for the courts to exercise their own time-honored 
and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and resolving claims like 
[Hamdi’s].”194
O’Connor’s broad, anti-detention rhetoric indicated an understanding 
that the World War II cases’ failures sounded not only in racism, but also 
in a misallocation of institutional power and trust. Even as she 
acknowledged that profound problem, however, O’Connor’s multifactor 
test left federal courts to balance, on a case-specific basis, private liberty 
interests versus asserted military needs. The obvious risk is that such a 
flexible approach may not sufficiently discipline executive decisions, 
especially when the government controls the flow of information, and may 
even change a detainee’s location to seek a more favorable forum.195
What made the World War II cases incredibly hard was the Court’s 
inability to assess whether the government’s claims of dire threats were 
true, false, or somewhere in between. This is why no Justice criticized the 
government’s flawed factual arguments until the threat of domestic attack 
receded in 1944.196 By comparison, Hamdi’s case was more important for 
politics than national security. Hamdi’s detention affected few apparent 
security interests from the start, and any specific threats requiring 
uncharged detention seemed less urgent with each passing month and year. 
Also, the Court decided Hamdi just as the national media reported stories 
and pictures of terrible abuses in Abu Ghraib and elsewhere.197 In such a 
government, simply because the Executive opposes making available such a challenge.”); id. at 537 
(“Any process in which the Executive’s factual assertions go wholly unchallenged or are simply 
presumed correct without any opportunity for the alleged combatant to demonstrate otherwise falls 
constitutionally short.”). 
 194. Id. at 535. 
 195. Cf. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
 196. Compare, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 112–13 (1943) (“[T]he military 
authorities could have reasonably concluded at the time that determinations as to the loyalty and 
dependability of individual . . . persons of Japanese extraction on the West Coast could not be made 
without delay that might have had tragic consequences.”) (Murphy, J., concurring), with Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 235 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he exclusion . . . of all persons 
with Japanese blood in their veins has no . . . reasonable relation [to invasion, sabotage, and 
espionage]. And that relation is lacking because the exclusion order necessarily must rely . . . upon the 
assumption that all persons of Japanese ancestry may have a dangerous tendency to commit sabotage 
and espionage and to aid our Japanese enemy . . . .”). 
 197. For discussion among popular print media, see, for example, Mark Bowden, Lessons of Abu 
Ghraib, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July/Aug. 2004, at 37; Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, 
THE NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, at 42; Josh White, Army General Advised Using Dogs at Abu 
Ghraib, Officer Testifies, WASH. POST, July 27, 2004, at A18. Television images and internet sources 
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climate, the government’s strict litigating position—which would have 
displaced all judicial review of alien terrorists’ detention, regardless of that 
confinement’s duration or conditions—threatened the governmental 
credibility that was critical to earning Rutledge’s “swing vote.”198 Hamdi’s 
attorney stressed this credibility problem at oral argument, sardonically 
summarizing the government’s overall position as: “Trust us.”199
In any event, although O’Connor would not accept Hamdi’s indefinite, 
uncharged detention without some form of additional process, her 
doctrinal test overlooked the institutional problems plaguing this field of 
the law. For example, if the United States had a popular President like 
FDR, and if there were more demonstrable threats to national survival than 
presently appear, O’Connor’s flexible analysis would seem far easier to 
satisfy than the Court’s “most rigid scrutiny,” which failed to protect 
Japanese-Americans during World War II. Thus, although Hamdi’s 
plurality is sometimes praised for having resisted executive muscle-
flexing, a historical focus suggests that its precedent might fail in times of 
evident, pressing crisis.200
Four Justices in Hamdi, in two separate opinions, rejected the 
government’s argument for indefinite detention, but also rejected 
O’Connor’s balancing test. Scalia, joined by Stevens, viewed 
of such information were also prevalent during this time. For analysis of how this media attention 
affected the Court’s cases, see Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2090–93 
(2005). 
 198. See supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text. 
 199. Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696), 
2004 WL 1066082; cf. Neal K. Katyal, Executive and Judicial Overreaction in the Guantanamo 
Cases, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 49. 
 200. The Court’s power to control executive decisions during true crisis is, under any doctrinal 
architecture, certainly debatable. Cynics might suggest that, for popular Presidents facing 
demonstrable threats, it makes no difference what any court says. A popular touchstone for that view is 
Biddle’s statement that “[t]he Constitution has not greatly bothered any wartime President,” FRANCIS 
BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 218 (1962), but one might also reach back to Hamilton’s Federalist 78, 
which describes the judiciary as “least dangerous” precisely because it lacks the military and financial 
force to implement its decisions. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 Such arguments may undervalue the modern Court’s political authority. When the Court ordered 
Roosevelt to release Endo, he not only complied, he also began drawing down the mass detention 
program. See, e.g., YAMAMOTO, supra note 100, at 174–75. The most egregious interbranch conflict 
regarding detention was Lincoln’s famous failure to comply with Chief Justice Taney’s order in 
Merryman. See REHNQUIST, supra note 131, at 32–43. But even in that one case concerning one 
detainee, Lincoln quickly sought a congressional remedy, and defied only a Chief Justice riding circuit 
(speaking only for himself) whose reputation had been badly bruised by Dred Scott. Indeed, among the 
great fortuities of United States history is a record of federal compliance with unfavorable Supreme 
Court decisions. But cf. IRONS, supra note 88, at 154 (noting that, even though the ACLU posted 
Korematsu’s bail, “[t]he military policeman insisted that he had orders to take Korematsu into custody, 
and [the district judge] finally gave in. Korematsu left the courtroom under armed guard, taken first to 
the Presidio and then escorted back to the Tanforan internment camp.”). 
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constitutional due process as requiring full criminal process before any 
citizen could be detained, unless Congress suspended habeas corpus.201 
Scalia’s position was hard to square with a World War II precedent, Ex 
Parte Quirin,202 and his broad constitutional pronouncement risked 
imposing significant, potentially premature burdens on the government’s 
War on Terror.203 Also, if the other branches deemed Scalia’s 
constitutional rule unworkable, the only political solution would be for 
Congress to suspend habeas corpus altogether, thereby allowing even 
unconstitutional detention to escape judicial remedy.204
Souter, joined by Ginsburg, took a more promising approach, one 
grounded in history and responsive to the systemic pressures of national 
crisis. Souter avoided any need for Scalia’s constitutional analysis by 
invoking the Non-Detention Act of 1971, which states that “[n]o citizen 
shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except 
pursuant to an Act of Congress.”205 Souter described the statute’s purpose 
by explicit reference to World War II internment: 
[T]he Emergency Detention Act of 1950 [that prompted enactment 
of the Non-Detention Act]. . . authorized the Attorney General, in 
times of emergency, to detain anyone reasonably thought likely to 
engage in espionage or sabotage. That statute was repealed in 1971 
out of fear that it could authorize a repetition of the World War II 
internment of citizens of Japanese ancestry; Congress meant to 
preclude another episode like the one described in Korematsu v. 
United States.206
 201. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia also endorsed the clear statement rule 
that Souter defended in detail. Id. at 574. For a superb discussion comparing Scalia’s view to the 
plurality’s, see Trevor W. Morrison, Hamdi’s Habeas Puzzle: Suspension as Authorization?, 91 
CORNELL L. REV. 411 (2006). 
 202. 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (upholding trial of a United States citizen before a specially composed 
military commission). 
 203. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 107–08 (noting some Justices’ apparent hesitation to 
make broad judicial pronouncements in Rasul until more details of the new “war” became known). 
 204. Cf. Hamdi, at 502–14 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Our tradition of infrequently suspending 
habeas corpus might have survived Scalia’s constitutional proposal, Dembitz, supra note 124, at 178 & 
n.11 (documenting historical examples of suspending the writ), but of course we cannot be sure. 
 205. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000). 
 206. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 542 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); see id. at 543 (“[Congress] 
adopted § 4001(a) for the purpose of avoiding another Korematsu.”); id. at 547 n.2 (noting “the 
congressional object of avoiding another Korematsu”). Scalia agreed with Souter’s statutory result, 
but, consistent with his distaste for legislative history, he declined to acknowledge the statute’s 
historical pedigree and objectives. Id. at 573–74 (Scalia, J., dissenting). By contrast, the plurality 
agreed with Souter’s general characterization of the statute, but not with his application thereof. Id. at 
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Souter repeatedly characterized the Non-Detention Act as “intended to 
guard against a repetition of the World War II internments”; thereby, he 
linked modern repulsion at wartime internment with legal authority to stop 
its recurrence, at least for citizens.207 Souter went further, stating a 
constitutional basis for his statutory approach: 
The defining character of American constitutional government is its 
constant tension between security and liberty, serving both by 
partial helpings of each. . . . For reasons of inescapable human 
nature, the [Executive] branch of the Government asked to counter a 
serious threat is not the branch on which to rest the Nation’s entire 
reliance in striking the balance between the will to win and the cost 
in liberty on the way to victory; the responsibility for security will 
naturally amplify the claim that security legitimately raises. . . . 
Hence the need for an assessment by Congress before citizens are 
subject to lockup, and likewise the need for a clearly expressed 
congressional resolution of the competing claims.208
517–19 (plurality). Oddly, Thomas’s dissent did not even mention 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a). Id. at 579 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 207. Souter also rested his analysis on a presumption against executive detention that allegedly 
derived from Endo. Id. at 2654–55. The other side of Endo, however, is that Korematsu was decided 
the same day. Cf. Guthridge, supra note 150, at 1965–70. Thus, it is hard to find in Endo any general 
presumption against executive detention. Such broad principles would seem inconsistent with 
Korematsu itself, where executive power was not limited to implementing the least restraint “clearly 
and unmistakably indicated by the language [Congress] used.” Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 300 
(1944). Most likely, Endo differed from Korematsu chiefly in that the government had explicitly found 
that Endo was loyal to the United States. Id. at 294; see IRONS, supra note 51, at 342. 
 It is also important that Souter’s analysis and the Non-Detention Act’s terms only reach citizens. 
See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002) (discussing myriad risks of allowing 
liberty protections to hinge on citizenship). The sharp legal distinction between citizens and non-
citizens is what allowed Murphy to say in Hirabayashi: “Today is the first time, so far as I am aware, 
that we have sustained a substantial restriction of the personal liberty of citizens of the United States 
based upon the accident of race or ancestry.” Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 111 (1943) 
(emphasis added). To be sure, antebellum victims of racist slavery were not technically “citizens.” But 
the failure even to mention slavery as part of our national history of discrimination illustrates how 
unsatisfying and misleading citizenship-based legal rules can be. See also Dembitz, supra note 124, at 
176 (“[T]he Japanese ancestry program brought to our law the first Federal measure of racial 
discrimination applicable to citizens . . . .”). 
 208. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 545 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Implicit in this analysis, and 
in Souter’s opinion more generally, is the premise that the Non-Detention Act binds the President even 
in his efforts to prosecute the War on Terror. No Justice other than Thomas cast doubt on that 
proposition. Cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 n.23 (“Whether or not the President has 
independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not 
disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his 
powers.”). 
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The government claimed that Hamdi’s detention complied with the 
Non-Detention Act because it did occur “pursuant to an Act of Congress,” 
namely, the Authorization for Use of Military Force.209 Thus, the 
operative question was how specific a congressional statute must be to 
satisfy the Non-Detention Act and authorize the detention of United States 
citizens. Souter replied by again resorting to history, comparing the post-
9/11 statute to statutes invoked in the World War II cases.210 The 
Japanese-American detentions were arguably supported by two 
congressional authorizations: the declaration of war against Japan and the 
statute criminalizing violation of any military exclusion order.211
If the Anti-Detention Act was drafted to prevent another Korematsu, it 
simply must require a clearer, more specific statutory basis for detention 
than appeared in World War II.212 Measured by that standard, the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force fails. Although the modern 
resolution may be a broad, general license to make war, it is not more 
specific than World War II’s declaration of war, and is clearly less specific 
than the statutes enforcing military-zone regulations. Souter did not 
explain his use of World War II history as a benchmark with maximal 
clarity, but that core historical comparison is what distinguishes his 
construction of the Non-Detention Act from other, more malleable “clear 
statement rules.” Under Souter’s approach, the backdrop of World War II 
presents an objective standard to measure future assertions of authorized 
executive detention.213
 209. The government’s other argument was that the Non-Detention Act applied only to detention 
by civil authorities, not to detention by military authorities. Id. at 517 (plurality). 
 210. Id. at 543, 547 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). For reasons disputed, supra note 207, 
Souter stressed Endo, rather than Korematsu, as the decisive precedent in interpreting these statutes. 
 211. Act of March 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173; see supra note 115 and 
accompanying text. 
 212. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 543 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Souter explained the World 
War II cases’ background as follows: 
Although an Act of Congress ratified and confirmed an Executive order authorizing the 
military to exclude individuals from defined areas and to accommodate those it might 
remove, the statute said nothing whatever about the detention of those who might be removed 
. . . . When, therefore, Congress repealed the 1950 Act and adopted § 4001(a) for the purpose 
of avoiding another Korematsu, it intended to preclude reliance on vague congressional 
authority . . . . In requiring that any Executive detention be “pursuant to an Act of Congress,” 
then, Congress necessarily meant to require a congressional enactment that [more] clearly 
authorized detention or imprisonment. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 213. For criticism of Souter’s opinion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 47, 94–95 (2004), and Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and 
the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2103–06 & n.271 (2005). Neither of these articles 
addresses the heart of Souter’s argument, namely, that the Non-Detention Act was designed to produce 
a different outcome in cases like Korematsu. If one accepts that premise, Souter’s conclusion seems 
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Souter acknowledged two implicit exceptions to the Non-Detention 
Act’s protection against executive imprisonment. First, “in a moment of 
genuine emergency, when the Government must act with no time for 
deliberation, the Executive may be able to detain a citizen if there is reason 
to fear that he is an imminent threat to the safety of the Nation and its 
people.”214 Souter clearly viewed extant criminal law as sufficient to 
manage such threats, but he noted in any event that Hamdi had been 
detained for over two years with no asserted or demonstrated emergency 
in sight; thus, any common-law “emergency exception” to the Non-
Detention Act was not applicable.215
Second, Souter agreed that the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
implicitly allowed the President not only to engage troops, but also to 
“deal with enemy belligerents according to the treaties and customs known 
collectively as the laws of war.”216 In Souter’s view, however, the 
government must demonstrate that its actions actually satisfied the laws of 
war, and he found that requirement unmet in Hamdi’s case.217 
Specifically, Souter cited the Geneva Convention’s mandate that captives 
be treated as prisoners of war until their status is individually determined 
by a “competent tribunal.”218 The President in 2002 proclaimed that al 
Qaeda and Taliban detainees are not entitled to prisoner-of-war status 
under the Geneva Convention.219 However, Souter denied that such 
categorical proclamations could resolve Hamdi’s individual status until 
some competent tribunal considered his factual claim not to be a member 
of al Qaeda or the Taliban. Souter did not technically resolve whether the 
government violated the Geneva Convention or other laws of war. Instead, 
he simply wrote that “the Government has not made out its claim that in 
detaining Hamdi in the manner described, it is acting in accord with the 
laws of war authorized to be applied against citizens by the Force 
directly to follow. For a modest defense of Souter’s opinion based on general habeas principles and 
institutional process theory, see Morrison, supra note 201, at 449–50. 
 214. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 552 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 215. Souter punctuated this conclusion with a flourish: “Whether insisting on the careful scrutiny 
of emergency claims or on a vigorous reading of [the Non-Detention Act], we are heirs to a tradition 
given voice 800 years ago by Magna Carta, which, on the barons’ insistence, confined executive 
power by ‘the law of the land.’” Id.  
 216. Id. at 548 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 217. Id. at 551.  
 218. Id. at 549 (citing Articles 4 and 5 of the Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3320, 3324 T.I.A.S. No. 3364). 
 219. Id. at 549–50. 
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Resolution.”220 Thus, the “laws-of-war” exception could not support 
Hamdi’s detention either. 
For readers focused on Rutledge’s role in Korematsu, Souter’s 
concurrence is especially striking because his decision to acknowledge 
judicial errors in World War II led to an analysis of the Non-Detention Act 
that safeguards constitutional values. Unlike the Constitution itself, with 
its long and mixed history of protecting rights in wartime (see, e.g., Quirin 
and Korematsu), the post-war statute was more easily construed as an 
uncontaminated, though limited, expression of ideals protecting individual 
liberty during crisis. Souter’s statutory rationale also left open the chance 
for further congressional involvement in detention policy, short of the 
extraordinary step of suspending habeas corpus. By shifting responsibility 
for detention decisions to Congress—instead of to judicial constitutional 
analysis—Souter’s approach furthered several institutional interests, 
including flexibility to meet new threats, power to collect empirical and 
political data, and time for unfolding events to confirm or dispel initial 
(potentially overdrawn) assessments of military necessity.221 All of these 
institutional benefits are of course tailored to ameliorate problems that 
emerged with a vengeance in Hirabayashi and Korematsu.222
By contrast, O’Connor’s opinion only partly addressed the perils of 
governmentally manipulated facts and risk assessments in wartime. If, for 
example, the government may rely solely on a federal official’s 
unconfirmed affidavit, and the affidavit is factually distorted by 
institutional pressures or worse, how will any judicial balancing of due 
process interests be useful? The plurality seemed not even to recognize 
such possibilities’ existence. Souter called historically grounded risks 
firmly to mind and took strong steps to prevent them from repeating. By 
requiring a clear congressional statement before citizens are detained 
 220. Id. at 551. 
 221. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 176–79 (discussing the delay separating Hirabayashi 
from Korematsu). Souter’s reliance on statutory law also blunts critiques of “judicial lawmaking.” The 
constitutional question (addressed by Scalia) of whether Congress and the President may ever detain 
civilian citizens without initiating ordinary criminal proceedings or suspending the writ of habeas 
corpus is a deep one, and the Solicitor General said—in surprisingly charged language—that a ruling 
against the government would be “constitutionally intolerable.” Brief for the Respondents at 46, 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696) 2004 WL 724020. 
 222. To be clear, Souter’s opinion did not abandon the constitutional field altogether. He 
suggested that notice, fair rebuttal, a neutral decisionmaker, and counsel are required—presumably as 
a matter of constitutional law. But he could not agree with the plurality’s suggestion that evidentiary 
presumptions against the defendant or the use of military tribunals might be legally acceptable. Hamdi, 
542 U.S. at 553 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). By leaving deeper constitutional issues aside, 
Souter’s approach also allowed that the political branches might endorse more presidential power than 
an Article III judge would have found apt. 
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without charges, and by recalling what may happen when presidential 
detention authority is not carefully supervised, Souter (who now holds 
Rutledge’s seat on the Court) offered just the sort of calm, normatively 
grounded analysis that Rutledge would have admired, especially in an 
opinion to correct his own greatest mistake.223
C. Military Commissions: Yamashita and Hamdan 
Our last paired cases are Rutledge’s celebrated dissent in In re 
Yamashita224 and the Court’s recent decision, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,225 
both of which address the President’s authority to try detainees in military 
tribunals. For the second time in three years, Justice Stevens has written a 
majority opinion validating his former employer’s dissent. More 
important, Hamdan’s case again raises questions of law’s status in crisis, 
and Rutledge’s work once more sheds significant light. 
1. A Japanese Commander 
Lieutenant General Tomoyuki Yamashita took command of Japan’s 
14th Area Army in October 1944, two weeks before General MacArthur’s 
 223. A final, possibly coincidental link to Rutledge is Souter’s disposition in Hamdi. Justice 
O’Connor’s plurality voted to remand Hamdi’s case for a Mathews v. Eldridge balancing as to the 
accuracy of Hamdi’s “enemy combatant” status determination. Four other Justices—Souter, Ginsburg, 
Scalia, and Stevens—voted to release Hamdi from detention, and only Justice Thomas voted to affirm 
the Fourth Circuit’s decision. With no majority of Justices supporting any one disposition, that four-to-
four vote would have affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s judgment by divided Court. The Court also could 
have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, which likewise would have left the 
Fourth Circuit’s ruling intact. To avoid this anomaly, Souter and Ginsburg compromised and accepted 
the plurality’s result, citing a Rutledge opinion that was the first to explain the need for such 
accommodations. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 134 (Rutledge, J., concurring in the result). 
Souter’s Hamdi opinion presented a clear and unyielding articulation of his substantive commitments, 
yet out of respect for the Court, his colleagues, and the individual interests at stake, Souter was able to 
reach a practical compromise—just as Rutledge did in his time. 
 224. 327 U.S. 1, 41 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). For contemporary praise of Rutledge’s 
dissent, see, for example, HOWARD, JR., supra note 3, at 374 (describing it as “undoubtedly a great 
opinion,” and “a careful examination of detail” that articulates a vision of fairness that is 
“commend[ed] as a precept”); Charles Fairman, The Supreme Court on Military Jurisdiction: Martial 
Law in Hawaii and the Yamashita Case, 59 HARV. L. REV. 833, 870 (1946) (explaining that 
“[w]hether one agrees with him or not on his several points . . . one must respect the ideal of justice” 
that Rutledge advocates); John T. Ganoe, The Yamashita Case and the Constitution, 25 OR. L. REV. 
143, 148 (1946) (calling the opinion “masterful” and “penetrating”). Neal Katyal recently stated that 
the Rutledge dissent “is one of the most powerful decisions I’ve ever read, and I commend each of you 
[to] read it.” Webcast: Panel Discussion on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, held by the Georgetown University Law Center Supreme Court Institute (June 30, 2006), 
available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/webcast/eventDetail.cfm?eventID=155 [hereinafter 
Georgetown Panel]. 
 225. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
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famous “return” to the Philippines.226 Outnumbered by advancing 
Americans four to one, Yamashita could not control his subordinates. 
Some officers disobeyed orders to withdraw from Manila, and their troops 
committed unspeakable atrocities against civilians until United States 
forces overran the city; other Japanese officers led counter-guerilla 
missions that killed 25,000 civilians. 
Japan surrendered on September 2, 1945, and Yamashita did so one 
day later. On September 25, the United States charged Yamashita with 
violating the law of war, and he was later arraigned before a commission 
of five American military officials, none of whom was a lawyer.227 The 
government’s bill of particulars listed sixty-four war crimes committed by 
Yamashita’s subordinates, claiming that Yamashita “unlawfully 
disregarded and failed to discharge his duty as commander to control the 
operations of the members of his command, permitting them to commit 
[the enumerated] brutal atrocities and other high crimes against the people 
of the United States and of its allies and dependencies, particularly the 
Philippines.”228 Yamashita pled not guilty, and three days before trial, the 
prosecution issued new charges concerning fifty-nine more atrocities 
committed by other officers. Defense attorneys were denied a continuance 
to address the new allegations. 
At trial, the prosecution presented 286 witnesses’ testimony and 423 
exhibits, the vast majority of which contained hearsay. Yamashita testified 
that he had not known of any of the charged misconduct, and two officers 
who had personally directed atrocities corroborated his account. Indeed, 
only two witnesses even purported to connect Yamashita directly to any 
atrocity, and those statements were so discredited that the prosecution’s 
closing arguments did not mention them.229 Nonetheless, on December 7, 
1945—four years to the day after Pearl Harbor—the military commission 
found Yamashita guilty “upon secret written ballot, two-thirds or more of 
the members concurring,” and sentenced him to death by hanging.230
Yamashita sought a writ of habeas corpus directly from the Supreme 
Court;231 his chief objections were that (i) his military commission was 
illegal because the war with Japan had ceased, (ii) the charges against him 
 226. FERREN, supra note 5, at 2. 
 227. Id. at 4. Although the commission was officially convened by a military officer, President 
Roosevelt approved the trial of Japanese officials by military commissions, and General MacArthur 
issued rules and regulations governing such trials. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 10–11. 
 228. FERREN, supra note 5, at 5. 
 229. Id. at 6. 
 230. Id.  
 231. Id. at 4–6. 
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did not state violations of the law of war, and (iii) the government’s use of 
depositions and hearsay evidence violated due process, the Geneva 
Conventions of 1929, and the Articles of War (statutory rules governing 
the Army’s military justice).232 At first, General MacArthur wished to 
execute Yamashita without judicial approval, but he was ordered to wait. 
In turn, the Supreme Court first wished not to hear Yamashita’s case, but it 
relented and granted certiorari under pressure from Rutledge.233
The Court voted six to two to deny Yamashita’s claims.234 Stone’s 
majority opinion listed extensive historical support for convening military 
commissions to try offenses against the “law of war.”235 In such cases, the 
Court held that the only proper judicial review was a habeas corpus 
proceeding that left all examination of factual disputes to military officials. 
Nonetheless, the Court noted that Congress had at least implicitly 
recognized the existence of military commissions, and had also implicitly 
recognized “the right of the accused to make a defense,” including a “right 
to contend that the Constitution or laws of the United States withhold 
authority to proceed with the trial.”236
On the merits, the Court upheld presidential authority to conduct trials 
by commission after hostilities ceased, “at least until peace has been 
officially recognized by treaty or proclamation.”237 Next, the Court upheld 
the government’s theory of “ineffective command,” which punished 
military leaders like Yamashita for unknowingly “permitting” 
subordinates to commit atrocities.238 The Court supported such liability by 
citing international conventions that arguably presupposed effective 
 232. See Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a 
Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261, 283 (2002) (discussing changes in the 
military justice system). Yamashita also alleged that the United States wrongfully failed to provide 
advance notice to Switzerland, the neutral power representing Japan’s interests, in violation of the 
Geneva Convention. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 6. 
 233. FERREN, supra note 5, at 8 (“To a former law clerk, Victor Brudney, Rutledge later wrote: 
‘[T]here was a three-day battle in conference over whether we would hear the thing at all. From then 
on the pressure was on full force.’”). 
 234. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 26. Jackson did not participate because he was at the Nuremberg 
trials. 
 235. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 7–9; see Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, 
cl. 10 (granting Congress power “[t]o define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations”). 
 236. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 9. 
 237. Id. at 12. That conclusion rested on practicalities of capturing war criminals, a scholarly 
consensus, and examples from United States history. E.g., id. (“No writer on international law appears 
to have regarded the power of military tribunals . . . as terminating before the formal state of war has 
ended.”); id. (“[O]nly after [hostilities’] cessation could the greater numbers of [war criminals] and the 
principal ones be apprehended and subjected to trial.”).  
 238. Id. at 13–18. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss1/3
p99 Green book pages2.doc8/23/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] EXECUTIVE DETENTION 153 
 
 
 
 
 
 
military command.239 But the Court’s main argument was that command 
responsibility was necessary for the law of war “to protect civilian 
populations and prisoners of war from brutality.”240
Finally, the Court rejected challenges to the military commission’s 
evidentiary standards.241 Yamashita invoked the Articles of War, which 
barred the use of depositions in capital cases before “any military court or 
commission,” and forbade hearsay or opinion evidence “before courts-
martial, courts of inquiry, military commissions, and other military 
tribunals.”242 The Court rebuffed those arguments because the Articles 
named only United States Army and similar personnel as “persons . . . 
subject to these articles”; enemy combatants were not included.243 The 
Court found that, despite Congress’s statutory recognition of military 
commissions’ existence, Congress had left control over procedures “where 
it had previously been, with the military command.”244
Yamashita also relied on the Geneva Conventions of 1929, which 
required prisoners of war to be tried “only by the same courts and 
according to the same procedure as in the case of persons belonging to the 
armed forces of the detaining Power.”245 As discussed supra, Yamashita’s 
trial violated evidentiary standards under the Articles of War, which 
undoubtedly would have governed a trial of United States personnel.246 
The Court found the Geneva Conventions inapplicable, however, because 
they regulated only prisoner-of-war prosecutions for acts committed while 
in detention, not (like Yamashita’s) before capture.247
 239. Id. at 15–16 (citing an Annex to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, the Tenth Hague 
Convention, and the Geneva Red Cross Convention); cf. id. at 16 (citing United States military 
tribunals rulings and international arbitrations to similar effect). 
 240. Id. at 15. But cf. id. at 16 (holding, with gross overstatement, that international law “plainly 
imposed” on Yamashita “an affirmative duty to take such measures as were within his power and 
appropriate in the circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the civilian population.”); id. at 16 
(“We do not make the laws of war but we respect them so far as they do not conflict with the 
commands of Congress or the Constitution.”). 
 241. “The regulations prescribed by General MacArthur . . . directed that the commission should 
admit such evidence ‘as in its opinion would be of assistance in proving or disproving the charge, or 
such as in the commission’s opinion would have probative value in the mind of a reasonable man.’” Id. 
at 18. 
 242. Id. at 18 & nn.5–6 (quoting the relevant statutes). 
 243. Id. at 19. 
 244. Id. at 20. 
 245. Id. at 20–21. 
 246. See supra note 218 (citing Articles of War regulating the use of hearsay and documentary 
evidence). 
 247. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 23. 
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Yamashita objected that the commission’s evidentiary standards also 
violated constitutional rights. The Court summarily dismissed that 
argument, with only the following explanation: 
For reasons already stated we hold that the commission’s rulings on 
evidence and on the mode of conducting these proceedings . . . are 
not reviewable by the courts, but only by the reviewing military 
authorities. From this viewpoint it is unnecessary to consider what, 
in other situations, the Fifth Amendment might require, and as to 
that no intimation one way or the other is to be implied.248
That analysis fails because the Court’s interpretation of statutory and 
international law was barely tangential to any constitutional objection.249 
Nevertheless, the Court held without further discussion that Yamashita’s 
trial “did not violate any military, statutory, or constitutional 
command.”250
Two dissents issued. Murphy’s was a fierce attack on the government’s 
“command responsibility” theory. Citing the Fifth Amendment, and a 
“philosophy of human rights” underlying the Constitution as a “great 
living document,” Murphy did not accept that Yamashita should die for 
subordinates’ wrongdoing—of which he was not alleged to have known—
especially when American forces themselves had dismantled Japanese 
command lines to disrupt control of Yamashita’s troops.251 Striking an 
ominous tone, Murphy implied that Yamashita’s trial was affected by “a 
prevailing degree of vengeance,” at a time when “emotions are 
understandably high” and it is “difficult to adopt a dispassionate 
attitude.”252
Rutledge’s dissent (which Murphy joined) focused on the procedures in 
Yamashita’s trial, which he viewed as raising three fundamental issues of 
fairness and judicial role: 
 248. Id.  
 249. The Court’s reference to reviewability is opaque at best, especially given the earlier holding 
that “Congress by sanctioning trials . . . by military commission . . . [implicitly] recognized the right of 
the accused to make a defense,” including a “right to contend that the Constitution or laws of the 
United States withhold authority to proceed with the trial.” Id. at 9. The Court perhaps envisioned a 
distinction between a petitioner’s contesting the “authority to proceed” and contesting the authority to 
proceed using constitutionally offensive procedures. The proposed scope or basis for such a 
distinction, however, has no further explanation. 
 250. Id. at 25. 
 251. Id. at 26 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 252. Id. at 40. 
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At bottom my concern is that [1.] we shall not forsake in any case, 
whether Yamashita’s or another’s, the basic standards of trial 
which, among other guarantees, the nation fought to keep; that [2.] 
our system of military justice shall not alone among all our forms of 
judging be above or beyond the fundamental law or the control of 
Congress within its orbit of authority; and that [3.] this Court shall 
not fail in its part under the Constitution to see that these things do 
not happen.253
After listing many specific deviations from criminal-law traditions in 
Yamashita’s prosecution—including ex post facto substantive liability, 
inadequate notice, liability without knowledge, inadequate time to prepare 
a defense, and proof without confrontation—Rutledge concluded that 
“[w]hether taken singly . . . as departures from specific constitutional 
mandates or in totality as in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s command 
. . . a trial so vitiated cannot stand constitutional scrutiny.”254 Given such 
massive and numerous procedural shortfalls, Rutledge stated that “this was 
no trial in the traditions of the common law and the Constitution.”255
Of course, the government and the majority did not believe that 
Yamashita’s trial satisfied due process under civilian law. Instead, the 
Court held that trials by military commission stood outside civil law 
standards and civil courts’ oversight. Rutledge believed that, although 
extraordinary deference was plausible in contexts of true “military 
necessity” or “battlefield” authority, it was not so after hostilities’ end. For 
Rutledge, the ancient maxim that laws are silent in the noise of arms had 
less force when the arms themselves are quiet.256
With respect to the Articles of War and the Geneva Convention, the 
Rutledge dissent (like his Ahrens opinion) was detailed and exhaustive. 
For each of the majority’s arguments, Rutledge offered counterarguments, 
which the Court did not try to answer. The Yamashita opinions merit 
closer attention than this space permits, but as in Ahrens, what is most 
important is the normative commitments underlying Rutledge’s technical 
 253. Id. at 42 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
 254. Id. at 45; id. at 60–61 (declaring that a military commission with such inadequate procedures 
“has no place in our system of justice, civil or military,” due to its “wide departure from the most 
elemental principles of fairness”). 
 255. Id. at 56; cf. id. at 61 (explaining that the impossible time pressures on Yamashita’s defense 
counsel “deprived the proceeding of any semblance of trial as we know that institution”). 
 256. Id. at 47 (“There is a maxim about the law becoming silent in the noise of arms . . . . [Inter 
armas silent leges.] But it does not follow that this would justify killing by trial after capture or 
surrender, without compliance with laws or treaties made to apply in such cases, whether trial is before 
or after hostilities end.”). 
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analysis. As Rutledge explained: “The difference between the Court’s 
view of this case and my own comes down to . . . [the Court’s holding] 
that no law restrictive upon these proceedings other than whatever rules 
and regulations may be prescribed . . . by the executive authority or the 
military . . . . “257
The majority’s legal vacuum would allow the executive to apply 
serious punishment—including death in Yamashita’s case—without 
respecting even the most basic procedural rights or fairness concerns. 
Rutledge’s forty-page dissent firmly rejected that result: “I cannot accept 
. . . that anywhere in our system resides or lurks a power so unrestrained to 
deal with any human being through any process of trial. . . . Nor has any 
human being heretofore been held to be wholly beyond elementary 
procedural protection by the Fifth Amendment.”258 For Rutledge, proper 
limits upon executive power could be derived from common-law fairness, 
constitutional due process, the Articles of War, international law, or all of 
the above. But nothing could reconcile his own dedication to legal rule and 
adjudicative process with “trial” procedures as shoddy as those that led to 
Yamashita’s death. 
2. Bin Laden’s Driver 
Although Rutledge worried that Yamashita’s decision to disregard 
conventional safeguards might portend a decline in all United States 
criminal procedure, those broad effects never materialized.259 Indeed, until 
recently, the Court’s decision to uphold Yamashita’s conviction—despite 
its ex post facto strict liability, hearsay evidence, and politicized time 
constraints—might have been forgotten or dismissed as simply “not th[e] 
Court’s finest hour.”260 Today’s War on Terror, however, has returned 
military commissions to the limelight. On November 13, 2001, citing the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Commander-in-Chief power, and 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, President Bush ordered that non-
citizen al Qaeda members and other international terrorists should, upon 
 257. Id. at 81. 
 258. Id. 
 259. See id. at 79 (“For once [the door against procedural abuse] is ajar, even for enemy 
belligerents, it can be pushed back wider for others, perhaps ultimately for all.”). Similarly, although 
Rutledge’s post-War hopes of entering “a new era of law in the world” were never fully realized, id. at 
43, it is hard to lay much of the blame upon the Court’s largely ignored result in Yamashita. 
 260. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 569 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing Ex parte 
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), which upheld a military commission’s decision to execute German 
saboteurs, including one United States citizen). 
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presidential designation, be tried in a military commission for violating the 
law of war.261
One person directly affected by military commissions’ resurgence is 
Salim Ahmed Hamdan. In November 2001, Hamdan was captured by 
militia forces; the United States then took custody and transferred him to 
Guantanamo. In July 2003, Bush announced “reason to believe” that 
Hamdan was a member of al Qaeda, or had aided terrorism against the 
United States, and designated him for trial in a military commission.262 
Until October 2004, Hamdan was held in solitary confinement; he was 
then evaluated by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal, which found he 
was an enemy combatant, thus (in the government’s view of Hamdi) 
justifying his detention without any further process.263
Hamdan was later charged before a military commission with 
conspiring to commit murder, attack civilians, attack civilian property, and 
commit terrorism.264 The government claimed that Hamdan was Osama 
bin Laden’s driver and bodyguard, who delivered arms to al Qaeda 
members and trained with high performance weapons, all with knowledge 
that bin Laden and al Qaeda organized the September 11 terrorist 
attacks.265 Hamdan’s military commission was composed of three U.S. 
colonels, and its procedures were set by regulation.266
Hamdan sought habeas relief in federal district court, claiming inter 
alia that trial by military commission was improper, and that the 
commission’s procedures were unlawful. As the case advanced, Hamdan 
focused on three arguments: (i) that the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
required a “competent tribunal” to decide his prisoner-of-war status before 
any trial by military commission,267 (ii) that he could not attend all 
proceedings against him, in violation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Constitution, and common 
 261. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 
Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 21, 2001). 
 262. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 263. Id. at 36. 
 264. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2761 (2006). 
 265. Id. 
 266. Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 36. 
 267. The basic logic of this argument relied on Article 5 of the Geneva Convention (III) Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 6 U.S. T. 3316, 3324 T. I. A. S. No. 3364, 
which requires signatory states to presume prisoner-of-war status unless that status is rebutted. A 
prisoner of war, in turn, is entitled to trial by the same procedures that are used to try the signatory 
nation’s own troops—a requirement that undeniably was not satisfied in Hamdan’s case. 
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law,268 and (iii) that the military commission at issue was unlawful 
because it was not authorized by Congress.269
Applying the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the district court ordered 
that a “competent tribunal” must find that Hamdan was not a prisoner of 
war before he could be tried in a military commission. Otherwise, the 
district court held that Hamdan must be tried before an ordinary court 
martial, like those that try United States personnel.270 The D.C. Circuit 
reversed and held that Congress had authorized the use of military 
tribunals.271 The panel rejected Hamdan’s international law claims for 
three reasons. First, it found that the Geneva Conventions were 
unenforceable in federal courts. Second, it held that Hamdan could not 
assert prisoner-of-war status and, in the alternative, that the military 
tribunal was “competent” to reject any such assertion. Third, it found that 
the Geneva Conventions were inapplicable to al Qaeda’s activities.272 The 
D.C. Circuit also denied Hamdan’s claims under the Uniform Code of 
Criminal Justice because it found those statutory restrictions almost 
entirely inapplicable to military commissions.273
3. Rutledge Once More 
Three weeks before this Article reached final edits, the Supreme Court 
reversed the D.C. Circuit, ruling in Hamdan’s favor and overturning 
Yamashita.274 For Rutledge, this would have been an unsurpassed triumph; 
it also may be his former clerk’s greatest success.275 Hamdan was a hard 
case, with details that will draw other commentators’ attention,276 but what 
 268. All sides agreed that Hamdan had been excluded from the voir dire process of selecting 
commissioners from his trial, and that Hamdan would also have been excluded from at least two days 
of testimony during presentation of the government’s case. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 
171 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 269. See Neal Katyal & Laurence Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military 
Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1280–93 (2002). 
 270. Hamdan, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 173. 
 271. Hamdan, 413 F.3d at 38. 
 272. Id. at 38–42. 
 273. Id. at 42–43. 
 274. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2759, 2788-90 (2006). 
 275. The latter claim remains plausible despite Stevens’s thirty years of service and countless 
jurisprudential contributions. For just a few recent examples, see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 
(2005); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); 
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm., 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); 
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 298 (2001); and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 276. Particularly notable were the government’s arguments that the Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2742, stripped the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to 
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is important for this Article is the Court’s basic decision to place 
procedural constraints on military commissions. As Rutledge put it, “our 
system of military justice shall not alone . . . be above or beyond the 
fundamental law or the control of Congress,” and the Court must “not fail 
in its part under the Constitution” to prevent such overreaching.277
Two structural features of Hamdan are also pertinent. First, despite its 
statutory pretensions, Hamdan’s limits on presidential power are mainly 
common-law in nature, with important parallels to Souter’s concurrence in 
Hamdi. Second, Yamashita presented a potentially decisive barrier against 
Hamdan’s common-law analysis, and the only adequate refutation of 
Yamashita is the Rutledge dissent, which Hamdan cites but does not 
explicitly adopt. Before addressing these points in detail, a brief 
introduction may be appropriate. 
Hamdan was decided five to three,278 with Stevens’s lead opinion 
joined by Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and in most parts Kennedy. The 
Court’s core holding was to require presumptive “uniformity” between 
military commission procedures and those in courts martial.279 The 
majority particularly criticized the military commission system for 
departing from court-martial evidence standards and for excluding 
Hamdan from his trial.280 The Court derived its uniformity requirement 
hear Hamdan’s case, and that the Supreme Court should “abstain” from judging the procedures and 
propriety of Hamdan’s military commission until that tribunal reached a final decision. See Hamdan, 
126 S. Ct. at 2762–72 (rejecting both of these arguments). 
 277. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 42 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
 278. Chief Justice Roberts was recused due to his part in the D.C. Circuit decision under review. 
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 279. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2788–97. 
 280. See, e.g., id. at 2792 (“Without for one moment underestimating [the danger of international 
terrorism], it is not evident to us why it should require, in the case of Hamdan’s trial, any variance 
from the rules that govern courts martial.” (emphasis added)); id. at 2797 (“At a minimum, a military 
commission ‘can be “regularly constituted” by the standards of our military justice system only if 
some practical need explains deviations from court-martial practice.’” (quoting id. at 2804 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in part)); cf. id. at 2808  (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (“For all the Government’s 
regulations and submissions reveal, it would be feasible for most, if not all, of the conventional 
military evidence rules and procedures to be followed.”). 
 A deep puzzle in Kennedy’s concurrence is the fact that he joined the majority’s general principle 
of procedural uniformity, including its criticisms concerning confrontation rights, see supra, yet he 
refused to invalidate Hamdan’s military commission for violating his right to be present. See id. at 
2809 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). If the uniformity principle requires military commissions to 
match court-martial evidentiary standards, appellate procedures, and composition standards, id. at 
2805-08, it seems obvious that identical logic requires parity with respect to a defendant’s right to be 
present. 
 In explaining his result, Kennedy observed that Hamdan might not actually suffer any prejudicial 
exclusion from the trial. Id. at 2809. But that is also true of the commission’s evidentiary standards and 
the Appointing Authority’s supervisory powers, each of which Kennedy found to be unacceptable 
departures from court-martial practice. Likewise, Kennedy seemed reluctant to interpret the guarantees 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p99 Green book pages2.doc8/23/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
160 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
jointly from Uniform Code of Military Justice Article 21 and Article 
36(b),281 even though no party addressed made either such argument. To 
explore links between Hamdan and general issues concerning executive 
detention, my first step is to show that the specific statutes the Court relied 
on are insufficient to support its rule. 
Article 21 does not acknowledge even the existence of military 
commissions, our “common-law war courts,” except by indirection: “The 
provisions of this code conferring jurisdiction upon courts martial shall not 
be construed as depriving military commissions . . . of concurrent 
jurisdiction of offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war 
may be tried by such military commissions . . . .”282 At most, this language 
implies that commissions may try offenders or offenses specified by 
statute or the law of nations. Yet Hamdan’s majority went beyond the text 
and held that Article 21 codified a pre-statutory power “to convene 
military commissions” and added an “express condition that the President 
. . . comply with the law of war.”283 On that basis, the Court invalidated 
Hamdan’s commission because the Geneva Conventions (part of “the law 
of war”) require detainees to be tried before a “regularly constituted 
tribunal,” with court-martial procedures where practicable.284 Hamdan’s 
of Common Article III or Article 75 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Id. But such issues are 
entirely irrelevant to whether the military commission’s departure from court-martial practice was 
adequately justified. 
 281. These statutes provide as follows: 
Jurisdiction of courts martial not exclusive. The provisions of this code conferring jurisdiction 
upon courts martial shall not be construed as depriving military commissions, provost courts, 
or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that by 
statute or by the law of war may be tried by such military commissions, provost courts, or 
other military tribunals. 
10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000) (emphasis added). 
President may prescribe rules. (a) Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of 
proof, for cases arising under this chapter triable in courts martial, military commissions and 
other military tribunals, and procedures for courts of inquiry, may be prescribed by the 
President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of 
law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United 
States district courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter. (b) 
All rules and regulations made under this article shall be uniform insofar as practicable. 
10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 282. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000) (emphasis added); see also supra note 281. See generally, e.g., 
Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 346–47 & n.10 (1952) (“While explaining a proposed reference to 
military commissions in Article of War 15, Judge Advocate General Crowder, in 1916, said, ‘A 
military commission is our common-law war court. It has no statutory existence, though it is 
recognized by statute law.’” (citation omitted)). 
 283. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2754 (emphasis added). 
 284. Id. at 2793–97. 
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commission clearly did not follow court-martial procedures, and the Court 
found no adequate justification for those differences.285
By its terms, the Court’s statement about Article 21 is false. Article 21 
says nothing “express” about procedures in military commission, or about 
how the President should apply them; indeed, the statute’s only link to the 
“law of war” concerns “offenders or offenses” triable in military 
commissions.286 Although Hamdan did object to his alleged status as a 
triable “offender,” and to his charges as triable “offenses,” a majority of 
Justices avoided those arguments.287 Instead, the Court expanded Article 
21 beyond its language and required that military commissions follow all 
“rules and precepts of the law of nations,” including procedural rules, and 
that such commissions be “justified” in every respect by the law of war.288 
Nothing in Article 21’s text, structure, enactment record, or ninety-year 
history supports such a close tie between the statute and international 
law.289
The Hamdan majority’s second statutory referent was Article 36(b). 
Article 36(a) allows the President to regulate military commissions’ 
evidentiary standards and other procedures for all organs of military 
 285. See supra note 280 and accompanying text. 
 286. The Court’s reliance on Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1942), is also no help. See 
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2274–75 & n.24. Quirin stated that Congress granted “jurisdiction [for] military 
commissions to try persons for offenses which, according to the . . . law of nations . . . are cognizable 
by such tribunals,” 317 U.S. at 28 (emphasis added), and described its judicial inquiry as “whether any 
of the acts charged is an offense against the law of war cognizable before a military tribunal, and if so 
whether the Constitution prohibits the trial.” Id. at 29 (emphasis added). Cf. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 
2274 (muddying the latter description through the passive voice, asking “whether the law of war had 
indeed been complied with” (emphasis added)). 
 Quirin, unlike the majority in Hamdan, analyzed whether the defendant was charged with 
violating the law of war. Also unlike Hamdan, the Quirin Court never questioned whether the military 
commission’s procedures, applied by “the President and those under his command,” satisfied 
international law. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2274. 
 287. For example, the district court found that Hamdan was presumptively a prisoner of war and 
thus was not a proper “offender” for trial by military commission. Compare Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 
F. Supp. 2d 152, 155, 158–65 (D.D.C. 2004), with Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795 n.61 (declining to 
decide the merits of this argument). And a plurality of the Supreme Court (not including Kennedy) 
held that the Hamdan’s charges were not valid “offenses” under the law of war. Compare id. at 2775–
86 (plurality), with id. at 2809 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
 288. Id. at 2755, 2786 (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28); see also id. at 2794 (“[C]ompliance with 
the law of war is the condition upon which the authority set forth in Article 21 is granted.”); cf. id. at 
2845 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]o the extent Article 21 can be interpreted as authorizing judicial 
enforcement of aspects of the law of war that are not otherwise judicially enforceable, that 
authorization only extends to provisions of the law of war that relate to whether a particular ‘offender’ 
or a particular ‘offense’ is triable by military commission. . . . [T]he Court’s holding . . . relates to 
neither.”). 
 289. Although the Uniform Code of Military Justice was enacted in 1950, Article 21 was copied 
from the Articles of War, which were enacted in 1916. Id. at 2744 & n.22. 
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justice, including military commissions, but such regulations must follow 
federal district court rules “so far as [the President] considers 
practicable.”290 Section (b) states that “[a]ll rules and regulations made 
under this article shall be uniform insofar as practicable.”291 The critical 
question is what it means for rules to be “uniform,” and at least four 
possible answers appear.292
Article 36(b) might require rules and regulations to be “uniform” in the 
sense of simple consistency with one another; it might require “uniform” 
application of rules without unduly specialized or vague exceptions; it 
might (per Thomas’s dissent) require “uniform” rules across various 
armed service branches.293 Or—as the Court held—Article 36(b) might 
mean that all procedural rules must be applied “uniform[ly]” to military 
commissions and courts martial alike.294 The statute’s text is spare and 
undeniably vague, with none of these possibilities’ seeming self-evidently 
correct. Nevertheless, the Court refused to acknowledge any ambiguity 
and thus offered literally no analysis to support its interpretation.295 As 
 290. 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (2000); see also supra note 281. Article 36(a) also states that presidential 
regulations “may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter.” Id. Hamdan argued that this 
language requires military commission regulations to follow every other requirement in the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice, including many procedural rights that apply to courts martial. Brief for 
Petitioner at 19-20, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184). The United States argued that 
regulations concerning military commission cannot be “contrary or inconsistent with” Uniform Code 
of Military Justice provisions that, by their terms, apply to courts martial but do not mention military 
commissions. Brief for Respondent at 44, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184). The Court 
did not resolve this interpretive dispute. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2791 (“Without [deciding] whether any 
provision of Commission Order No. 1 is strictly ‘contrary to or inconsistent with’ other provisions of 
the UCMJ, we conclude that the ‘practicability’ determination the President has made is insufficient to 
justify variances from the procedures governing courts martial.”). 
 291. 10 U.S.C. § 836(b) (2000). 
 292. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “uniform” as follows:  
I.  Of things in respect to their own qualities or constitution. 
 1. Of one form, character, or kind; having, maintaining, occurring in or under, the same 
form always; that is or remains the same in different places, at different times, or under 
varying circumstances; exhibiting no difference, diversity, or variation. 
. . . 
II. Of things of the same class in respect of each other, or of one thing in relation to another 
or others of the same class. . . . 
 4. Of the same form, character, or kind as another or others; agreeing or according with 
one another; conforming to one standard, rule, or pattern; alike, similar. 
19 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 59–60 (2d ed. 1989). 
 293. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2842 n.17 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing legislative history from 
Article 36(b)’s author suggesting that the statute was aimed to ensure inter-service uniformity). 
 294. Id. at 2791–93. 
 295. Even the majority’s efforts to rebut the Thomas dissent were fairly weak. See id. at 2791 
n.29. For example, although the Court insisted that Congress might have intended to provide both 
uniformity among the military services and uniformity between military commissions and courts 
martial, the Court cited no evidence to substantiate that possibility. The Court also wrote (with striking 
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with Article 21, it can only be said that nothing in the structure, enactment 
record, or judicial history of Article 36(b) confirms the Court’s holding; 
indeed, Hamdan did not even cite Article 36(b) in his merits briefs.296
Others may suggest that Hamdan’s questionable statutory analysis 
means that its result was wrong. That is not my view at all. Rather, to 
identify such weaknesses simply proves that Hamdan was not a case of 
routine interpretation “resolved by ordinary rules.”297 On the contrary, the 
following discussion shows that Hamdan’s statutory gaps were quietly 
filled with more eclectic material, including the “common law” of war, 
double-negation) that 36(b)’s “textual proximity” to 36(a) disproved “that Congress did not intend 
uniformity across tribunal types.” That “proximity” in no way proves that Congress did intend 
uniformity across tribunal types. On the contrary, many interpretations of 36(b)’s “uniformity” 
requirement (including all four in the text) are consistent with the provision’s “proximity,” and 
application, to rules and regulations discussed in 36(a). The obvious link between 36(a) and 36(b) is 
that the latter’s uniformity requirement—whatever it means—applies to presidential regulations 
concerning all organs of military justice listed in 36(a), whether they be courts martial, military 
commissions, or otherwise. 
 296. Brief for Petitioner at ix, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184) (table of authorities); 
Reply Brief at ii-iii, Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184) (same). On balance, most 
interpretive tools support Thomas’s view of 36(b), and his dissent may have understated its arguments 
on this point. Before Congress enacted the “Uniform” Code of Military Justice, law enforcement in the 
military was governed by the Articles of War, which applied to the Army, and the Articles for 
Government, which applied to the Navy. These two systems were generally similar, but they also had 
intricate, confusing variances at the level of practical detail. See, e.g., WILLIAM T. GENEROUS, JR., 
SWORDS AND SCALES: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 9–11 (1973).  
 After World War II, control over the various services was consolidated under the Department of 
Defense, and President Truman extended the Articles of War to govern the Air Force. GENEROUS, 
supra, at 31. When concerns emerged over perceived injustices throughout the range of different 
military proceedings, the Secretary of Defense appointed a committee, headed by Edmund M. Morgan, 
Jr., “to integrate the systems of the three services [Army, Navy, and Coast Guard] into a Uniform Code 
of Military Justice.” GENEROUS, supra, at 34; see also Edmund M. Morgan, Jr., The Background of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6 VAND. L. REV. 169, 173 (1952–1953) (explaining his committee’s 
goal of drafting a Code that would apply uniformly to all armed forces); Uniform Code of Military 
Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. On the Armed Services, 81st Cong. 600 (1949) 
(statement of Prof. Edmund M. Morgan, Jr.) (same). 
 The result was the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which proposed “[t]o unify, consolidate, 
revise, and codify the Articles of War, the Articles for the Government of the Navy, and the 
disciplinary laws of the Coast Guard.” 64 Stat. 107 (preamble), quoted in Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2842 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Even as 36(a) granted the President administrative power to set procedures 
for all forms of military justice, it makes perfect sense that 36(b)’s “uniformity” would simply require 
that those sub-statutory rules support the inter-service parity provided by the Code itself. This 
interpretation of 36(b), which merely forces regulations to comport with the Code’s overall aims, thus 
works in conjunction with 36(a)’s requirement that regulations must not be “contrary to or 
inconsistent” with Code provisions. 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (2000); supra note 281. Thomas’s view of 
“uniform” also finds specific support in the enactment record of Article 36(b). Compare Hamdan, 126 
S. Ct. at 2842 n.17 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (collecting sources), with supra note 295 (discussing the 
Hamdan majority’s response). And it has the advantage of being consistent with the Yamashita 
decision, which was only four years old when Article 36(b) was enacted. See infra note 313 and 
accompanying text. 
 297. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
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Souter’s concurrence in Hamdi, and ultimately Rutledge’s Yamashita 
dissent. 
Stevens’s opinion recognized that military commissions are “neither 
mentioned in the Constitution nor created by statute.”298 Authority for 
such trials thus occupies an important common-law interstice between 
constitutional war power, traditional practice, unanticipated exigency, and 
general statutes like the Authorization for Use of Military Force. Details of 
how military commissions operate are undefined by statute, seldom 
applied, and almost inevitably open to judicial interpretation. Even as the 
Hamdan Court accepted the President’s implicit non-statutory authority to 
operate military commissions, it was likewise able to impose limits that 
more closely resemble common-law innovations than “true” statutory 
interpretation.299
An important model for Hamdan’s common-law analysis is Souter’s 
concurrence in Hamdi. There, Souter purported to apply the Non-
Detention Act, which used “severe” language to bar United States citizens’ 
imprisonment and “preclude another episode like” World War II 
internment.300 Yet Souter acknowledged an exception—entirely of judicial 
creation—allowing Presidents to “deal with enemy belligerents according 
to the treaties and customs known collectively as the laws of war.”301 The 
Geneva Conventions thus became a limit on executive power, 
undisputedly amenable to judicial review, rather than a source of 
detainees’ individual rights, which might or might not have been legally 
self-executing.302
Similar common-law decisionmaking emerged in Hamdan, with one 
major difference. Hamdan did not involve a common-law exception to a 
statutory ban; it concerned a common-law limit on the common-law power 
to operate military commissions in the first place.303 As we have seen, 
 298. Id. at 2772–73. 
 299. Of course, lines between “common law” and “statutory interpretation” often are not 
exceedingly bright ones, and different scholars use different standards to define what counts as federal 
common law. See generally, e.g., Martha Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 
99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 894 (1986) (detailing this problem). 
 300. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 542 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 301. Id. at 548.  
 302. In Hamdan, Thomas argued in dissent that the Geneva Conventions are not enforceable at all, 
because they were intended to be enforced only diplomatically. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 266–67 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). In Hamdi, by contrast, Thomas argued only that Hamdi’s detention 
comported with the Geneva Conventions. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 597 n.6 (2004) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). 
 303. As discussed supra, both the executive power at issue and the limit thereon are of arguably 
mixed origin. See supra note 298 and accompanying text (discussing hybrid nature of presidential 
power in this area); supra notes 282–99 (discussing hybrid nature of Hamdan’s limits on military 
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Hamdan did not directly hold that the Geneva Conventions give military 
commission defendants independently enforceable rights, nor that every 
court-martial procedure applies in every commission trial.304 Instead, the 
Court proclaimed a common-law “principle of procedural parity” or 
“uniformity,” with correspondingly common-law “flexibility” to “tailor” 
departures to exigencies—none of which can be squarely located in any 
statute.305 The fact that “both sides” of Hamdan’s doctrinal analysis rested 
on common law meant that, where Souter’s relied on the Non-Detention 
Act’s “severe” language and tone to restrain the President, Hamdan turned 
mainly to history and tradition. 
As a matter of craft, the Court’s historical approach was a partial 
success.306 Relying on Civil War military commissions, commentators 
from World War I, and unimplemented plans for tribunals in Korea and 
Vietnam, the Court ably demonstrated a “general rule” or “background 
assumption” that military commissions and courts martial follow similar 
procedures.307 And although Thomas’s dissent objected that “uniform” 
practice does not necessarily make uniformity a requirement,308 he 
understated the deeper relevance of the Court’s common-law “background 
assumption.”309 If statutes concerning military commissions did not 
specifically authorize the President to freely depart from court-martial 
procedures, Congress may have expected the President to follow the 
“general rule” of parity, and courts might justifiably enforce that 
expectation using otherwise unhelpful statutory text.310
commissions). 
 304. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790, 2794. 
 305. Id. at 2788, 2790 
 306. A notable highlight was the Court’s effort to link military commissions with “military 
necessity,” thereby explaining why military commissions should not simply be used “to dispense a 
more summary form of justice than is afforded by courts martial.” Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2772–73, 
2792. The plurality also applied this theme of “necessity” as a benchmark for criticizing charges 
against Hamdan, but Kennedy refused to join that conclusion. Id. at 2777, 2785. 
 307. Indeed, even Thomas agreed that “it is undoubtedly true that military commissions have 
invariably employed most of the procedures employed by courts martial.” Id. at 2839 n.15 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 308. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Winthrop for the proposition that “war-courts are indeed 
more summary than [courts martial], and . . . their proceedings . . . will not be rendered illegal by the 
omission of details required upon trials by courts martial.” (emphasis original)). 
 309. Thomas also failed to perceive how the Court uses military commissions’ common-law 
nature to help Hamdan. See id. at 2841 n.16 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (seeming to equate “the common-
law status of military commissions” with “the corresponding power of the President to set their 
procedures”). 
 310. For detailed analysis of federal courts’ common-law authority, in areas of executive power 
and otherwise, see Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth (2006) (unpublished manuscript on file with 
author).  
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Thus, the Court’s main obstacle lay not in its method, but in historical 
fact. The foregoing analysis absolutely depends on the existence of a 
consistent background rule, but the Court’s proposed rule had one 
“glaring” exception: Yamashita.311 Yamashita’s military commission 
utterly discarded court-martial procedures,312 and the Court’s decision to 
deny habeas (in what had been the Court’s latest case concerning “law-of-
war” commissions) was exceptionally modern history when the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice was enacted in 1950. It seems implausible that 
Article 36(b) would reverse that recent pro-government decision, 
especially because no legislator mentioned any such possibility.313
The Hamdan Court’s treatment of Yamashita is thus far more important 
than it seems. Unless the Court could demolish that World War II 
precedent, its entire common-law methodology might unravel, leaving 
Hamdan’s statutory arguments uncomfortably exposed. The Court 
recognized as much, and it forcefully proclaimed that Yamashita was 
overruled, having been “seriously undermined by post-World War II 
developments” and “stripped of its precedential value.”314 But why? The 
Court correctly noted that many technical arguments supporting 
Yamashita’s result have changed. Unlike the 1929 Geneva Conventions in 
Yamashita, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in Hamdan regulate trials for 
misconduct committed before (not just during) detention.315 Similarly, 
where Yamashita read the Articles of War to regulate only trials of United 
States military personnel, today’s Uniform Code of Military Justice clearly 
applies to detainees like Hamdan.316  
But those changes are not enough. Yamashita did not rely only on 
statutes and treaties; it also embodied a view of the nature of military 
commissions, and the latter analysis was never addressed, much less 
undermined, by subsequent events:  
 311. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2788 (2006); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
 312. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 313. Cf. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2793 n.54 (“Prior to the enactment of Article 36(b), it may well 
have been the case that a deviation from the rules governing courts martial would not have rendered 
the military commission “‘illegal.’” Article 36(b), however, imposes a statutory command that must be 
heeded. (citations omitted)). 
 314. Id. at 2788–90.  
 315. Id. at 2789–90 & n.48; FERREN, supra note 5, at 242; Christopher C. Burris, Time for 
Congressional Action: The Necessity of Delineating the Jurisdictional Responsibilities of Federal 
District Courts, Courts Martial, and Military Commissions To Try Violations of the Laws of War, 
2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 4, at *VI.3 (2005).  
 316. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2789 & n.47; 10 U.S.C. § 802 (2006) (applying the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice to, among others, all “prisoners of war in custody of the armed forces”). 
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[T]he military commission before which [Yamashita] was tried, 
though sanctioned, and its jurisdiction saved, by Article 15 [now 
Article 21], was not convened by virtue of the Articles of War, but 
pursuant to the common law of war. It follows that the Articles of 
War . . . were not applicable to petitioner’s trial and imposed no 
restrictions upon the procedure to be followed. The Articles left the 
control over the procedure in such a case . . . where it had 
previously been, with the military command.317
This part of Yamashita’s analysis, which placed control over military 
commission procedures in the unguided hands of military leadership, 
revealed a potentially devastating flaw in Hamdan’s account of tradition 
and common law. What the Court needed was to discredit the Yamashita 
precedent altogether, and its generic citations to statutory and 
international-law reforms simply could not do the job. 
The only possible solution—as readers may by now expect—lay in 
Rutledge’s dissent, which Stevens described as “unusually long and 
vociferous,” and which offered the sole basis for calling Yamashita 
“notorious.”318 Although Hamdan cited several sources discrediting other 
parts of Yamashita’s majority opinion, only the Rutledge dissent addressed 
the basic normative issue of whether military commissions should be 
subject to any enforceable procedural constraints.319 Drawing on 
Rutledge’s deep unwillingness to allow any form of “adjudication” that 
violated basic fairness norms, and on a similarly robust aversion to 
unbridled executive power, his dissent articulated cogent, value-based 
reasons to reject Yamashita entirely. Just as Rutledge’s Ahrens dissent 
refused to permit any governmental detention that was exempt from 
judicial oversight, his Yamashita dissent decried any form of military 
“adjudication” that might lie beyond all enforceable procedural restraints. 
As Professor (and Hamdan counsel) Neal Katyal has said publicly: 
“It’s not just that Justice Stevens clerked for Rutledge. I actually think that 
that opinion, [Rutledge’s] dissent in Yamashita . . . , is one of the most 
powerful decisions I’ve ever read, and . . . a lot of our litigating strategy 
. . . came out of that.”320 What has made Rutledge’s dissent so powerful, 
even after reforms superseded its analysis of the Articles of War and the 
 317. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 20 (1946) (emphasis added). 
 318. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790.  
 319. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 79 (“The Court does not declare expressly that petitioner as an 
enemy belligerent has no constitutional rights . . . . I think the effect of what it has done is in substance 
to deny him all [procedural] safeguards. And this is the great issue in the cause.”). 
 320. Georgetown Panel, supra note 224. 
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Geneva Convention, is its palpable commitment to fairness even under 
conditions of national crisis: 
In this stage of war’s aftermath . . . [i]t is not too early, it is never 
too early . . . for the nation steadfastly to follow its great 
constitutional traditions, none older or more universally protective 
than due process of law in the trial and punishment of men, that is, 
of all men, whether citizens, aliens, alien enemies or belligerents. It 
can become too late.321
A testament to the force of Rutledge’s opinion is that (as with Ahrens 
and Rasul), none of Hamdan’s dissenters said much to defend Yamashita’s 
sixty-year-old precedent, and none objected to the Court’s overruling it.322 
For Rutledge, Yamashita was a national and legal disgrace. And 
somewhere between the Hamdan majority’s label of “notorious” and the 
dissenters’ silence, it may be that the modern Court has come to 
sympathize with Rutledge’s point of view. 
For readers who are not surprised at Hamdan’s heavy reliance on the 
Rutledge dissent, they may be perplexed that his arguments did not appear 
in the Court’s various opinions. Part of this absence owed to Hamdan’s 
procedural posture. Where Rutledge had a full record of injustices against 
Yamashita, and knew that the general’s life was at stake, Hamdan’s trial 
barely got off the ground, and could hardly generate a comparable sense of 
urgency. Another explanation, however, echoes Rasul and Ahrens, where a 
tentative fifth vote (cf. Kennedy in Hamdan) left the Court willing to 
endorse Rutledge’s conclusion, but unable to fully adopt the principles of 
his argument. In Yamashita, Rutledge wrote about unyielding fairness, 
moral commitments, and the minimum procedures for tolerable 
adjudication.323 By contrast, the Hamdan majority hardly mentioned such 
principles.324 On the contrary, the Court’s two concurring opinions (which 
 321. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 20 (1946) (emphasis added). As Rutledge further explained: 
This long-held attachment marks the great divide between our enemies and ourselves. Theirs 
was a philosophy of universal force. Ours is one of universal law, albeit imperfectly made 
flesh of our system and so dwelling among us. Every departure weakens the tradition, 
whether it touches the high or the low, the powerful or the weak, the triumphant or the 
conquered. 
Id. 
 322. For example, Thomas quoted Yamashita only in describing basic legal principles, see 
Hamdan 126 S. Ct. at 2841 n.16 (Thomas, J., dissenting), Alito’s dissent did not mention Yamashita, 
and Scalia’s dissent did so only once, on a peripheral point concerning reviewability, see id. at 2814 
n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 323. See supra notes 253–58, 319, 321, and accompanying text. 
 324. The one partial exception is Stevens’s discussion of the right to be present: “The absence of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss1/3
p99 Green book pages2.doc8/23/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] EXECUTIVE DETENTION 169 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stevens alone declined to join) focused almost entirely on inadequate 
statutory authorization and unpersuasive claims of military necessity, thus 
effectively inviting Congress to alter the framework that sheltered Hamdan 
from procedural abuse.325
As in Rasul and Ahrens, the Hamdan majority’s approach represents a 
very different mode of judicial product than is typical of Rutledge’s work. 
On the facts of a case like Rasul or Hamdan, the modern Court’s narrow, 
less meticulous methodology can operate alongside and in harmony with 
the careful, deeply substantive work of someone like Rutledge. That is not 
always so, however. Time and future cases may yet test whether the Court 
will embrace Rutledgian principles explicitly, or will continue to invoke 
them only indirectly and ad hoc. Thus, as a brief conclusion, it seems apt 
to consider Hamdan’s impact on the future of executive detention 
jurisprudence. 
4. Where From Here? 
With respect to military commissions themselves, there may not be a 
“next step” after Hamdan. That is because, technical problems aside, the 
Court’s result makes appreciable sense: Like Souter’s “laws-of-war” 
exception in Hamdi, the Hamdan rule limits the President’s common-law 
power over military commissions based on international law and collateral 
statutory benchmarks, and allows additional “flexibility” to accommodate 
demonstrated need.326 The President is thus allowed to use military 
commissions, but he is required to provide “regularly constituted 
any showing of impracticability is particularly disturbing when considered in light of the clear and 
admitted failure to apply one of the most fundamental protections afforded [by the UCMJ]: the right to 
be present. . . . [T]he jettisoning of so basic a right cannot lightly be excused as ‘practicable.’” 
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2792. Although Kennedy technically joined this analysis, he later seemed oddly 
hesitant to say so. See supra note 280 (discussing this confusion). 
 325. See id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Nothing prevents the President from returning to 
Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary. . . . The Constitution puts its faith in those 
democratic means. Our Court simply does the same.”); id. at 2800 (“If Congress, after due 
consideration, deems it appropriate to change the controlling statutes, it has the power and prerogative 
to do so.”) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
 It seems unlikely that Rutledge would have joined such opinions, given the deep fairness issues at 
stake. Cf. supra note 145 (explaining that Rutledge declined to accept a commerce clause rationale in 
case that raised fundamental questions of racial equality). However, Rutledge almost certainly would 
have joined Stevens’s discussion rejecting Hamdan’s conspiracy charge as an improper “offense” 
under the “law of war.” See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775–86 (plurality); 10 U.S.C. § 821 (limiting 
implicitly the types of offenses over which military commissions have jurisdiction). 
 326. Id. at 2790 (“The uniformity principle is not an inflexible one; it does not preclude all 
departures from the procedures dictated for use by courts martial. But any departure must be tailored to 
the exigency that necessitates it.”). 
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tribunals” that ensure “judicial guarantees . . . recognized as indispensable 
by civilized peoples” as well as ordinary safeguards in courts martial.327 
Unless political will emerges to revise this framework, the Hamdan 
regime might prove long-lived as, at the very least, a triumph of “judicial 
statesmanship.” 
On the other hand, change may already be afoot. Hamdan (like 
Souter’s Hamdi concurrence) left the door open for legislative action,328 
and Congress almost immediately held hearings on whether commissions 
are needed that depart from international law standards and court-martial 
procedures.329 It is too soon to predict whether Congress will, for example, 
grant the President broad discretion, enact its own military commission 
procedures, or acquiesce in the status quo. 
If Congress does approve a “second generation” of military 
commission procedures, however, the content of those rules may 
determine their validity. Recent cases in the War on Terror (Rasul, Hamdi, 
Hamdan) have interwoven themes of separated powers, legal rule, and 
individual liberty.330 But if Congress explicitly authorizes commission 
procedures, separation of powers objections would dissipate. Also, absent 
a statutory objection, the Court would have to determine whether 
Guantanamo Bay detainees have constitutional rights and, if so, whether 
 327. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. This requirement of “Common Article 3” is applicable to prisoners of 
war and civilians alike. 
 328. See supra note 325 (collecting sources). Of course, the President technically could try to 
satisfy the majority’s rule merely by offering a better “justification” for his departures from court-
martial practice. That, however, might seem too brazen to be attempted, and it is unlikely to happen 
given Congress’s steps to consider the issue. 
 329. The House Armed Services Committee, Senate Judiciary Committee, and Senate Armed 
Services Committee met during the week of July 10 to discuss the future of military commissions and 
to hear testimony from administration officials, military and civilian lawyers, and other personnel. 
Military Commissions in Light of the Supreme Court Decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Hearing of the 
S. Comm. On the Armed Services, 109th Cong. (2006); Standards of Military Commissions and 
Tribunals: Hearing of the H. Armed Serv. Comm., 109th Cong. (2006); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: 
Establishing a Constitutional Process: Hearing before the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. (2006); 
see, e.g., Kate Zernike and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Detainee Rights Create a Divide on Capitol Hill, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2006, at A1. 
 330. See, e.g., Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2798 (“[I]n undertaking to try Hamdan and subject him to 
criminal punishment, the Executive is bound to comply with the Rule of Law that prevails in this 
jurisdiction.”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535–36 (2004) (plurality) (“[The government’s] 
approach serves only to condense power into a single branch of government. . . . [A] state of war is not 
a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens. . . . [The 
Constitution] most assuredly envisions a role for all three of the branches when individual liberties are 
at stake.”); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 474 (2004) (“Executive imprisonment has been considered 
oppressive and lawless since John, at Runnymede, pledged that no free man should be imprisoned . . . 
save by . . . the law of the land.” (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 
218–19 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting)). 
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such rights apply in military commissions. Rasul offers a plausible 
framework for analyzing such problems, as the following footnote 
explains in detail,331 but it is unclear whether such reasoning (which 
Kennedy did not join) would draw five votes from the current Court. 
 331. The key is to apply both elements of Rasul’s analysis, which (as we discussed) not only 
embraced Rutledge’s Ahrens dissent but also offered a Guantanamo-specific argument rebutting the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480–85 (2004); see supra 
notes 103–10 and accompanying text. The government’s most recent argument against applying 
constitutional rights to Guantanamo detainees was that “aliens outside the United States [do not] have 
due process rights under the Federal Constitution.” Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 19 n.11, 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Sept. 7, 2005) (No. 05-184) 2005 WL 2214766. Yet Rasul held that 
Guantanamo Bay is “within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States” for habeas purposes. Rasul, 
542 U.S. at 480–81 (internal quotation marks omitted). That same basis for applying habeas statutes to 
Guantanamo Bay detainees also supports recognizing their substantive constitutional rights. Simply 
put, the presumption against extraterritoriality should apply in both contexts or in neither. Cf., e.g., 
Kermit Roosevelt III, Guantanamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 
2017, 2017–18, 2026–29, 2059–71 (2005); Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and 
Constitutional after Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2073, 2073–83 (2005). 
 This argument does not rely on Rasul’s well-known “footnote 15,” which implied without analysis 
that United States standards for legal custody reach Guantanamo Bay. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484 n.15 
(“Petitioners’ allegations—that, although they have engaged neither in combat nor in acts of terrorism 
against the United States, they have been held in Executive detention for more than two years in 
territory subject to the long term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without 
access to counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing—unquestionably describe ‘custody 
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’”). Rasul’s fifteenth footnote 
received close attention in two district court opinions. In Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 
2005), Judge Richard Leon rejected petitioners’ view that that footnote “intended to overrule, sub 
silentio, Eisentrager and its progeny.” Id. at 323. Judge Joyce Green reached an opposite conclusion in 
In re Guantanamo Detainees Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 453–64 (D.D.C. 2005). Judge Green cited 
footnote 15 as “perhaps the strongest basis” for applying constitutional rights to Guantanamo 
detainees; she also cited Rasul’s holding that Guantanamo Bay lies within the territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States and Kennedy’s opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 462–63. See also supra 
note 104. 
  Instead, the approach presented here relies on the structure of Rasul’s majority opinion as a whole. 
In Part III, the Court construed the habeas statutes to allow jurisdiction in cases where the prisoner is 
held outside the issuing court’s territory. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475–79. In Part IV, the Court held that 
the habeas statutes (independent of their content) apply to Guantanamo Bay just as they would to any 
State or the District of Columbia. See id. at 480–83. Phrased this way, it is hard to see how the 
presumption against extraterritorial application of United States law could bar a detainee’s 
constitutional rights when it did not limit the habeas statutes’ application in Rasul. 
 Of course, a Rasul-based response might not require applying every constitutional right to military 
commissions, or to Guantanamo detainees generally. Much less would it require Scalia’s caricature of 
allowing detainee damage suits under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of 
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 500 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Under current 
precedents, Bivens has proved to be a rather delicate flower, and the Supreme Court has been entirely 
willing to recognize “special factors counseling hesitation” in various contexts. See, e.g., Correctional 
Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68–70 (2001). Without examining details, one presumes that the 
Court could find such factors with respect to Guantanamo detainees held as enemy combatants. 
Scalia’s attempted analogy between Bivens’s fragile damage remedies and the robust right to challenge 
illegal detention suggests a mistaken view of both judicial mechanisms. 
 Furthermore, some procedural rights (the easiest example is grand jury indictment) might not 
apply to military commissions at any location. Nor would the Court have to resolve all such questions 
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 In structure, though not in impact, a legislative authorization of 
military commission procedures could pose questions more similar to 
Hirabayashi and Korematsu than to other War on Terror cases. What 
should courts do when Congress and the President jointly authorize 
oppressive activity? What should our Court do if military commissions are 
(again) marked off as a realm of unchained power, where Presidents may 
blend engineered results with ostensible fairness to suit dominant political 
tastes? 
Fortunately, we may never confront these questions in their pure, most 
dangerous form. Even before Hamdan, President Bush did not construct 
military commissions as “kangaroo” or “drum-head” courts. Indeed, 
despite their shortcomings, the procedures for Hamdan’s trial would have 
compared well to those used to convict Yamashita. For example, 
Hamdan’s commissioners were legally trained, his lawyers were not 
rushed, and any conviction would, en route to the President’s desk, have 
been reviewed by a panel of exceptionally talented lawyers.332 Other 
protections included Hamdan’s receipt of charges, his presumed 
innocence, his ability to confront witnesses if available, his attorney’s 
right to see classified inculpatory materials, and the requirement of proof 
beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, Hamdan’s commission 
permitted unsworn statements as evidence, gave no right to a speedy trial, 
allowed his exclusion from the trial, and stated that the presumption of 
innocence and the right to silence were not “enforceable” rights, arguably 
allowing their abridgment at any time.333
Even if Congress simply approved these pre-Hamdan procedures 
wholesale, it seems preponderantly likely that Kennedy (Hamdan’s fifth 
vote) would uphold them as constitutionally valid.334 Yet lessons from the 
at once. Military commissions in this respect may present a relatively “easy” case. An important, 
realistic first step would be to hold that detainees tried before a military commission deserve the same 
constitutional and statutory rights in Guantanamo Bay as would obtain in a military commission for 
United States citizens in Miami. Cf. Cole, supra note 208, at 978–79. Regardless of the precise 
constitutional standards applied to military commissions in either locale, such a ruling would at least 
serve Rutledge’s goal of ensuring that military commissions beyond immediate hostilities remain 
consistent with fundamental procedural justice, and that such proceedings remain subject to some form 
of Article III oversight. Related questions may (or may not) prove more difficult concerning whether 
suspected terrorists held in Chicago and Guantanamo Bay deserve equal statutory and constitutional 
rights with respect to their indefinite detention.  
 332. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 167 & n.13 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 333. See Brief for Appellee at 3–4, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-
5393) (citing 32 C.F.R. §§ 9.6(d)(3), 9.10-11 (2004)). 
 334. Only “preponderantly” because Kennedy’s vote is not always predictable, and because 
speculation about executive detention cases can be especially unstable. Looking back to the World 
War II era, three Justices (Roberts, Jackson, and Murphy) changed their votes in the year that 
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Rutledge era suggest that congressional blessing should not necessarily 
displace judicial authority to stop serious abuse. One can imagine, for 
example, commissions with serviceable evidentiary standards where 
intervention by military command at trial, or on appeal, makes acquittal 
nonetheless impossible.335 A “test case” concerning military commission 
procedures might not present such flagrant unfairness, but regardless of 
particular objections heard or decided in a particular case (cf. 
Hirabayashi336), it is crucial to heed the fullness of history in confronting 
modern threats. And if nothing else, the historical experience of Rutledge 
and Hirabayashi shows beyond question how “small” mistakes regarding 
executive detention can grow. If Congress were to decide that military 
commissions were unconstrained by the Constitution, common law, the 
Geneva Conventions, and almost all of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice, it is hard to see how any procedural safeguards—from notice, to 
counsel, to confrontation, to an impartial decisionmaker—would be more 
separated Hirabayashi to Korematsu, perhaps partly because the government’s arguments about 
wartime necessity had started to wear thin. See supra notes 147–79 and accompanying text. 
Particularly for Roberts and Jackson, their change of heart would have been difficult for outsiders to 
anticipate, and it is possible, though not at all certain, that Kennedy might undergo an analogous shift. 
 An underlying, recurrent issue that allows such changes concerns presidential credibility. To some 
extent, executive detention cases inevitably involve a President’s claim that courts should “trust him” 
to do what is right. After all, the President and military command are situated to assess threats and 
measure successful responses in ways that courts simply cannot. Presidential credibility is not 
inexhaustible, however, and the government’s losses in recent War on Terror cases may someday take 
their toll. 
 For example, the government once argued that Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla were too dangerous 
for trial in federal court, or for any process to investigate their status as “enemy combatants.” After the 
Supreme Court ordered the district court to pursue “prudent and incremental” factfinding about 
Hamdi’s status, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539 (2004) (plurality), the government instead 
settled the case by releasing Hamdi from prison, rescinding his citizenship, sending him to Saudi 
Arabia, and having him agree not to sue the United States for wrongful detention or mistreatment. See 
supra Amann, note 197, at 2099. As Padilla’s case approached the Supreme Court for potentially 
similar treatment, the government changed its collective mind and suddenly decided to try Padilla on 
criminal charges in federal district court. See, e.g., Jerry Markon, Court Bars Transfer of Padilla to 
Face New Terrorism Charges, WASHINGTON POST, December 22, 2005, at A1. 
 Likewise, the President prior to Hamdan had argued that his system of military commissions was 
vital to national security. Now that the Court has partially invalidated those commissions, the President 
might choose to test his claims of military necessity in the political arena, and thereafter in litigation. 
The problem is that Kennedy in Hamdan announced that he did not believe the President’s position 
that procedurally deviant commissions were necessary. See, e.g., Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2808 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part). Perhaps ensuing events will show that Kennedy was wrong. If not, 
Kennedy might remember the President’s “erroneous” arguments for military deference in Hamdan (or 
Hamdi or Padilla or Hirabayashi or Korematsu or Yamashita) when he evaluates the government’s 
claims in future national security cases. How a reduction in governmental credibility might (if it 
occurs) affect specific cases is too speculative for useful discussion. 
 335. Cf. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2806–07 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
 336. 320 U.S. 81 (1943); see supra notes 125–79. 
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than a matter of grace. Whether federal courts could invalidate such a 
system if Congress authorized it would pose far more difficult questions 
than appeared in Hamdan. 
The greatest risks of abuse, however, lie outside the military 
commission context. Hamdan confirms that the three separable steps I 
have used to analyze executive detention cases—jurisdiction, uncharged 
detention, and military tribunals—are doctrinally interrelated. In Rasul, for 
example, the Court took important steps to maintain jurisdiction over 
Guantanamo detainees, but that decision indirectly relied on Hamdi, which 
endorsed some level of substantive review over citizens’ indefinite, 
uncharged detention.337 By similar logic, Rasul and Hamdi are both 
landmark cases, but their practical effect would have been less if Hamdan 
had endorsed limitless presidential discretion to establish military 
commissions, and to handpick the decisionmakers, procedures, and 
punishments therein. 
With Hamdan, the wheel turns again. Hamdan was captured in 
November 2001,338 and almost five years later, there is no prospect of his 
being released. Thus, the next “great case” in the War on Terror may 
concern the government’s ability to indefinitely detain non-citizens 
without trial.339 If President Bush persists in detaining hundreds of 
individuals for undefined and lengthy periods, the challenge reserved in 
Hamdan may yet emerge. And the result in such a case, concerning non-
citizen uncharged detainees, may once and for all decide whether the 
President holds a “blank check” to imprison suspects in the War on 
Terror.340
Our country has known several security threats, and each has become 
famous or infamous for its legal response. The Civil War era witnessed the 
suspension of habeas corpus and trials by military commission;341 World 
War II had racial detentions and martial law.342 Likewise, today’s Court 
has written, and will yet write, opinions about executive detention that will 
determine the life or death of many individuals, affect the United States’ 
image regarding rule of law and human rights, and influence history’s 
 337. See supra Parts II.A–II.B. 
 338. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 339. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2798 (“It bears emphasizing that Hamdan does not challenge, and we 
do not today address, the Government’s power to detain him for the duration of active hostilities in 
order to prevent such harm.”). 
 340. Cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004); Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
 341.  REHNQUIST, supra note 139, at 23–25, 118–37. 
 342. See, e.g., IRONS, supra note 51, at vii; YAMAMOTO, supra note 123, at 194. 
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judgment of whether we have learned from the past in shaping the future. 
The decisive vote in such cases will likely fall to Justice Kennedy, and the 
country must hope that all members of the Court will find their own way 
to honor the high standards that wartime pressures require. 
III. EPILOGUE: YOU ARE WHAT YOU READ 
There is one final lesson to be drawn from Rutledge’s story; it concerns 
judicial biography as a genre, and judicial role as its underrecognized 
topic. This Article has laid out a two-part argument (historical and 
modern) that Rutledge deserves greater attention than he has received. But 
some readers may wonder, “If Rutledge really is such a fine jurist, and his 
work so central to executive detention, why don’t we hear of him more 
often?”343 In attempting an answer, let us first consider why judicial 
namedropping is prevalent in United States legal culture. If some language 
students measure their progress by their working vocabulary, or by the 
number of Kanji they know, there is a (lesser) sense in which students of 
United States law are measured by their knowledge (or ignorance) of 
certain judicial names and personalities. Why? 
Part of the tradition simply corresponds to the high status reserved for 
United States judges and their decisions. This country has an undeniable 
fetish for our Constitution—with special attachment to free speech, due 
process, and equal protection. Insofar as American judges are distinctive 
oracles who give the document voice, they are important people, and we 
study them accordingly.344 But there may be more to it than that. 
As a methodological matter, debates about judges and judicial role 
flow through two overlapping channels. First, a declarative mode seeks to 
state basic principles to define and limit judicial behavior. Ronald 
Dworkin’s work exemplifies such discussion at an abstract level.345 
Alexander Bickel,346 Owen Fiss,347 Cass Sunstein,348 and many others 
 343. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2005) lxi–lxxix (listing 
“Biographical Notes on [Thirty-Eight] Selected U.S. Supreme Court Justices,” including Abe Fortas, 
George Sutherland, and Willis Van Devanter, but not Wiley Rutledge). 
 344. For descriptions and instantiations of this phenomenon, see, for example, 2 BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 3–31 (1998); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD (1997); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES 9–34, 207–48 (2004). 
 345. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
 346. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS (1962). 
 347. OWEN FISS, THE LAW AS IT SHOULD BE (2003). 
 348. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 
(1999). 
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strive to explain what judges should do in more particular circumstances. 
The declarative mode describes judicial role in explicit terms, but such 
precatory abstractions have drawn strong criticism,349 and they do not 
always have the cultural influence that one might expect. 
The second mode of discussion is narrative or biographical. Many if 
not most debates about judges orbit a charted constellation of “heroes” and 
“villains.” Names like John Marshall, Benjamin Cardozo, William 
Brennan, Felix Frankfurter, Louis Brandeis, Roger Taney, Hugo Black, 
Antonin Scalia, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and a dozen more stand out in the 
popular imagination as different “types” of judges. Their lives and 
decisions are thought to stand for something. And even though that 
“something” is not precisely explained, when one name or another is 
invoked, listeners nod with understanding. 
A common step in law students’ acculturation is to identify their most 
and least favorite Justice, and cycles of debate and education develop such 
personalities into positive and negative role models. Some Justices’ 
opinions are read favorably and carefully, others skeptically or 
dismissively. Students often retain such impressions of “good” and “bad” 
judges long after their interest in Dworkin or Bickel has faded. And such 
ex-students fill the ranks of lawyers, judges, and professors, thereby 
explaining why judicial biography—the narrative mode’s highest form—
remains an indispensable element of United States legal culture. 
The problem is that academic biographers focus on eye-catching 
judges, with long (preferably evolving) service to the Court, and with 
some characteristic that inspires special fascination, whether it be a 
Holmesian epigram, Marshallian tour de force, or a role in some legal 
revolution or reform. This quasi-sensational focus is not always bad, but it 
is incomplete. We have always needed judges with intellectual and 
personal verve, yet the narrative mode’s distorted examples can obscure 
that judging, especially when done well, is not a flashy business. By 
nature, law is a conservative enterprise, where “creative,” “novel” 
arguments are often suspect and the “unprecedented” is heresy. 
Against that backdrop, Rutledge’s story is especially important because 
it reveals a judge who was profoundly committed to legal craft (perhaps 
too much in a case like Korematsu), but who also manifested compassion 
and deep awareness of law’s human impact. In one writer’s phrase, 
“Rutledge was rarely eloquent. The judicial beachheads he took were won, 
 349. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999). 
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not by sleight-of-words, but on the merits.”350 What may be most 
satisfying about the celebration of such a judge is that his intellectual 
strength stands out despite an absence of pyrotechnic ornament. 
When Ferren’s book ends, with Rutledge’s death, the reader must draw 
her own conclusions about how this judge’s life and career rate. Some 
observers have implied that, if Rutledge had lived longer, his name and 
career would be mentioned alongside Frankfurter’s or Black’s.351 Perhaps 
so, but Rutledge also marked a very different path from his judicial 
colleagues. Wechsler stated Rutledge’s distinctive characteristics as 
modesty, principle, judgment, and “pointing [out] the implications of 
small things.”352 Those traits, combined with Rutledge’s anti-dramatic 
style, might never have attracted such popular attention as Frankfurterian 
campaigns for Our Federalism or Black’s “absolutist” view of free speech. 
And this is the sense in which Rutledge not only portrays a distinctive type 
of judge; his story invites us to rethink how judges are valued in legal 
culture, and how judicial biography affects that process. 
It took almost fifty years for Rutledge’s biography to emerge, but today 
is a uniquely valuable time for Rutledge’s enduring lessons about judicial 
role and constitutional values. This is true not only for executive detention, 
but in other contexts also, as two new Justices join the Court and 
undertake to develop and realize their own models of judging. Today’s 
judicial selections will be examined by tomorrow’s biographers, and we 
can only hope that, decades from now, books like Ferren’s may yet be 
written about judges like Rutledge. 
 350. Pollak, Profile of a Judge, supra note 4, at 191. 
 351. Id. at 177. 
 352. FERREN, supra note 5, at 215. 
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